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Abstract
An exchange protocol describes a sequence of steps by which several entities are
capable of exchanging certain pieces of information in a particular context. Ratio-
nal–exchange protocols serve that core purpose with several important advantages
over the existing exchange paradigms, those referred to as fair–exchange solutions.
Traditional fair–exchange protocols impose strong restrictions on the protocol exe-
cution context. They ensure fairness to participants but at the expense of entities
such as TTPs (trusted third parties) having to be involved in the exchange. By con-
trast, rational schemes, although not ensuring fairness, assure that rational entities
would have no reason to deviate from the steps described in the protocol and, have
the enormous advantage of not needing the services of a TTP. Rational–exchange
protocols therefore represent the only viable option in many modern ad–hoc and
unstructured environments.
The main goal of this thesis is to apply concepts from Game Theory to both
the analysis and design of rational–exchange protocols. In our opinion, significant
contributions have been made in both directions:
• In terms of the formal analysis of these schemes, our work has focused on the
proposal of two extensions to an existing formalism. The viability and effec-
tiveness of our proposals is corroborated by the application of both formalisms
to the analysis and verification of several exchange schemes.
• With regard to the design of rational protocols, our approach is based on
applying heuristic search to automate the process, and to generate exchange
protocols which can be proven rational within an underlying game theoretical
framework.
Experimental work is carried out to illustrate the proposed methodology in
a particular three-entity exchanging scenario as well as in several randomized
environments. Different heuristic techniques are implemented and their results
compared, measuring success rates and the average number of protocols eval-
uated until an optimal solution is obtained. Furthermore, as a result of this
experimental work, a whole family of multi–party rational exchange protocols
is presented.

Resumen
Durante siglos el comportamiento racional de la especie humana ha sido extensa-
mente estudiado por filo´sofos, socio´logos, psico´logos, etc. Considerado siempre como
un concepto abstracto, a mediados del siglo veinte el desarrollo de la Teor´ıa de Jue-
gos proporciono´, por primera vez, un marco matema´tico para la definicio´n formal
del comportamiento racional de las entidades participantes de un juego. A partir de
entonces la Teor´ıa de Juegos se ha convertido en el modelo matema´tico que sustenta
importantes resultados en campos tan diversos como la Biolog´ıa, la Economı´a, la
Inteligencia Artificial o la Criptograf´ıa.
Este trabajo se encuentra englobado dentro del campo de la Criptograf´ıa Racional.
La Criptograf´ıa Racional nace de la aplicacio´n de los resultados teo´ricos sobre juegos
al campo de la Criptograf´ıa. Nielsen et al. en [Nielsen et al., 2007] establecen una
relacio´n de los avances ma´s significativos llevados a cabo hasta el momento en esta
a´rea de reciente creacio´n. En particular, especialmente relevantes para esta tesis
sera´n los trabajos de Syverson [Syverson, 1998] y Buttya´n et al. [Buttya´n, 2001]
centrados respectivamente en el disen˜o y ana´lisis formal de protocolos seguros de
intercambio racional.
0.1 Protocolos Criptogra´ficos
Un protocolo seguro o criptogra´fico consiste en una sucesio´n de instrucciones dadas
a un conjunto de entidades para llevar a cabo un cometido comu´n. Estos protocolos,
adema´s, verifican una serie de propiedades de seguridad que vienen definidas por el
objetivo concreto y el tipo de protocolo.
Ejemplos de protocolos seguros son los de distribucio´n de claves secretas, para
los que propiedades esenciales de seguridad son la confidencialidad y la integridad
de las claves distribuidas, o los protocolos seguros de intercambio justo.
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0.1.1 Protocolos Seguros de Intercambio Justo
Un protocolo seguro de intercambio justo describe una sucesio´n de pasos que han
de seguir un conjunto de entidades para el intercambio de un conjunto de tokens
de informacio´n, de tal manera que, ningu´n participante puede acabar el protocolo
de manera desventajosa, esto es, habiendo enviado su token y no habiendo recibido
nada a cambio. Adema´s, la seguridad ofrecida por este tipo de protocolos queda
garantizada incluso en entornos de ejecucio´n en los que los participantes puedan ser
agentes maliciosos.
Los protocolos seguros de intercambio justo son especialmente relevantes por
el gran nu´mero de instancias y aplicaciones en las que son utilizados hoy en d´ıa:
comercio electro´nico, firma digital de contratos, servicios de correo certificado, etc.
Sin embargo, existe una amplia clase de entornos en los que no pueden utilizarse.
La principal razo´n de este hecho se encuentra en un resultado formal de Pagnia
y Ga¨rtner [Pagnia and Ga¨rtner, 1999] que establece que todo protocolo seguro de
intercambio justo ha de involucrar a una entidad de confianza, llamada tercero de
confianza (Trusted Third Party o TTP), que sera´ la encargada de proteger a las
entidades honestas participantes del intercambio.
En este marco, redes y servicios electro´nicos ad-hoc sin infraestructuras preestable-
cidas, sistemas descentralizados, dispositivos mo´viles de baja capacidad computa-
cional, operaciones cr´ıticas de respuesta inmediata, etc., representan un reto desde
el punto de vista de la seguridad. Ma´s en concreto, es relevante la ausencia de ter-
ceros de confianza en cualquiera de los contextos anteriormente citados, que puedan
garantizar un intercambio justo en el que se apoyan muchas operaciones esenciales.
En este tipo de entornos, los protocolos seguros de intercambio racional representan
en la actualidad la opcio´n ma´s viable, ya que estas soluciones ofrecen la enorme
ventaja de no necesitar los servicios proporcionados por una TTP.
0.2 Protocolos Seguros de Intercambio Racional
Un protocolo seguro de intercambio racional dicta una serie de pasos a un conjunto
de entidades para que puedan intercambiarse una serie de tokens de informacio´n de
tal manera que, si bien el protocolo no asegura que entidades honestas no puedan
acabar en situacio´n desventajosa con respecto a sus oponentes, lo que s´ı garantiza
es que ninguna otra entidad obtendra´ beneficio de ello. Los protocolos racionales
operan sobre la premisa de que las entidades participantes sean racionales y tengan
como objetivo maximizar su propio beneficio. En este supuesto, si manifestar un
comportamiento malicioso con respecto a otros participantes no incrementa el ben-
eficio obtenido, las entidades racionales no tendra´n motivacio´n alguna en hacerlo.
Finalmente, cabe destacar que el primer y u´nico protocolo de intercambio racional
que se encuentra en la literatura es el protocolo de Syverson [Syverson, 1998]. Este
protocolo fue formalmente analizado por Buttya´n et al. utilizando un formalismo
basado en Teor´ıa de juegos [Buttya´n, 2001].
0.2.1 Ana´lisis Formal y Disen˜o de Protocolos Seguros de Intercam-
bio Racional
Distintos problemas son claramente identificados en cada una de estas a´reas.
Por un lado, en el a´rea del ana´lisis formal de protocolos seguros de intercambio
racional nos encontramos que:
• Existe tan so´lo un formalismo para el estudio formal de este tipo de protocolos
[Buttya´n, 2001] y, adema´s,
• El formalismo, basado en Teor´ıa de Juegos elemental, es muy ba´sico y limita su
capacidad al ana´lisis de esquemas muy sencillos en entornos muy controlados.
Por otro lado, en la parte del disen˜o de este tipo de soluciones encontramos que:
• Existe una ausencia total de metodolog´ıas para el disen˜o de este tipo de pro-
tocolos.
• Como resultado, existe una ausencia de propuestas y soluciones de intercambio
racional y, por u´ltimo,
• Son necesarios esquemas escalables que puedan dar solucio´n a problemas de
intercambio en entornos multiparte.
El trabajo realizado en esta tesis tiene por objetivo dar solucio´n a cada uno de
los puntos anteriores.
0.3 Contribuciones Principales
Esta tesis se encuentra dividida en dos partes claramente distinguibles.
Parte I: Ana´lisis Formal de Protocolos Seguros de Intercambio Racional
Las aportaciones originales en este campo son:
1. La extensio´n, basada en juegos de informacio´n imperfecta, del modelo de
ana´lisis de Buttya´n.
2. La extensio´n, basada en juegos de informacio´n incompleta o juegos bayesianos,
del modelo de ana´lisis de Buttya´n .
De ambos modelos podemos resaltar las siguientes caracter´ısticas:
1. Ambos formalismos suponen un avance en el estudio formal de los protocolos
de intercambio racional, proporcionando una herramienta de ana´lisis ma´s com-
pleta y precisa en la que se pueden capturar fa´cilmente variables del entorno
de ejecucio´n de un protocolo, como son la desconfianza entre los participantes,
la reputacio´n de los mismos o el estado de la red de conexiones.
2. Dentro del campo global del ana´lisis formal de protocolos resulta especial-
mente novedoso la representacio´n, que en las propuestas descritas en este tra-
bajo se hace, del comportamiento impredecible de un posible adversario, no
encontra´ndose este comportamiento en ningu´n caso predefinido o limitado.
3. Los modelos extendidos son escalables a cualquier nu´mero de participantes y
nu´mero de tokens de informacio´n que aquellos deseen intercambiarse.
4. Ambos modelos se han aplicado al ana´lisis formal del protocolo racional de
Syverson. Los resultados son manifiestamente significativos ya que difieren de
los obtenidos hasta ahora con el esquema de ana´lisis de Buttya´n.
5. Adema´s, se ha realizado un estudio formal basado en juegos bayesianos, de un
protocolo racional de intercambio de contenidos en una red peer to peer.
Parte II: Disen˜o Automatizado de Protocolos Seguros de Intercambio
Racional
En el campo del disen˜o de este tipo de protocolos podemos destacar las siguientes
aportaciones:
1. La definicio´n de una metodolog´ıa formal de disen˜o de protocolos seguros y
multiparte de intercambio racional.
2. La definicio´n de una taxonomı´a de problemas y protocolos multiparte de in-
tercambio racional. La taxonomı´a se basa en las posibles coaliciones entre
entidades participantes y en los programas de incentivos de los que puedan
formar parte.
3. La reduccio´n del problema de disen˜o de este tipo de protocolos a un problema
de optimizacio´n probabil´ıstica.
4. Por u´ltimo, el desarrollo e implementacio´n de una te´cnica, basada en una
bu´squeda heur´ıstica, para el disen˜o automatizado de protocolos multiparte
de intercambio racional. Los protocolos sintetizados segu´n estas te´cnicas son
0.3. Contribuciones Principales xvii
adema´s formalmente racionales, al existir para todos ellos una demostracio´n
formal de racionalidad basada en Teor´ıa de Juegos e integrada en el proceso
de s´ıntesis.
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Chapter 1
Motivation, Scope and
Objectives
This chapter serves to contextualize this thesis within the field of Rational
Cryptography, and more particularly within the areas of the design and analysis
of rational exchange security protocols.
For centuries, rationality in humankind has been extensively studied in areas of
Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology always considered as an abstract concept. In
the 1950’s Game Theory provided a mathematical formalism to explain and define
rational behavior and from then on it rapidly became the basis for theoretical models
in other areas such as Economics, Biology and Artificial Intelligence. By contrast,
relatively novel is the application of Game Theory and the concept of rationality to
the area of Cryptography and in particular, to the analysis and design of security
protocols.
1.1 Rational Cryptography
Rational Cryptography is the research area in which methodologies and techniques
of Game Theory are applied to Cryptography.
At the heart of Rational Cryptography is the re-definition of the concepts of
adversary and adversarial model. Traditionally, from a security point of view, an
entity or participant involved in any type of electronic operation was considered to be
either honest (behaving correctly) or dishonest, that is, intentionally and maliciously
deviating from the instructions given for the completion of the task. Furthermore, a
dishonest entity could have been motivated by the chances of attaining informational
advantage over their opponents or by simply causing damage to third parties. In this
context, Cryptography, as well as many other techniques, was deployed to protect
properly behaved parties from malicious agents.
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As this type of adversary could ultimately represent a worst-case attacker, heavy
and elaborated constructions were designed to offer honest participants enough
guarantees of security. Many of these operational schemes included trusted third
parties (TTP) that would monitor operations to detect malicious actions and finally
restore or compensate damage caused to honest participants. Although these
techniques have been very successful at securing electronic operations, a recurring
factor has always been high costs in terms of resources, time and the infrastructure
needed for deployment. Unfortunately, in some instances such heavy requirements
simply cannot be provided. Decentralized systems, light-weight devices with lower
computational power, speed critical operations, ad-hoc e-services and networks, etc.,
all represent a challenge from a security point of view, difficult to overcome with
the techniques and schemes currently available.
Rational Cryptography represents an alternative to some of the existing schemes
for some specific environments in which it is feasible to modify the adversary model
by introducing a new type of entity: a rational entity. Basically, rational agents aim
to maximize their own benefit. A rational entity will only perform a task if and when
it is in their own self-interest. Rational (self-interested) parties cannot be considered
honest and dishonest or, good and bad. Rational agents behave exclusively in line
with their expectations and objectives and, by being able to model these we will be
able to predetermine their conduct.
When considering a traditional worst-case adversary (also referred to as the
Dolev-Yao adversary model [Dolev and Yao, 1983]), the design of security schemes
had to be such that agents were unable to misbehave as the security mechanisms
would either prevent all possible deviations or detect (and therefore penalize) such
conducts. By contrast, when considering an adversarial model based on rational
entities, the designed schemes have to be such that entities do not misbehave on
the sole assumption that misbehaving does not render any benefit. Furthermore,
in the traditional adversarial model, entities had to be protected “externally” by
applying recovery procedures or recurring to third parties to ensure safety. In a
rational model, agents cannot react to attacks, they can only react to threats by
abandoning the scheme before putting themselves in disadvantageous situations.
Rational Cryptography can be seen as a trade-off of security for feasibility and
resource economization.
Adversarial models based on rationality can be composed of all rational entities
or, some mixed models have also been proposed where a fraction of the parties is
assumed to be rational and the rest assumed to collude and behave arbitrarily, even
against their own interests. In this thesis, we will only consider rational agents,
selfish and self-interested, aimed solely at maximizing their own returns.
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Rational Cryptography has already been applied to many common cryptographic
scenarios. A summary report can be found in [Nielsen et al., 2007]. These are some
of the applications:
• Auction protocols and techniques,
[Cramer et al., 2001, Bogetoft et al., 2006].
• Collaborative benchmarking and forecasting,
[Khetawat et al., 1997, Atallah et al., 2004].
• Exchange protocols,
[Syverson, 1998, Buttya´n, 2001].
• Fair division of goods,
[Lipton et al., 2004, Beza´kova´ and Dani, 2005].
• Function evaluation,
[Izmalkov et al., 2005].
• Multi–party computation,
[Abraham et al., 2006, Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos, 2006].
• Network Routing,
[Roughgarden and Tardos, 2000, Roughgarden, 2005].
• Polling,
[Ambainis et al., 2004, Moran and Naor, 2006].
• Secret sharing protocols,
[Halpern and Teague, 2004, Gordon and Katz, 2006].
In particular, some of the work in this thesis will focus on extending and
complementing the work in [Syverson, 1998] and [Buttya´n, 2001], applying Game
Theory results to the analysis of rational exchange protocols.
1.2 Cryptographic Protocols
Over recent years there have been an overwhelming amount of new security protocols
published at a variety of forums and conferences. Both fields, Analysis and Design
of security protocols have been of enormous interest and proliferation of ideas.
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In the next sections we will give a succinct overview of some of the most relevant
aspects regarding each one of these fields. This brief introduction will further assist
in contextualizing the contribution of our work.
1.2.1 Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
The definition of formal models to validate and verify cryptographic protocols has
been an area of intense development. Since the definition of the Dolev-Yao adversary
model [Dolev and Yao, 1983], many tools and techniques have been developed to
prove the correctness of a protocol. Informally, a security protocol is assumed to be
correct when it satisfies all its goals, requirements and, security properties. However,
correctness does not mean that the protocol offers protection against every possible
type of attack [Bicakci and Baykal, 2003]. In fact, to attack a security protocol, we
only need to step out of the set of restrictions imposed by the model used to verify
its properties [Dennin, 1999].
Tools to formally validate classic security requirements such as confidentiality,
authentication or integrity have been extensively studied. By contrast, the formal
analysis of more recently defined security properties such as fairness, non-repudiation
or timeliness, is still pending a global solution1.
Several issues pose an extra challenge to the already complex task of protocol
formal verification. Firstly, the constant emergence of new security properties and
secondly, that many of these requirements cannot be modeled and represented using
the formal tools and techniques currently available. Consider multi–party contract
signing protocols as an example of a new service difficult to formalize using any of
the old methods.
Different approaches have been considered when developing formal validation
methods: Abstract logics [Burrows et al., 1990, Syverson and van Oorschot, 1994b];
Communicating sequential processes language [Roscoe, 1995]; Inductive theorem
proving method [Paulson, 1998]; Game theoretical models
[Kremer and Raskin, 2000, Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2001, Buragohain et al., 2003];
Model checking [Lowe, 1997]; Process algebra [Abadi and Gordon, 1997]; State
exploring techniques [Meadows, 1991], etc. Furthermore, most of the tools have
been developed merging and combining several of those formalisms.
Moreover, the most powerful constraint to overcome when defining tools to
formally analyze security protocols is known as the Protocol Insecurity Problem and
has been the focus of study for decades. The protocol insecurity problem arises when
one tries to answer a simple but very relevant question: Is it possible to formally
decide whether a cryptographic protocol is secure or not?
1Section 1.2.2 provides a description for these and other common security properties.
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The global idea evolves around the following issue: if the analytical model used to
validate a given protocol imposes strong restrictions on entities and their capabilities
to interact, then it might be possible to formally prove that a protocol is secure
within such a controlled environment. On the other hand, relaxing the context in
which entities interact and analyzing more realistic scenarios makes the insecurity
problem harder and ultimately, undecidable. In this regard, important results have
been obtained and are summarized in the following statements:
1. Secrecy is an undecidable security property
[Durgin et al., 1999, Amadio et al., 2002, Delaune, 2006].
2. Protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of
the XOR operator [Chevalier et al., 2003].
3. The testing problem for multi–party protocols of the Dolev-Yao type is NP-
Hard [Even and Goldreich, 1983].
4. The protocol insecurity problem with finite number of sessions is NP-Complete
[Rusinowitch and Turuani, 2001].
1.2.2 Design of Cryptographic Protocols
It is not only the formal analysis of security protocols that has been a challenge to
researchers in recent years, but also the design and definition of such schemes.
Not all protocols serve the same purpose. The following list represents a small
sample of the type of services that security protocols provide. This is a list in
constant expansion as commercial and business driven organizations seek to satisfy
market demands.
List of Protocol Services
• Access control
• Entity authentication
• Auction and barter services
• Certified e-goods delivery
• Certified mail delivery
• Contract signing
• E-billing
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• E-commerce services
• E-lottery
• E-voting
• Session Key establishment schemes
• Etc.
Furthermore, each of the services that a security protocol provides is usually
accompanied by a wide set of desired properties and characteristics. These properties
are difficult to define but also, in many cases, their definition is not always consistent
throughout the literature. Some effort has gone into classifying them according
to different criteria (safety properties and liveliness properties [Lamport, 1977])
however, there still seems to be different understanding of which ones are the
required security properties for each kind of service. Finally, some of these properties
are optional and will be specific to a given kind of security service, while others are
essential and indispensable in all instances of a cryptographic protocol.
As an example, what follows is a list with the informal description of some of
the most common protocol security properties in alphabetical order.
List of Protocol Security Properties
• Abuse-free [Wang et al., 2005]: A protocol preserves the abuse-free property
when it is impossible for a single entity, at any point during the protocol
execution, to prove to an outside party, that she has the power to terminate
(abort) or successfully complete the protocol. Since many protocols give
participants the option to invoke aborting or recovery sub–protocols, a new
abuse-free property has recently been defined. A fair protocol is strongly abuse-
free if before the protocol ends, no party is able to prove to an outside party
that his/her opponent is participating in the protocol.
• Composability [Meadows, 2003a]: Usually, a protocol is executed at the same
time and in the same environment as many other protocols (simultaneous and
interleaving sessions). In these kind of scenarios it must be ensured that a
message or messages from one protocol could not be used to subvert other
protocols’ goals. That is, it is necessary to prove that no protocol in the
collection will accept a message sent by another protocol in the collection.
• Computational efficiency: The protocol must be efficient given the
computational and technological power of the different entities involved.
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• Correctness [Bicakci and Baykal, 2003, Meadows, 2003b]: Traditionally, a
protocol has been considered correct when, at completion time and under a
predetermined set of hypothesis, a number of specific goals have been achieved
such as, an entity being authenticated, a session key provided, or a message
being sent in a confidential way.
• Fairness [Kremer et al., 2002, Nenadic et al., 2004]: Typically, an exchange
protocol satisfies fairness when no participant can terminate the execution of
the protocol in a disadvantageous situation with respect to other participants
and, regarding the protocol exchanging goals. Several variants to this property
exist:
– Computational fairness
[Kremer, 2003]: A protocol is computationally fair when, at any point
during the protocol execution, if an entity quits early or misbehaves,
for every participant there is the same amount of computational work
involved in getting to an informational advantageous position.
– Probabilistic fairness [Kremer, 2003]: A protocol satisfies this
property when at any stage of the protocol, the probability of one of the
entities having informational advantage is at most ², a fixed predefined
parameter.
– Strong fairness [Franklin and Tsudik, 1998, Zhang et al., 2004]:
Strong fairness is ensured when no participant entity can gain any
informational advantage by quitting early or otherwise misbehaving
during the protocol execution.
– True fairness [Kremer et al., 2002]: True fairness is ensured when the
protocol provides strong fairness and, if the exchange is successful, the
non-repudiation evidences produced during the protocol are independent
from how the protocol is executed (with or without the involvement of a
trusted third party).
– Weak fairness [Franklin and Tsudik, 1998,
Kremer et al., 2002, Zhang et al., 2004]: Weak fairness is satisfied when
a participant entity could terminate the execution of the protocol in a
disadvantageous situation but at least, that entity can prove that other
parties have misbehaved.
• Message confidentiality: This property is satisfied when messages exchanged
during the protocol execution are such that no other entity, apart from the
intended recipient, is able to disclose the content of such messages.
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• Message integrity: This property is satisfied when messages exchanged during
the protocol execution are such that no attacker is able to modify the content
of such messages, without the intended recipient noticing the fraud.
• Non–repudiation evidence generation and key revocation scheme: Protocol
security also depends on good management and good design of non–
repudiation evidences. Deficiently designed non–repudiation evidences could
result in successful attacks on sound protocols [Alcaide et al., 2005]. Moreover,
it is necessary to be able to identify whether a signature, present in a non–
repudiation evidence, was generated before or after revocation.
• Non–repudiation of delivery [ISO/IEC13888-3:1997], [Kremer et al., 2002]:
Non–repudiation of delivery is intended to provide evidence that the
recipient/s received the message.
• Non–repudiation of origin [ISO/IEC13888-3:1997], [Kremer et al., 2002,
Onieva et al., 2003]: Non–repudiation of origin is intended to provide evidence
that an entity is the originator and the sender of a given message.
• Non–repudiation of submission [ISO/IEC13888-3:1997]: In
indirect communication a delivery agent is involved in transferring messages
from an originator to one or more recipients. Non–repudiation of submission
is intended to provide evidence that the originator submitted the message for
delivery.
• Protocol participant
confidentiality [Franklin and Tsudik, 1998, Kremer et al., 2002]: A security
protocol satisfies this property when one or more participants of the protocol
can be ensured confidential and anonymous participation.
• Robustness [Husdal, 2004]: Robustness means the ability to stay on course
and to accommodate unforeseen events.
• Secrecy [Durgin et al., 1999]: A protocol is considered to satisfy the secrecy
property when it ensures message confidentiality and integrity during
simultaneous and interleaving sessions of the same protocol.
• Timeliness [Kremer et al., 2002]: A protocol is considered to satisfy timeliness
when it satisfies some required security features during current execution and
during all future instances of the same protocol. In other words, the protocol
finishes for honest participants in a finite amount of time.
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• Viability [Kremer and Raskin, 2000]: A protocol is viable if honest
participants always succeed in exchanging the expected evidences.
• Etc.
Again, this is a list in constant expansion. Most frequently, the need to add
extra security features to existing schemes stems from the latest attacks and threats
on security services. In this regard, many authors have argued that only experience
and time can give us a clear picture of what is needed to design secure protocols
([Meadows, 1994, Dennin, 1999]).
1.3 The Fair Exchange Problem
When focusing on a specific type of cryptographic protocol other problems of similar
characteristics arise. For example, numerous cryptographic schemes are defined to
provide entities with a mechanism to exchange items in a fair manner. Definition
1.3.1 gives a formal definition of this type of protocol.
Definition 1.3.1 (Fair-exchange security protocol). A fair-exchange security
protocol is a cryptographic protocol allowing several parties to exchange commodities
in such a way that, even when one or more entities deviate from the protocol
description, none of the well-behaved entities will finish the protocol in a
disadvantageous situation, that is, having sent their items and not receiving the
appropriate items in return.
Interest in this class of protocol stems from its importance in many services
that rely on electronic transactions where disputes among parties can take place.
Examples of these include digital contract signing, certified e-mail, exchange of
digital goods and payment, etc. Moreover, assurance of fairness is fundamental
when the exchanged items include any kind of evidence of non–repudiation, for
this constitutes a key service in most of the previously mentioned applications. As
a result, fair non–repudiation has experienced an explosion of proposals in recent
years (see [Kremer et al., 2002] for an excellent survey).
Unfortunately, there is no established protocol by which a number of parties
can exchange items in a fair manner, exclusively by themselves, and assuming that
misbehaving parties participate in the protocol. Pagnia and Ga¨rtner provide a
formal treatment of this problem in [Pagnia and Ga¨rtner, 1999]. The underlying
idea can be intuitively sketched avoiding technical details: during the protocol
execution, eventually one of the parties has to go first in providing her item to
the other party. At that point, the first agent falls into in a unfair situation of
which a misbehaving party can take advantage.
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Therefore, the simplest protocol that can provide true fairness relies on the use
of a trusted third party. The role of the TTP varies from one class of fair-exchange
protocols to another according to its involvement. In schemes based on an in-line
TTP (e.g. [Bahreman and Tygar, 1994]), this acts as a delivery authority which
is involved in every message exchanged. The main drawback of these schemes is
the heavy reliance on the involvement of the TTP, which can typically become a
bottleneck. To avoid this inefficiency, some authors proposed the use of an on-line
TTP (e.g. [Abadi et al., 2002]). Here, the TTP is involved during each protocol
execution, but not necessarily in every message exchanged between parties. A third
step towards reducing the role of the TTP was the introduction of off-line TTPs (see
[Asokan et al., 1997, Asokan et al., 1998]). In these protocols –sometimes referred
to as optimistic fair exchange–, parties try to carry out the exchange by themselves,
and only appeal to the TTP in case of misbehavior of a dishonest party, or whenever
a failure occurs during the protocol execution.
However, as mentioned before, recent computing paradigms (for example, ad
hoc and peer–to–peer networks) pose a challenge from the point of view of the
security mechanisms that should be applied as in many cases, the operation of these
systems rely on a complete lack of fixed infrastructure. Generally, it is not realistic
to assume that services such as those provided by a TTP will be available in these
environments. In this context, the notion of rational exchange becomes especially
interesting as in particular, rational–exchange protocols have the main advantage of
not needing a trusted third party.
As for fair exchange protocols, the following formal definition will serve to unify
understanding of this type of protocol.
Definition 1.3.2 (Rational–exchange security protocol). A rational–exchange
security protocol is a cryptographic protocol allowing several parties to exchange
commodities in such a way that, if one or more parties deviate from the
protocol description, then they may bring other correctly behaving participants to
a disadvantageous situation, but they cannot gain any advantages in doing so.
In particular, this thesis will focus on the analysis and automated design of
rational–exchange protocols.
1.4 Heuristic Search
An heuristic search is concerned with the finding of optimal solutions to very difficult
problems. An heuristic approach is usually taken when deterministic algorithms
cannot produce an answer to a given problem, for example, if their running times
are non–polynomial or simply the number of inputs is so huge that a polynomial
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algorithm would take too long to deliver the appropriate solution. This is the
case in multi–party exchange scenarios, where the design space of cryptographic
exchange protocols grows exponentially as the number of participants or the number
of items increase. In these scenarios, an heuristic technique is sometimes able to
produce optimal solutions within feasible and tractable computational settings. In
fact, heuristic algorithms have already been successfully applied to the design of
cryptographic protocols.
Some of the work in this thesis will focus on the automated design (by means of
heuristic techniques) of rational–exchange security protocols.
1.5 Scope of Our Work
This thesis represents a contribution to the Rational Cryptography field. In
particular, our work will focus on the analysis and design of rational–exchange
cryptographic protocols. Some effort will go into extending and complementing the
work in [Syverson, 1998] and [Buttya´n, 2001], whilst other aspects will regard the
application of non–standard computation to the automated design of multi–party
rational–exchange cryptographic protocols.
We now explain in detail the objectives of this work.
1.6 Objectives
In the previous sections we have described what is a remarkably challenging scenario.
Globally, existing security schemes find it very difficult to satisfy the security
demands of heavily decentralized and structure–less computing frameworks.
Existing cryptography protocols cannot be applied to secure new computational
environments, usually due to a shortage of available resources. In particular, fair
exchange security protocols are in need of a replacement as the required presence of
a TTP and the services it provides cannot be guaranteed in these environments.
Moreover, not only the design of new schemes presents difficulties but also the
formal verification of these new protocols. Current formal analytical tools are of no
use to validate the new security properties defined in recent cryptographic solutions.
Finally, multi–party scenarios make the design space of cryptographic exchange
protocols grow exponentially to a scale difficult to explore through manual design
methodologies.
All in all, Rational Cryptography combined with heuristic search seem to provide
a suitable frame for the development of a different approach.
We have created this thesis within the framework just described and with very
clear objectives in mind.
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Objective 1:
To extend and enhance existing model based on Game Theory
([Buttya´n, 2001]), for the formal analysis of rational–exchange security protocols.
Game Theory has already been identified as a suitable tool for the formal analysis
of rational–exchange protocols ([Buttya´n, 2001]). In this work Buttya´n defines
a formal analytical model, based on Game Theory, for the analysis of rational–
exchange protocols. The formalism defines rationality in terms of the Nash equilibria
found in a game constructed from the protocol description. The study is sound and
correct but it is also limiting in terms of scalability and adaptability to the analysis
of rational–exchange protocols in different execution environments. In our opinion,
despite the effort made by Buttya´n and despite the similarities with fair exchange,
rational exchange still poses a challenge regarding its formal verification.
Our new formalism will extend Buttya´n et al.’s work in two main areas:
• It will allow for some protocol contextual information to be taken into
consideration to formally analyze a rational–exchange protocol. Factors such
as participant reputation, protocol robustness or network reliability, which are
usually determinant of the outcome of a rational–exchange protocol, will be
represented within the analytical framework.
• Additionally, the analytical model will not impose any restrictions on
participant’s capabilities to misbehave or deviate form a protocol description.
By contrast, the formalism will allow us to easily represent any participant
unpredictable behavior.
Two different Game Theory concepts will be applied to extend Buttya´n’s model:
• Games of imperfect information and Nash equilibrium perfect in sub-games.
• Games of incomplete information or Bayesian games and perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
Objective 2:
The definition of a new methodology to incorporate validation and
contextual information into the design of rational–exchange security protocols.
Some authors have already suggested integrating, in one single process, protocol
analysis and design ([Meadows, 2003b, Kremer, 2003]). In our opinion not only
analysis and design need to be compounded but also, the real scenarios where the
protocols are going to be implemented and executed. As experience has shown,
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a protocol cannot be safely taken out of a given environment and applied in a
completely different setting.
The new methodology that we propose will have the following characteristics:
• The definition of a set of linear structures will allow us to represent any given
exchange problem.
• Contextual information such us the capability of coalition between participants
in the execution environment and whether participant entities are part of an
incentive scheme, will be easily parameterized within such set of structures.
• Intrinsic to the design methodology will be a mathematical reasoning based on
Game Theory for the synthesis of provably rational–exchange cryptographic
protocols.
Objective 3:
The definition of a process based on heuristic techniques
for the automated design of multi–party rational–exchange security protocols.
The number of possible ways in which various entities can exchange a series of
items can grow exponentially as the number of items or the number of participants
increases. In this scenario, we will define a meta–heuristic search technique, for
the automated exploration of large rational protocol design spaces, far greater than
could be considered using manual design.
Our technique will offer the following features:
• The process will make use of the formalism described as Objective 2 to explore
the space of rational–exchange solutions for a given multi–party exchange
problem.
• The process will be highly scalable, versatile and it will be based on meta–
heuristic Simulated Annealing algorithm.
1.7 Organization
The document is divided in three parts.
1.7.1 Part I: Game Theoretical Analysis of Rational–Exchange
Protocols
Four chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5) constitute the second part of this thesis:
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Chapter 2: Syverson’s Rational–Exchange Protocol and Buttya´n et al.’s
Game–Theoretical Model
Buttya´n et al. introduced in [Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2004] a mathematical model
based on Game Theory under which rationality can be formally defined and
properties of rational–exchange protocols can be analyzed. As an example, the
model was used to analyze Syverson’s rational–exchange protocol [Syverson, 1998].
In this chapter we present and examine both, Buttya´n et al.’s model and Syverson’s
protocol. We also carry out a cryptanalysis of Syverson’s scheme and propose an
enhanced version.
Chapter 3: A Model based on Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information
In this chapter, we present a contribution consisting of extending Buttya´n et al.’s
model to capture relevant aspects involved in the execution of a rational–exchange
protocol. We base our extension on games of imperfect information.
Chapter 4: A Model based on Bayesian Games
In this chapter, a new extension to Buttya´n et al.’s work is described. This time,
our formalism is based on Bayesian games.
Chapter 5: Bayesian Analysis of a Secure P2P Content Distribution
Protocol
In this chapter we apply our model based on Bayesian games to the analysis of a
secure content P2P distribution protocol. The protocol is proven to be a rational
protocol for which it is possible to predict all possible outcomes.
1.7.2 Part II: Automated Design of Multi–party Rational–
Exchange Security (M–RES) Protocols
Three chapters (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) make up this part:
Chapter 6: Introduction to the Automated Synthesis of Cryptographic
Protocols
The aim of this chapter is to give the reader a basic understanding of what an
heuristic search technique is. Also in this chapter, we will briefly describe existing
work on applying heuristic search to the automated synthesis of security protocols.
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Chapter 7: Foundations for the Automated Synthesis of M–RES
Protocols
In this chapter, we describe the formal foundations for the automated synthesis of
multi–party rational–exchange security protocols (M–RES protocols). We define
the appropriate structures to describe any given multi–party exchange problem in
need of a rational solution. Furthermore, a taxonomy is provided which will help in
identifying the type of problem we are encountering and, what type of solution the
synthesis process is going to produce.
Chapter 8: Heuristic Synthesis of v–RES Protocols
This chapter serves to apply the formalism described in Chapter 7 to the
parametrization of a particular three entity rational exchange problem. We also
define an heuristic search technique, based on Simulated Annealing, for the synthesis
of rational–exchange solutions. Finally, we provide the formal analysis of a family of
M–RES protocols. The analysis is based on Game Theory using the formal model
described in Part I.
Chapter 9: Solving More Complex Problems
In this chapter we apply the techniques and automated tools for the synthesis
of M–RES solutions for more complex exchanging problems. As a result of the
experimentation a series of rational solutions are presented, which serve to give
solution to several multi–party randomized exchange problems. For all these
protocols a formal proof of rationality exists, based on Game Theoretical concepts.
1.7.3 Part III: List of Contributions, Conclusions and Future Work
Chapter 10: Summary and List of Contributions
In this chapter we present a summary of the main contributions obtained in the
process of developing this thesis, a summary of the main conclusions and open issues
and future work in relation to all previous chapters. Finally, the author presents a
list of publications containing parts of this thesis.
Appendix A: Principles on Game Theory
This appendix offers a basic introduction to Game Theory principles.
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Part I
Game Theoretical Analysis of
Rational–Exchange Protocols

Chapter 2
Syverson’s Rational–Exchange
Protocol and Buttya´n et al.’s
Game–Theoretical Model
2.1 Introduction
In 1998, P. Syverson introduced the idea of rational exchange as an alternative
to fair exchange for those scenarios where the use of a TTP (trusted third party)
is not allowed or not feasible ([Syverson, 1998]). Informally, a rational–exchange
protocol cannot provide fairness but it ensures that rational (i.e. self-interested)
parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol, as misbehaving does not
result beneficial.
Moreover, in 2001 Buttya´n et al. identified Game Theory principles as
a powerful and suitable tool to formalize rationality in exchange protocols, in
particular in Syverson’s rational–exchange protocol ([Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2001],
[Buttya´n, 2001]).
In this chapter, we will describe Syverson’s scheme and introduce Buttya´n
et al.’s analytical model. We will detail how the model was applied to analyze
Syverson’s protocol highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of such a formalism.
Besides, the protocol, as it was first described by its author, presents some significant
vulnerabilities and several attacks can be successfully mounted against the scheme,
showing how protocol participants can end up in undesired situations. In the next
sections, we will describe the aforementioned attacks and suggest how to fix the
scheme. Finally, a formal verification of the enhanced version will be specified using
BAN logic as a formal tool ([Burrows et al., 1990]).
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2.1.1 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we introduce Syverson’s
scheme and Buttya´n et al.’s model respectively. In Section 2.4, we describe some
flaws present in the protocol and describe how they can be exploited to mount three
different attacks. Section 2.4.5 is devoted to explain how the protocol can be fixed
in order to eliminate previous vulnerabilities. Section 2.5 serves to present some
concepts used to give formal proof of the enhanced scheme. Section 2.6 describes
weaknesses and limitations of the formal model defined by Buttya´n et al. Finally,
we conclude the chapter with Sections 2.7 and 2.8 in which we briefly describe some
results on the complexity of Nash equilibria computation and, summarize the main
conclusions of this chapter, respectively.
2.2 Syverson’s Protocol Description
The scheme presented by Syverson in 1998 is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. It consists
of three messages exchanged between two different entities. Next are the main
components and the adopted notation:
• A and B denote the two protocol parties, with private keys k−1A and k−1B ,
respectively.
• We assume that itemA and itemB are the items to be exchanged, being
descitemA a description of itemA. (There is no equivalent description for itemB
because the scheme was introduced to serve as a payment protocol, in such a
way that itemB has the role of the payment for buying itemA).
• Moreover, Ek(m) is a symmetric encryption algorithm that encrypts message
m with key k.
• Likewise, sig(k−1i ,m) provides a digital signature on m using private key k−1i .
All messages exchanged are cryptographically signed by the corresponding
sender.
• Finally, w(·) is a WSBC (Weakly Secret Bit Commitment) function
[Syverson, 1998]. For our analysis, it suffices to know that w(x) keeps x secret,
but it can be broken in acceptable bounds on time with reasonable resources.
In step one of the protocol, A sends B itemA in a encrypted form. Next, B
sends A itemB in return, along with acknowledgement of the first message. Finally,
A sends the appropriate key k and acknowledgement of the second message.
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A→ B : m1 = (descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k), σ1)
B → A : m2 = (itemB,m1, σ2)
A→ B : m3 = (k,m2, σ3)
where:
σ1 = sig(k−1A , (descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k)))
σ2 = sig(k−1B , (itemB,m1))
σ3 = sig(k−1A , (k,m2))
Figure 2.1: Syverson’s rational–exchange protocol.
We now proceed to analyze some aspects of the protocol just described. These
will help in understanding the type of scenarios where the protocol is suitable to
use, as Syverson’s protocol is not always appropriate.
• Note that after message m1, B cannot access encrypted itemA unless it first
accesses the encryption key k. For this, B would need to break w(k).
• Therefore, B can only disclose the encrypted itemA if m2 has been sent (this
is, payment has gone through) and A has responded with message m3. As a
result, A could send a forged itemA and still receive payment in return.
• Also note that, at step three, A might fail to send message m3 or she might
not send it for a long time.
The first deterrent againstA delaying sending messagem3 is thatA gains nothing
by doing so, except a bad reputation that could ruin her business. In the case of A
sending B the wrong itemA, B holds message m3 as a proof of such misbehavior.
However, an important issue arises from both of the previous statements: during the
protocol execution both participants must exchange irrevocable evidences to be able
to prove each other’s misbehavior. For example, an scheme on entity A’s reputation
can only be implemented when it is not possible for B to accuse A of misbehaving if
A was honest, and vice versa. A fourth message could be added in which customer
B acknowledges timely receipt for message m3. Likewise, for B to be able to prove
in front of an external judge that A sent an invalid itemA, B must hold irrevocable
proof of such a message.
Given the observations above, the author of the protocol identifies scenarios
where the scheme could be used for:
1. If the vendor A is selling relatively low value items, so it is not worth it for
the customer (in terms of computational cost or the inconvenience of delay)
to break the encryption to recover the item;
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2. The vendor A might be selling something that might be of timely and
diminishing value, such as short term investment advice or regularly changing
lists of bargain items for sale; or
3. The protocol might begin one step earlier with a signed customer request for
itemA. The vendor A can then take the chance of trading with unknown
customers and refuse to service customers who repeatedly fail to pay.
2.3 Buttya´n et al.’s Formal Model
Syverson’s rational–exchange protocol was analyzed by Buttya´n et al. in
[Buttya´n, 2001]. For readability and completeness, we first provide a
summary of the game–theoretical model proposed by Buttya´n et al. Please
refer to [Buttya´n, 2001], [Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2001], [Buttya´n et al., 2002] and
[Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2004] for further details.
Where possible, we have adopted the same notation. Also at this point, the
reader should already be familiar with some of the concepts in Game Theory
provided in Sections A.1 and A.4.
2.3.1 Protocol Games
Buttya´n et al. introduced the concept of protocol game as a way to represent
an exchange protocol. The protocol game of an exchange protocol is intended to
model all possible interactions of the protocol participants, even the potentially
misbehaving actions (i.e., those different from the ones prescribed by the protocol).
A protocol game is constructed from the protocol description as follows:
• Each of the parties involved in the protocol, including the network, becomes a
player of the protocol game. A different set of strategies is associated to each
different player.
From this point onwards and throughout this document, we will refer to
protocol participants and players indistinctly.
• The network is considered to be reliable, which means that it correctly delivers
messages to their intended destinations within a constant time interval.
Therefore, the network has only one fixed strategy consisting of delivering
messages to players.
• The rest of the participants have the strategies to quit, do nothing, send
a message following the steps described in the protocol or send a message
deviating from the protocol description.
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• Each player can send messages which have been defined as compatible with the
protocol, this is, messages which are within the context of the protocol. The
setMpi of messages compatible with a protocol pi is formally defined within the
model. Although the participants can alter the order in which those messages
are sent, the model does not allow the protocol parties to run multiple instances
of the protocol in parallel (i.e., they do not consider interleaving attacks).
Furthermore, neither eavesdropping nor message manipulation are considered
in the model.
• Information sets for players (information available to players at each step in
the protocol game) are defined in terms of their local state. Buttya´n et al.
formally define both, the structure of such sets as well as the way they are
updated according to the actions observed during the game. These sets are
defined as singletons, so all protocol games constructed following Buttya´n et
al.’s formalism are of perfect information.
• Finally, a payoff function yi(·), is established for every player. In particular,
the model considers two players P1 and P2 and two items to be exchanged
denoted by γP1 and γP2 . What γP1 is worth to P1 and P2 is denoted by u
−
P1
and u+P2 , respectively. Likewise, what γP2 is worth to P1 and P2 is denoted by
u+P1 and u
−
P2
, respectively. In this way, the values u+i and u
−
i can be viewed as
the potential gain and loss of player i ∈ {P1, P2} in the game.
When the protocol game is over, every participant can assess the profit or the
loss they have incurred by using this payoff function. The function takes the
local state of every participant at the time the game is over and calculates
an outcome value (the highest profit represents the most preferable protocol
outcome). Buttya´n et al. introduce this concept in their model as follows.
Given a terminal sequence of actions q, the payoff function for player i is
defined as yi(q) = y+i (q) − y−i (q), where functions y+i (q) and y−i (q) represent
the gain and the loss player i has incurred, respectively. In general, these
functions can be defined as follows:
y⊕i (q) =
{
u⊕i if φ
⊕
i (q) = true
0 otherwise
(2.1)
where ⊕ ∈ {+,−}. The purpose of boolean functions φ⊕i (q) is to capture
those conditions under which each partner gains/losses control over the items.
Thus, φ+i (q) = true⇔ player i gains access to γj (i 6= j), and φ−i (q) = true⇔
player i losses control over γi, where i, j ∈ {P1, P2}.
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2.3.2 Security Properties
Informally, a two–party rational–exchange protocol is an exchange protocol in which
both parties are motivated to follow the protocol faithfully as misbehaving does not
result beneficial. If one of the parties deviates from the protocol, then she may bring
the other correctly behaving party to a disadvantageous situation, but she cannot
gain any advantages in doing so.
Buttya´n et al. define the concept of rationality in terms of a Nash equilibrium of
the protocol game. It is required that the strategies that correspond to the behavior
described by the protocol form a Nash equilibrium of the protocol game and that
no other Nash equilibrium is strongly preferable by any other participant.
Other properties such as fairness, effectiveness, termination, gains closed, and
safe back–out are also formally defined within the model. In particular, the proof
of the protocol rationality relies on the fact that the protocol must be:
• Closed for gains: The closed for gains property is satisfied when for every
possible outcome of the game q, it holds that y+A(q) > 0 ⇒ y−B(q) > 0 and
y+B(q) > 0 ⇒ y−A(q) > 0. Put simply, this property establishes that if a party
A gains access to an item belonging to the other party B, then B must lose
control over the same item and vice versa.
• It must also satisfy the safe back–out property: The safe back–out property is
satisfied when for every possible sequence of actions q, if party A’s strategy was
always quit, then A loses nothing by following sych a strategy (i.e. y−A(q) = 0).
In the same way, if B’s strategy is to always quit, then y−B(q) = 0.
In our opinion the model is consistent and correct, even though, as we will see,
it is easy to step out of it and break that way the rationality property. It is also
possible to break the closed for gains property to attack rationality.
2.3.3 Syverson’s Protocol within Buttya´n et al.’s Model
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The protocol game derived by Buttya´n et al. from Syverson’protocol description
is shown in Fig. 2.2. The protocol game is represented in extensive–form (i.e. a
tree) showing all possible moves each participant can make and all the different
outcomes.
The vectors assigned to each terminal node represent the values of the payoff
function (also called utility function) for A (first value) and B (second value) when
A and B follow the path of strategies to finish the protocol at that end. The payoff
function for each participant can take different values defined by Buttya´n et al. as
follows: u+A and u
+
B reference how much itemB and itemA are worth to parties A
and B respectively. In a similar way, the values u−A and u
−
B denote the values that
itemA and itemB are worth to A and B, respectively.
The total payoff values assigned at each terminal node are computed as follows:
• Entity A obtains a positive value u+A in all tree branches in which entity A
gains access to itemB. By contrast, entity A obtains a negative value u−A if
along the branch, A losses control over message m1 .
• The value of FA represents the penalty A has to pay when sending a forged
message m1 (denoted as garbage m1). Although entity B can end the protocol
holding a fake itemA and, this could only be discovered at step three of
the game (once payment has gone through), penalty FA serves to deter such
malicious behavior.
• In a similar way, entity B obtains a positive value u+B(r) in all tree branches in
which entity B gains access to itemA. Factor r specifies the round number in
the game. Moreover, entity B obtains a negative value u−B if along the path,
B losses control of message m2.
• Besides, the payoff values are defined to satisfy the following relations: u−A <
u+A < FA and u
−
B < u
+
B(r).
• Finally, there is not penalty for entity B’s misbehavior as this can be detected
by entity A at execution time. In this case, entity A would quit the protocol
which does not result beneficial for entity B.
Buttya´n et al. established that the path in tree which would result in an exchange
of items itemA and itemB constitutes a Nash Equilibrium so, by definition, neither
of the players would want to deviate from it. Therefore, any two rational parties
following Syverson’s protocol description would terminate the protocol having
exchanged their items.
In this regard, Buttya´n’s model serves to:
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1. Formally define rationality, and
2. Prove that Syverson’s protocol is a rational–exchange protocol.
2.4 Cryptanalysis of Syverson’s Protocol
In this section we will show how Syverson’s protocol, as originally described by its
author, presents some vulnerabilities not detected by Buttya´n et al.’s formalism and
how some attacks on the scheme can be successfully mounted. Additionally, at the
end of this section we will provide an enhancement to the original protocol which
we will formally prove correct in a subsequent analysis.
2.4.1 Observations
All messages involved in the protocol are cryptographically signed (see Fig. 2.1).
Since such cryptographic algorithms are assumed to be unbreakable, the primary
focus for attackers or penetrators is on the possibility to reuse messages, even
when they are not able to read them or to produce them by themselves. By
replaying old messages, dishonest parties can impersonate other entities, mislead
other participant’s actions or obtain confidential information. We will see how it is
possible in some instances, to reuse messages during a Syverson’s protocol execution.
The following observations will help in the understanding of the overall
cryptanalysis:
1. Message m1 could be used as a proof of A’s misbehavior. Indeed, due to the
nature of w(k), if A randomly generates a ciphertext ² to include in m1, A
can be penalized whenever the commitment w(k) is broken and k disclosed.
Therefore, this kind of misbehavior can always be proven to a judge. In this
regard and from B’s point of view, the protocol provides a sort of weak fairness.
However, also note that m1 ensures B that A is the author of such a message,
but it does not guarantee that A is also the sender of such a message. It is not
until step 3 of the protocol that B holds a valid NRO (Non–Repudiation of
Origin) token for itemA. Therefore, message m1 could be used to prove that
A once generated a forged message, but m1 cannot be used to prove that A is
actually the sender of such a message in the current instance of the protocol.
2. Message m2 could serve as a NRR (Non–Repudiation of Receipt) token for
message m1 as well as a NRO of itemB. B’s signature on message m2 ensures
A that B received itemA and that B has proceeded with the sending of itemB.
Messagem2 could always be used as a proof of B’s misbehavior in the protocol.
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3. Message m3 could serve as a NRR token for message m2 as well as a NRO of
itemA. A’s signature on message m3 ensures B that A received itemB and
that A has generated and sent m1 with the correct key. Message m3 could
always be used as a proof of A’s misbehavior in the protocol. A might not
send the third message, or not do it for a long time, but A gains nothing by
doing that apart from a poor reputation that could damage her business. The
context in which to execute this protocol should then be a regularly repeated
scenario.
The protocol, therefore, when rationally executed could provide rational
exchange of non–repudiation evidences. However, the non–repudiation evidences
would have to be linked to each particular protocol run to serve the purposes of
non–repudiation in future disputes. Since A is asked to generate a fresh key k for
each run of the protocol, k could be the unique label to reference each different
protocol run and the corresponding evidences. In particular, notice how, although
it is possible to determine whether m2 and m3 are fresh, this is not the case for m1
unless some enhancements are made.
Next, we describe three possible attacks on the original scheme that illustrate
the aforementioned observations and which motivated us to propose an enhanced
version of the protocol.
2.4.2 Attack 1
Consider the following scenario, where P (Q) means that party P acts impersonating
the role of party Q:
A → B : m1 = (descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k), σ1)
B(A) → C : m1 = (descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k), σ1)
C → B(A) : m2 = (itemC ,m1, σ2)
This attack is based on B impersonating A, sending the same message m1 to C
and receiving itemC in return. B would have to quit the protocol after receiving
the payment as she has no key to send to C. Although C has paid a full price for
itemA, by the time that k is disclosed to C, itemA would be of very little value to C.
The customer C could only present message m1 to prove A misbehaved. However,
A will claim that m1 was never intended for C and that she was not part of such
a communication. Indeed, there is nothing in m1 linking A and C as participants
on the same protocol run. To overcome this attack, new restrictions would have to
be placed over the communicating network or amendments should be made to the
structure of m1.
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2.4.3 Attack 2
Let us suppose the following simplistic scenario: A is selling an access code to
enable the viewing of a football match on a private television network. Let us
suppose that A and B carried out a successful Syverson’s protocol execution and
that they properly exchanged the encrypted access code Ek(itemA), itemB and the
corresponding key k in messages m11, m12, and m13, respectively. The access code
that B has bought from A is obviously of timely diminishing value, but B could still
have time to impersonate A and sell the access code to other customers, receiving
payment in return:
B(A) → C : m21 = m11 = (descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k), σA)
C → B(A) : m22 = (paymentC ,m21, σC)
B(A) → C : m23 = m13 = (k,m12, σA)
In this scenario, by the time C receives message three and realizes that there is a
fraud going on, C has no evidence of such a fraud to present in front of a judge and
has got the key k to decrypt the football match access code and watch the match.
However, A could claim that C is watching a program without a license and take
action against her. If the number of reselling codes is large, the scale of the fraud
would make it impractical to pursue each of the individuals watching the match
without license. Furthermore, trying to trail back the origin of such messages would
be practically impossible. Again, the nature of the communicating network would
have to change or the content of the first message amended.
2.4.4 Attack 3
If a vendor sends the customer a message m1 containing garbage (i.e, a ciphertext
which does not correspond with the actual itemA), the vendor is indeed providing the
customer with evidence of such a form of cheating. Message m1 could be presented
to a judge and the vendor would be charged with the appropriate penalty. Such
a penalty could greatly exceed the value of the goods, so the vendor is completely
discouraged from performing such a scheme. However, the vendor could not be sued
and penalized twice for the same offence and, on these terms, a vendor A could carry
on sending the forged message m1 to many others customers, receiving payments in
return. These new angry customers would only have message m1 to blame vendor
A. Vendor A would claim that she never sent m1 to them and that they must have
got it from the first resentful customer. As a matter of fact, there will be nothing in
m1 to prove that A is using the same forged message all over again. A’s reputation
would therefore stay untouched.
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2.4.5 Fixing the Protocol
Even though the replay attacks one to three described in the previous section
correspond to simple deviations from the protocol description, they represent real
threats to parties using the scheme to exchange their items. In e-commerce
transactions, neither vendor A nor customer B would want to take the risk of being
cheated.
However, previous weaknesses can be avoided if a better cryptographic evidence
is constructed. This can be done in many ways. Probably the easiest one is just
by including the identity of B in m1, thus linking the message with its intended
receiver. Since A is asked to generate a fresh key k for each protocol run, the tuple
(k,A,B)1 could be the unique label to associate each m1 with the corresponding
protocol execution:
A→ B : m1 = (B, descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k), σ1) (2.2)
where:
σ1 = sig(k−1A , (B, descitemA , Ek(itemA), w(k))) (2.3)
Note how this modification suffices to prevent attacks one to three. Now, in
attack one, an entity C would have sent a payment to a false entity A. With the
new structure of message m1, C would know that m1 is newly formulated by A
(since A is asked to create a fresh key k for each instance of the protocol) and that
C is the intended recipient. Therefore, A could not claim that it was not part of
the protocol run.
In a similar way, this also prevents attack two, for entity B can establish whether
the other participant is able to provide key k in the last message of the protocol.
Attack three is also easy to prevent, as entity B can tell if the message is an old
message that entity A is trying to replay in a new protocol run.
Next is the formalization of all concepts described in this section.
2.5 Formal Analysis of the Enhanced Version
Proof of our new scheme’s correctness will be based on establishing the freshness of
messages m1, m2, and m3. Therefore, any type of replay attack with messages from
outside the current execution (old replayed messages) will automatically be rejected,
in particular attacks one to three. Interleaving attacks (a type of replay attack
occurring when two instances of the same protocol are running simultaneously) are
not being considered in our analysis as Syverson’s protocol participants are assumed
1We assume that A’s identity is implicit in m1, since the message contains A’s signature.
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to run only one instance of the protocol at the time. No other form of attack is
considered, as messages one to three are digitally signed by algorithms which are
assumed to be cryptographically secure.
Below, only those steps of the formal process which are relevant to our
enhancement are explicitly shown. Notice how this formal proof could not have been
performed on the original protocol as freshness of message m1 was not guaranteed.
2.5.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce some concepts that will be used throughout our
analysis of the scheme proposed by Syverson. In particular, we will outline a well
known formalism used to analyze security protocols (BAN logic) and we will use it
to clarify the protocol’s main security properties.
A Brief Overview of BAN Logic
Burrows, Abadi and Needham made a significant effort in 1989 defining a logic for
the analysis of security protocols [Burrows et al., 1990]. BAN logic is a logic of
beliefs. An inference process develops from a set of initial beliefs to a set of final
goals for each protocol participant. Inference rules are defined as part of the logic.
Next, we introduce a few concepts and two of the BAN logic inference rules,
which will be enough for the proofs presented in this chapter.
• BAN Notation:
– ](M) : Formula M is fresh, that is, M has not been sent in a message at
any time before the current run of the protocol.
– P |≡M : Entity P believes M , i.e.: P may act as if M is true.
– P |∼M : P once said M .
• BAN Inference Rules:
1. Freshness Verification Rule (FVR): This rule expresses that if a message
is fresh, then the originator of such a message still believes in it:
P |≡ ](M), P |≡Q |∼M
P |≡Q |≡M (2.4)
2. Encrypted Freshness Verification Rule (EFVR): If a message or part of a
message is known to be fresh, then the encrypted message must also be
fresh.
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](M)
]({M}K)
(2.5)
Given an entity P and a messageM , the statement “P said M” (P |∼M) implies
entity P having said or sent message M at some point in the past. By contrast, the
statement “P believes M” (P |≡M) implies entity P to have said or sent M during
the current protocol execution –typically taken from the initial point of the protocol
run–, so M is fresh and A still believes in M . This distinction is crucial for our
analysis.
2.5.2 Freshness of Messages and Replay Attacks
Replay attacks consist of the capture of a message –or a piece of a message– that is
used at a later time, and probably with a different semantics. Freshness of messages
is a common and relevant element in security-related protocols, in particular because
of its importance as a mechanism to prevent replay attacks. Within the context
of a protocol, freshness of a message will guarantee such a message belongs to
that specific protocol instance and that it has never been used before in any other
instances.
Linking a message to a particular protocol run is commonly obtained by
the use of Timestamps in messages and Timestamping Certification Authorities.
Other methods are also implemented, as the use of nonces (randomly
created identifiers generated fresh by a participant for each protocol instance
[Needham and Schroeder, 1978]), counter values, numbers provided by synchronized
pseudo-random number generators, or fresh encryption. See [Gong, 1993] for a
detailed description of each of them. However, message replay can take place in
many different forms (see [Syverson, 1994] for a full classification and taxonomy)
and usually more than one of these mechanisms has to be implemented to prevent
the protocol from one or another form of replay attack. Freshness of messages is
therefore a difficult and very important matter. In any given protocol, the recipient
entity of any message should be able to determine whether the message received
is fresh. Particularly, our cryptanalysis of Syverson’s protocol is based on the
impossibility for entity B to determine freshness of message m1.
Freshness of m1
When entityB receivesm1, B knowsA’s public key and is able to verifyA’s signature
on m1. Once B verifies the signature, B can be sure that the originator of that
message was entity A. In BAN logic notation, we would express:
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B |≡A |∼m1 (2.6)
Furthermore, B can see their name as part of the message so B is convinced she is
the intended recipient. The item descitemA serves B to identifym1 as unique. Entity
A has signed a message where itemA has been encrypted and B is the intended
recipient. Entity B believes this message could not have been used in any other
instances of the protocol of which she was not part. Therefore, the combined tuple
(B, descitemA), which is part of message m1, is fresh: B |≡ ](B, descitemA). Then,
the following formula can be inferred applying the EFVR:
B |≡ ](m1) (2.7)
Note that if B was buying the same itemA twice, then entity B would have
to verify that the two message components, B and Ek(itemA), were never bound
together in any of the previous instances. Recall that entity A is forced to generate
a new key k for each new run.
Therefore, in any given case, applying FVR to formulæ (2.6) and (2.7) we obtain:
B |≡A |≡m1 (2.8)
which ensures freshness of m1.
Freshness of m2
When entityA receivesm2, A knowsB’s public key and is able to verifyB’s signature
on m2. Once A verifies the signature, A can be sure that the originator of that
message was entity B. In BAN logic notation we would express:
A |≡B |∼m2 (2.9)
Moreover, A can see message m1 as part of message m2. Entity A generated
m1 as step one of the protocol so A believes m2 is fresh as it could not have been
generated in any other previous instances of the protocol. In BAN logic notation
we have:
A |≡ ](m2) (2.10)
Now, applying FVR to formulæ (2.9) and (2.10), we obtain a proof of freshness
for m2:
A |≡B |≡m2 (2.11)
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Freshness of m3
This part of the formal verification is exactly the same as for the freshness of message
m2. Therefore, mirroring the previous steps, we can conclude that m3 is also fresh:
B |≡A |≡m3 (2.12)
2.6 Weaknesses of Buttya´n et al.’s Model
In our opinion, Buttya´n et al.’s model presents as major contribution the
identification of Game Theory as an appropriate framework in which rational–
exchange protocols can be formally analyzed. However, we are able to identify
a few drawbacks in its definition which lead to a very restricted model.
In the following sections, we will briefly describe in more detail some of those
limitations. The first two observations in Section 2.6.1 are related to the way
participant actions and behavior are modeled, i.e. the computational model
according to which messages are analyzed. Furthermore, in Section 2.6.2 we find
basic Game Theory as a too narrow formalism for real-world protocols. In particular,
we strongly believe that uncertainty plays a major role in rational exchange and,
therefore, it should be somehow incorporated into the reasoning model.
2.6.1 Flaws in Local Computations and History Records
In Section 2.4, we described a number of vulnerabilities in Syverson’s protocol
allowing several attacks against the scheme. The reason why these flaws were
not detected by Buttya´n et al.’s analysis is not related to the reasoning model
itself (i.e. Game Theory), but to a inherent hypothesis: the model assumes that
messages are well constructed from a security point of view. In other words, in
the process of formalizing participant local actions, the logic applied is limited to
message compatibility and not message content. We further elaborate on this topic
in what follows.
In Buttya´n et al.’s model, an exchange protocol is considered to describe a set
of local computations Πj , one for each participant j of the protocol. Typically,
each program Πj contains instructions to wait for messages that satisfy certain
conditions or to generate events such as to send a message m to a given participant
p. In particular, when the program ΠB is described for entity B, no test is defined
to determine whether m1 is an old message being reused. In this regard, the model
assumes that evidences are fresh and well constructed, thus failing to reflect the
actual content of message m1 as it is described in the protocol. This erroneous
assumption is subsequently reflected in the protocol game. The result is that
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the formal notation and structures used do not allow entities to verify essential
properties such as freshness of a message, originator, sender or intended receiver.
Furthermore, it is specified that each player creates a history record of all the
events that were generated by her and the round number of their generation.
Possible entries in the history record file of protocol participant A would be
send(m1, B) or rcv(m2), in round r. Based on the entries stored in this record, each
player is either allowed or not allowed to send a particular compatible message. For
instance, a valid digital signature sig(k−1A ,m) can only be generated byA. Therefore,
B can send a message containing sig(k−1A ,m) iff B received a message containing
sig(k−1A ,m) earlier in the current protocol execution.
As the model was defined, this history record is newly created for each
protocol run, so information received in previous runs is discarded at the end of
each execution. However, any (malicious) participant of the protocol could have
compatible messages from previous runs and will be able to use them, as they are
perfectly compatible with the protocol. In particular, attacks 1 and 2 described in
Section 2.4 are based on the use of evidences obtained in different protocol runs.
Summarizing, in this first section we have identified two aspects of the model
which can induce to erroneous protocol analysis.
• First, the construction of the protocol game must take into account the fact
that messages could not be well constructed. For this, a number of additional
tests on messages have to be carried out, beyond those aimed at ensuring
compatibility with the current protocol round.
• Second, these security checks must include messages received in previous runs,
and not only those corresponding to the current protocol execution.
However, improving the model with respect to the above aspects is out of the
scope of this thesis. For our purposes, we will use the corrected version of Syverson’s
protocol described in Section 2.4.5.
Other aspects represent further limitations to the formalism presented by
Buttya´n et al. These are related to the lack of expressiveness of some of the formal
parameters defined in the model and are described in the next section.
2.6.2 Limitations in Expressiveness
A fundamental aspect that remains unaddressed by Buttya´n et al.’s analytical model
is the lack of expressiveness when dealing with uncertainty, especially to model
contextual information. Due to their very nature, uncertainty plays a major role
in rational protocols. Not in vain, it has been stated in several occasions that the
context in which the protocol is to be executed should be carefully checked. Roughly,
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this means that some environmental factors, such as how much we trust other(s)
participant(s) or the degree of reliability of the network, should be in some way
incorporated into the security analysis.
Example 1
To illustrate this idea, consider the following example. As we can see in Fig. 2.2, A
is not motivated to be fair to B in the last round of the protocol. Therefore, A could
threaten B to execute quitA or to delay sending m3 to B. Then, B would be safer
quitting the protocol before round 2 and aborting the exchange. The best response
that A can give to B’s quit strategy is to quit as well. Therefore s∗ = (quitA, quitB)
is also a Nash equilibrium of the protocol game of the model, which could be the
most preferable protocol outcome under threatening situations.
In order to resolve this issue, A could have an incentive to be fair to B in the last
round of the protocol. This incentive may be a kind of “reputation factor”, securely
managed by external parties, publicly known and which would have an effect on
entity A’s payoff function.
At a more practical level, suppose that, in the past, A has been honest (i.e.
she has sent m3 at step 3) in the 75% of the exchanges performed. How can this
information be taken into account by other entities to decide whether or not to
initiate a new protocol run with A? Moreover, this decision will also depend on
the values that the exchanging items are worth to both parties. For instance, if the
item is very important to player B, B would assume the risk of exchanging with a
questionable party.
In Buttya´n et al.’s model, the protocol participants could not bring their past
experience or their beliefs into the current protocol instance. We found this
inappropriate and unrealistic.
Example 2
In Buttya´n et al.’s model –as in many others reasoning models– the network is
considered an additional participant of the protocol. However, its behavior is limited
to always deliver messages. Even though a reliable network can be assumed in many
circumstances, it would also be interesting to count on a formalism in which more
complex behaviors can be analyzed.
This feature is particularly relevant in the case of rational–exchange protocols,
for their most probable execution environments could be hostile to, at least, one of
the participants. For instance, in a mobile ad hoc network, two devices that are
not in each other’s range must rely on intermediary nodes to carry out a multi-hop
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communication. In this case, assuming that each node that compose the network
will behave well is a hypothesis that simplifies the analysis, but it is unrealistic.
Apart from modeling the actions that the network can perform as a participant
(e.g. deliver or not deliver messages), it would also be informative to take into
account beliefs about its behavior. This would allow us to distinguish between a
network which is highly reliable (e.g. 99% of the messages are properly delivered)
and a network which is highly non–reliable.
In this thesis, part of our effort will go into extending Buttya´n et al.s model, so
uncertainty and contextual information can be easily considered and parameterized,
in an enhanced version of the original formalism.
2.7 Complexity on Computing Nash Equilibria
Finally, in this section we describe additional considerations which establish further
limitations on formalisms based on Game Theory, such as the one just described.
Game Theory, and in particular Buttya´n et al.’s model, provides an excellent
framework in which to analyze rationality. The basic idea of representing protocols
as games and, identifying rational protocol outcomes with Nash equilibria of the
protocol game, represents a powerful analytical tool.
However, existing results on the complexity of computing Nash equilibria impose
significant limitations to the aforementioned approach.
On the one hand, the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium in a finite
game is a well known and easily demonstrable result (see Theorem A.1.1). On
the other, finding just one Nash equilibrium if a finite normal–form game has been
formally proven to be hard (in particular PPAD-complete2, even in the two–player
case ([Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004]).
Moreover, many other questions related to the computation of Nash points are
also proven to be extremely difficult to answer. For example, counting the number of
equilibria points in a finite game is ]P−hard ([Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004]) 3; find
which of the players pure strategies receives positive probability in the equilibrium
is also an NP problem ([Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004]); or given a pure strategy,
to decide whether it is played in any Nash equilibria of the game is NP − hard
([Gilboa and Zemel, 1989]). Similar results are encountered for Bayesian games for
which to determine whether there exists a pure-strategy Bayesian equilibrium is
proven to be NP − complete ([Conitzer and Sandholm, 2004]).
Another topic of interest is how the protocol game is presented. Most results on
2PPAD is a complexity class, standing for ”Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs”.
3]P is the set of counting–problems associated with the decision–problems in the set NP. A ]P
problem is at least as hard as the corresponding NP problem.
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complexity are enunciated for normal–form games (games are represented as tables).
However, two main issues make these results extendable to extensive–form games
(games represented as trees): (1) A normal–form game can always be represented in
an extensive–form. However, an algorithm to convert a extensive–form game onto
a normal–form runs in exponential time. This indicates that the computational
problem on extensive–form representations cannot become any easier than under
normal–form. And (2), the computational complexity increases significantly when
the games are dynamic of imperfect information with information sets of more than
one element.
The best-known algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in finite games in
normal–form is the Lemke-Howson algorithm ([Lemke and Howson, 1964]), which
has however been proven to have exponential running times in some instances.
Significant efforts have also gone to resolve games in extensive–form representations.
However, most of the results are related to the design of efficient algorithms for the
computation of approximations to equilibrium points in zero–sum two–player games
([Koller and Megiddo, 1992], [Gilpin et al., 2007], [Gilpin and Sandholm, 2007]).
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have demonstrated how Syverson’s scheme suffers from some
weaknesses due to an inappropriate design of the cryptographic evidences. Several
attacks are described showing that the protocol can lead to undesired situations for
any of the two parties involved in the exchange. We have also suggested how to fix
the scheme and we have given a formal security proof of the enhancement. The proof
is based on guaranteeing freshness of all protocol messages, thus ensuring rejection
of all forms of replay attacks. We have used BAN logic to prove the correctness of
our enhancement.
Additionally, we have presented Buttya´n et al.’s formal model used to analyze
Syverson’s scheme. We recognized Buttya´n’s formalism as a powerful tool to reason
about rationality in exchanging schemes. Nevertheless, other aspects of the model
were identified as weak and limiting. In particular, one of those aspects has
motivated us to propose two extended versions of the formalism, to be described in
the next chapter of this thesis.
Finally, results on the complexity of computing Nash equilibrium of finite games,
impose further restrictions to any analytical tool based on a Game theoretical
approach.
Chapter 3
A Model based on Dynamic
Games of Imperfect Information
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we presented Syverson’s rational exchange protocol. In
Section 2.4, we carried a cryptanalysis of Syverson’s scheme and proposed and
enhanced version. For all intents and purposes and from this point onwards in
this document, we will always refer to the corrected version of Syverson’s protocol
described in Section 2.4.5.
Also in Chapter 2, we introduced Buttya´n et al.’s formal model and, although
the model was found correct and consistent, we also found it presented several
drawbacks limiting the overall scope of the formalism. For example, the lack of
expressiveness when dealing with uncertainty, in particular when trying to model
contextual information, was considered to be too restrictive for real life exchanging
scenarios.
In this chapter, we present a contribution which consists in extending Buttya´n
et al.’s model, to capture relevant aspects involved in the execution of a rational–
exchange protocol. We will formalize and analyze the effect that factors such
as participant reputation, protocol robustness or even unpredictable participant
behavior, have on the outcome of the protocol execution. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the first time that such parameters have been formalized and
considered when analyzing security protocols, therefore providing an extended
analysis framework that goes beyond the cryptographic properties of the scheme.
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3.1.1 Chapter Overview
Our approach is based on representing protocol games as dynamic games of imperfect
information. In simple terms, a dynamic game is one of imperfect information if a
player does not know exactly what actions other players took up to that point in
the game. Intuitively, if it is my turn to move, I may not know what every other
player has done up to the current point.
In this type of games, players’ beliefs over other participants’ previous actions
can be taken into account when making the optimal decision at any given point
during the protocol execution. Several Game Theory results allow us to predict the
outcome of such a game and therefore, the outcome of the protocol it represents
when executed by rational entities. Despite the analysis becoming more complex
than by using basic Game Theory, we find it more realistic and more powerful.
Readers are referred to Appendix A for a detailed exposition on Games of Imperfect
Information.
3.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a global description of
our extended model detailing the differences with the original formalism. In Section
3.3, we apply the new model to the analysis of Syverson’s protocol. In Section 3.4
we describe the main conclusions.
3.2 Extended Model based on Dynamic Games of
Imperfect Information
In this section, we formalize those aspects of Buttya´n et al.’s model previously
described in Section 2.3.1 extending such a formalism by the use of:
(I) Imperfect information in protocol games: Represented as information sets with
more than one element in which entities form conjectures about other players’
previous actions.
(II) Randomized strategies: Strategies based on probability distribution functions
over players’s set of actions.
Next, we give a formal definition of each one of these amendments followed by
a detailed description and a relation of the differences between our work and the
original formalism.
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3.2.1 Extensions to the Model
(I) Imperfect Information in Protocol Games
The concept of protocol game was introduced by Buttya´n et al. as a way to represent
an exchange protocol (see Section 2.3.1). As mentioned before, the protocol game
of an exchange protocol is intended to model all possible interactions of the protocol
participants, even the potentially misbehaving actions (i.e., those different from the
ones prescribed by the protocol).
In the following definitions, we will formally define the process of deriving a
protocol game from the description of a given exchange protocol. We will describe
such a process according to Buttya´n et al.’s work ([Buttya´n, 2001]) but we will
also include several novel components part of our extension to the original model.
Whenever possible we will use the same notation as in [Buttya´n, 2001] and Appendix
A.
We start by unifying notation regarding two–entity exchange protocols.
Definition 3.2.1 (Two–entity exchange protocol). We notate a two–entity
exchange protocol as a tuple Π = 〈P,O, T 〉 where:
• P = {P1, P2} is the set of protocol participants,
• O is the set of all items/tokens being exchanged during the protocol execution.
Let M = O∗ be the set of all possible messages that can be constructed by
concatenating zero or more items from O, and
• T is an ordered collection of n protocol steps describing the scheme, each of
the form:
t : Pi → Pj : mt
with t = 1 . . . n, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and mt ∈M
(3.1)
The following game of imperfect information can be constructed to represent any
given two–entity exchange protocol denoted as previously.
Definition 3.2.2 (Extended protocol game). Given a two–entity exchange protocol
Π = 〈P,O, T 〉, the following protocol game of imperfect information denoted as GΠ
is defined to represent such a protocol:
GΠ = 〈P,A,Q, p, (Ii)i∈P , (¹i)i∈P 〉 (3.2)
where:
• P = {P1, P2} is a set of players.
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• A and Q are the set of actions and set of action sequences respectively,
satisfying:
a1. ² ∈ Q, where ² is the empty sequence.
a2. if q = (ak)tk=1 ∈ Q and 0 < w < t, then q = (ak)wk=1 ∈ Q
a3. if q = (ak)tk=1 ∈ Q, 0 < t < n and a ∈ A then q · a denotes the action
composed by q followed by a.
a4. A finite sequence of actions q ∈ Q is said to be terminal if there is no
a ∈ A, such that q · a ∈ Q. The set of terminal sequences of actions is
denoted by Z.
a5. A(q) = {a ∈ A : q ·a ∈ Q} denotes the set of available actions after action
sequence q ∈ Q\Z.
a6. In particular, for every q = (ak)t−1k=1 ∈ Q\Z, A(q) = {quit, mt, gmt,
ugmt} where,
– mt represents action send message mt, where mt is as described in
the protocol.
– gmt represents action send message gmt, where gmt represents a
predictable deviation from message mt.
– ugmt represents action send message ugmt, where ugmt represents
an unpredictable deviation from message mt.
a7. p is the player function. It assigns a player p(q) ∈ P to every non–
terminal sequence q ∈ Q\Z. The interpretation is that player p(q) has
the turn after the sequence of actions q.
• Ii is an information partition for player Pi ∈ P . It is a partition of the set
{q ∈ Q\Z : p(q) = i} satisfying:
b1. If sequences q and q′ are in the same information set Ii ∈ Ii, then
A(q) = A(q′).
b2. In particular, for any sequence q ∈ Q\Z, sequences (q · send mt) and (q
· send ugmt) are in the same information set, so A(q · send mt) = A(q
· send ugmt).
b3. If sequences q and q′ are in the same information set Ii ∈ Ii, then
player Pi is forced to define a probability distribution αi over every action
sequence in Ii, so
∑
q∈Ii αi(q) = 1.
• Finally, ¹i is a preference relation of player Pi ∈ P on Z.
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The most common representation of a game of imperfect information is a tree
(see Section A.4 for a detailed description of games in extensive–form). All possible
action sequences in set Q are represented by branches in the tree and every new
action added to an existing sequence is represented by a new edge directed to a new
node. Terminal nodes represent different outcomes of the game.
Note that, information sets Ii describe the information available to player Pi at
every stage of the game. The protocol game just described has been defined such
that one information set can cover several nodes. This means that, a player reaching
such a set does not know in which particular node of the information set she is –or
equivalently– she does not know the last action of her rival. Nodes which belong to
the same information set are represented with a dashed line across the game tree.
Moreover, for those information sets Ii, with more than one node it is necessary
to specify some player beliefs. Formally, these beliefs are represented by a probability
distribution function αi over the nodes belonging to the information set Ii.
Finally, all sequences q ∈ Z are the possible outcomes of the game. The
preference relations ¹i establishes which outcomes are preferred by player Pi. Thus,
if q, q′ ∈ Z and q ¹i q′, then player Pi prefers q′ to q.
(II) Randomized Strategies
Buttya´n et al.’s original model will also be enhanced by the use of mixed or
randomized strategies. A randomized or mixed strategy is a strategy which chooses
randomly between possible moves. For each player, there is a probability distribution
over the set of possible moves at each step in the game. Each probability value will
correspond to how frequently each move is chosen, being possible for players to
assign probability zero to one or more moves. Playing a mixed strategy should be
understood in contrast to playing a pure strategy, where a player follows a single
strategy with probability one and assigns probability zero to all other options. Next
are the formal definitions of these concepts within the model being described. The
reader should refer to Section A.1.3 of the Appendix A for further details on mixed
and randomized strategies.
Definition 3.2.3 (Pure strategy). A pure strategy for player Pi is defined as a
function si that assigns an action in A(q) to each non–terminal action sequence
q ∈ Q\Z for which p(q) = i, with the restriction that:
si(q) = si(q′) ∀q, q′ ∈ Ii (3.3)
In other words, function si assigns the same action to all action sequences
belonging to the same information set.
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We denote the set of all strategies of player Pi by Si. Since a strategy si assigns
the same action to every action sequence q that belongs to the same information set
Ii, we sometimes write si(Ii) instead of si(q).
Definition 3.2.4 (Strategy profile). A strategy profile is a vector of pure strategies
si, one for each player in the game, where si ∈ Si.
Definition 3.2.5 (Mixed strategy). Being Si the set of all possible pure strategies
for player Pi, a mixed strategy for Pi is a probability distribution function pi ∈ ∆(Si).
Definition 3.2.6 (Probabilistic strategy profile). A probabilistic strategy profile is
a vector of mixed strategies pi, one for each player in the game.
3.2.2 Comparison with Buttya´n et al.’s Model
Various aspects of the formalism proposed in Section 3.2.1 make it differ from
Buttya´n et al.’s original model presented in Chapter 2. These are:
i. Information sets with more than one element: Buttya´n et al. considered
information sets of only one element. This meant that players were always
aware of other player’s previous moves. In particular, given a two–entity
exchange protocol the original model assigns entities actions to quit the game,
send message mt as defined in Section 2.2, or send garbage message gmt as
described in Section 2.3.3, being these last two messages fully distinguishable
by the recipient. By contrast, in our model information sets are defined such
that for each message sent in the protocol (action taken by a player in the
protocol game) there will be an information set of at least two elements
(Condition b.2 of Definition 3.2.2) which will be undistinguishable for the
recipient’s point of view.
ii. Entity’s misbehavior representation: In the original formalism, entities’s
misbehavior is limited to sending forged messages (garbage mt) which are
always detected and penalized1 as shown in Fig. 2.2. By contrast, our
specification includes a new action consisting in sending unpredictable garbage
message ugmt. If message mt is composed of several items/tokens, an
unpredictable garbage message could differ from mt in only one or in more
than one of the components. Message ugmt could vary from mt only in
content and/or it could also be semantically different. In fact, message ugmt
represents whatever a malicious entity is able to configure to forge a valid
1Note that this is only applicable when the enhancement described in Chapter 2 is added to the
protocol description, so that at the end of the protocol, entity B holds a valid token to evidence
A’s misbehavior.
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mt message. Therefore, our model takes into account the possibility of an
unpredictable malicious message being sent instead of mt (specified in the
protocol description) of which we cannot anticipate the content or its nature.
Those game strategies including action send unpredictable garbage mt will play
an important role in our new analysis of Syverson’s protocol.
iii. Player’s conjectures: Moreover, in our new model, entities are forced to
form conjectures about previous player’s moves. Probability distribution
functions are defined for each non–singleton information set in the game.
Besides, conjectures over information sets can be interpreted in several ways
according to the particular protocol and its analysis. When appropriate,
distribution αi could represent the level of confidence an entity Pi can place
on the robustness of the protocol design, for example assigning a negligible
probability value to the action of sending message ugmt when the protocol
design offers high levels of trust.
iv. Player’s beliefs: Finally, in Buttya´n et al.’s model, all strategies are
considered to be pure. In other words, at every decision point in the game,
players have no doubt about which action to take next should they reach such
a point. The game equilibrium is therefore an equilibrium on pure strategies
whose existence is not always guaranteed. By contrast, at relevant decision
points during a protocol game our model is able to consider and manage
randomized strategies. Moreover, in finite games, the existence of at least one
Nash equilibrium point with randomized strategies is ensured by an important
result (see Theorem A.1.1). An application of this will be depicted when
analyzing Syverson’s scheme in our extended model.
3.3 Syverson’s Rational–Exchange Protocol as a Game
of Imperfect Information
In order to illustrate the proposed formal model we will apply the formalism
described in Section 3.2.1 to the analysis of Syverson’s scheme. Section 3.2.1
provided the guidelines to represent a rational–exchange protocol as a game of
imperfect information. In this section, we will present a series of definitions which
will serve to represent Syverson’s protocol game within such an extended Game
theoretical model.
Furthermore, we will also describe a series of parameters used to define the
level of uncertainty players hold about certain aspects of the game. Formally, some
of these parameters will be used to define probability distribution functions over
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non–singleton information sets, while others will represent randomized strategies
for the players involved in the game. Finally, Syverson’s protocol game of imperfect
information will be represented in extensive–form.
Definition 3.3.1 (Set of players). We denote P the set of players in Syverson’s
protocol game where P={A,B}.
Definition 3.3.2 (Player’s set of actions). The set of actions available to players
A and B in Syverson’s protocol game of imperfect information is:
A = AA ∪AB (3.4)
where:
AA = {quitA,m1, gm1, ugm1,m3},
AB = {quitB,m2}
(3.5)
and,
• quitX represents action quit the protocol for an entity X.
• mk represents action send message mk.
• gmk represents action send garbage gmk.
• ugmk represents action send unpredictable garbage ugmk.
Definition 3.3.3 (Pure strategies for player A). The complete set of pure strategies
for player A, denoted as SA, is defined as the set of tuples:
SA = {(m1,m3), (m1, quitA),
(gm1,m3), (gm1, quitA),
(ugm1,m3), (ugm1, quitA),
(quitA, ·)}
(3.6)
where the first component of each tuple represents the action taken by player A at
step one of the protocol and the second component represents the action taken by A
at step three of the protocol.
Definition 3.3.4 (Pure strategies for player B). The complete set of pure strategies
for player B, denoted as SB, is defined as the set of actions:
SB = {m2, quitB} (3.7)
where each strategy represents the action taken by player B at step two of the
protocol.
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3.3.1 Modeling Uncertainty
By introducing imperfect information and randomized strategies, we are providing
the mechanisms to consider and measure a completely new set of variables when
formally analyzing an exchange protocol. We will be able to evaluate the effect that
factors such as participant reputation, protocol robustness, network reliability or
participant past experience, have on the outcome of a protocol execution.
In this regard, for the analysis of Syverson’s protocol three novel parameters are
defined to capture a series of factors surrounding the protocol execution. These are
essential parameters when trying to predict and anticipate the outcome of Syverson’s
rational–exchange and they are used to describe two different areas of uncertainty:
• The different beliefs that each entity holds about the protocol robustness and,
• The level of trust between participants.
The conjecture about the protocol’s robustness is especially important as what
we present here is a novel way to express unpredictable participant behavior. Since
the definition of the Dolev-Yao adversary [Dolev and Yao, 1983], in all formal models
participant unpredictable behavior has always been tailored and limited to a series
of possible malicious actions. Our approach is based on expressing, within a single
parameter, the whole set of unknown vulnerabilities that a protocol might present.
Below we provide a detailed description of each one of these new variables.
As stated before, these parameters will be used to formally define probability
distribution functions over non–singleton information sets and to represent
randomized strategies for the players involved in the game.
Parameter α
The chances of successfully attacking a particular protocol (a malicious entity being
able to derive from the protocol description without being detected) get reduced
if the protocol is a well known scheme, on which reasonable levels of testing
and trialling have been performed. By contrast, the probability of unpredictable
malicious behavior taking place at execution time increases if the scheme is new or
if it has a reputation for poor and insecure performance.
In the case of Syverson’s protocol, B is the entity taking a greater risk, so B
must be confident that the protocol is well designed and that A cannot deviate from
it without being noticed. In this regard, our model captures the level of uncertainty
that participant B holds over the robustness of Syverson’s protocol. A certain
probability α will be considered as the level of confidence customer B has in the
protocol’s design. It represents the possibility that a forged message sent by A could
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actually be part of the protocol execution, enabling A to finish the protocol in a
advantageous position over entity B.
As previously mentioned, in the original model A’s misbehavior was limited to
sending a forged message garbage m1 which would always be detected and penalized.
By contrast, in our model we also consider the possibility of ugm1 being sent instead
of m1 of which we cannot anticipate the content or its nature.
Parameter β
Furthermore, entity A will also be asked to conjecture about entity’s B behavior
during the protocol. We will define a parameter β which will capture the uncertainty
participant A has over participant B’s behavior at step two in the protocol. B could,
at step two, continue or quit the protocol. In our model, A will assign a certain
probability β to the event of B sending m2 at round two of the protocol. Hence,
(1 − β) represents the probability of B misbehaving at round two by quitting the
execution. Note that A can always verify the freshness of message m2 and its
originator, so B cannot cheat sending the wrong m2 as this will always be detected
and punished. B’s signature on m2 ensures A that B received itemA and that
B proceeded sending itemB. Message m2 could always be used as a proof of B′s
misbehavior in the protocol (message m2 is a Non–Repudiation of Origin token for
entity A).
Parameter δ
In a similar way, as we mentioned before A could quit or delay sending m3 in the
last round of the protocol. This forces entity B to form a new conjecture over
A’s behavior besides the initial one captured by parameter α. This new conjecture
could be based on past experience, A’s reputation or any other factor. This way,
our model will evaluate the uncertainty B has over A’s behavior at the last step in
the protocol.
Formally, a certain value δ will define the probability that entity B assigns to
the event of A sending m3 at round three of the protocol. Consequently, the value
(1− δ) determines the probability entity B assigns to the event of A getting delayed
in sending m3 or not sending it at all.
Most likely, entity A will be using Syverson’s protocol to interact with a variety
of entities in different occasions. This information (represented by a reputation
factor or similar) will help entity B to adjust an accurate value for δ.
Note that in a different instance, parameter δ could be given a complete different
meaning. It could be defined as the formal representation of the level of trust entity
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B places on the network. The reliability of the network can be taken into account
when trying to anticipate protocol participant behavior.
3.3.2 Protocol Game in Extensive–Form
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By considering Syverson’s protocol game as a game of imperfect information, we
are enabling both entities, A and B, to evaluate the conjectures about each other,
and also about the correctness and robustness of the protocol. These conjectures are
represented by probabilities α, β, and δ previously introduced and can be formalized
as follows:
• Parameter α represents a probability distribution function over the non–
singleton information set composed by actions m1 and ugm1 at stage one
of the protocol.
• Parameter β represents a probability distribution over the set of pure actions
for entity B. It therefore represents a randomized strategy for entity B.
• Finally, parameter δ represents a probability distribution over entity’s A set of
actions at step three of the protocol. Therefore it is part of entity A’s mixed
strategies.
See Fig. 3.1 for a representation of the imperfect information Syverson’s protocol
game in extensive–form. Fig. 3.1 extends Fig. 2.2 showing a completely new
scenario, as well as being able to evaluate uncertainty at each step of the game
represented in the tree. Payoff values are defined as in Section 2.3.3. In Fig. 3.1,
there exists the possibility that A could send B a forged message ugm1, for which
A would obtain message m2 in return, and for which entity A will not be fined
or penalized. This would only be possible by stepping outside the previous model
and assuming that there are still vulnerabilities in the protocol design. A may well
identify such flaws and try to take advantage of them. However, it is not always clear
that flaws exist and that entity A could recognize them. So the uncertainty B holds
over the protocol correctness and entity’s A behavior at step one in the protocol can
be captured and modeled by this new branch in the tree and the parameter α.
Note that α is composed by two different probabilities (p, q). Probabilities p
and q represent the original B’s conjectures over entity A’s behavior at step one.
Parameter α is calculated using the Bayes rule, so α = p/(p+ q).
To simplify the tree, we have omitted the predictable gm1 path, previously shown
in Fig. 2.2 and from which entity A would always be deterred as it would always
be punished.
The dashed line across B’s nodes represent the uncertainty that B holds over A’s
previous move (formally, both nodes belong to the same information set). Entity B
might be incapable of recognizing A’s unpredictable misbehavior after step one of
the protocol. B assumes a risk when deciding what to do at round two as it does
not know what move A has made. If A tries to deceive B and A is detected, then
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B would quit the protocol. In that case, A would be penalized with the same value
FA as if she had sent gm1 in the original model.
In the following section, several calculations will establish the criteria for A and
B to be participants of the protocol depending on the values of the new set of
parameters. We will see how the values that itemA and itemB are worth to entities
A and B also play an important role in the decision-making process. Additionally,
we will calculate where entities reach an equilibrium in the new protocol game.
3.3.3 Expected Payoff for Entities A and B
Let EPB(m) represent the expected payoff for entity B after sending message m.
Likewise, EPB(quitB) represents the expected payoff for entity B after quitting the
protocol. Entity B can then formulate the following considerations for each one of
the two possible pure strategies at round two of Syverson’s protocol:
EPB(quitB) = 0
EPB(m2) = α ∗ [(1− δ) ∗ (−u−B) + δ ∗ (−u−B)]+
(1− α) ∗ [δ ∗ (u+B(3)− u−B)+
(1− δ) ∗ (−u−B)]
= u+B(3) ∗ δ ∗ (1− α)− u−B
(3.8)
Note that:
EPB(m2) > EPB(quitB)⇔ δ ∗ (1− α) ∗ u+B(3)− u−B > 0 (3.9)
Therefore:
EPB(m2) > EPB(quitB)⇔ δ ∗ (1− α) > u−B/u+B(3) (3.10)
The graph shown in Fig. 3.2 (a) represents the function δ ∗ (1− α). For values
α and δ for which the graph is over the value u−B/u
+
B(3), the best strategy for B
would be to carry on with the exchange and follow the protocol description. Below
that line, B’s best strategy is to quit, as otherwise the expected payoff value would
be less than zero.
In a similar way, A can formulate the following considerations. For each possible
strategy that A can follow, the expected payoff would be:
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EPA(quitA, ·) = 0
EPA(m1, quitA) = β ∗ (u+A − u−A) + (1− β) ∗ (−u−A)
= β ∗ u+A − u−A
EPA(m1,m3) = β ∗ (u+A − u−A) + (1− β) ∗ (−u−A)
= β ∗ u+A − u−A
EPA(ugm1, quitA) = β ∗ (u+A) + (1− β) ∗ (−FA)
= β ∗ (FA + u+A)− FA
EPA(ugm1,m3) = β ∗ (u+A − FA) + (1− β) ∗ (−FA)
= β ∗ u+A − FA
(3.11)
Note that we have omitted the strategies (gm1,m3) and (gm1, quitA) which
appeared in the original representation tree. They do not affect the following
rationale, as they are strictly dominated strategies, i.e. there are no possible
conjectures over entity B’s behavior which would make a rational entity A choose
such strategies. The strict dominance comes from a negative payoff (expected payoff)
given by the expression β ∗u+A−FA. Furthermore, the strategy (ugm1,m3) is also a
strictly dominated strategy with a payoff value less than zero. However, the strategy
(ugm1, quitA) plays an important role, as there will be a threshold value for β to
establish whether A, having the opportunity to attack the protocol, would take the
risk to be detected at the first step of the protocol.
From previous expressions, we obtain the following relationship:
EPA(ugm1, quitA) 6 EPA(m1,m3)⇔ β 6 (FA − u−A)/FA (3.12)
This is, for a rational entity A to be motivated to behave accordingly to the
protocol description, the expected payoff by doing so must be higher than the
expected payoff obtained when misbehaving. Misbehavior is only profitable when
β > (FA − u−A)/FA.
Fig. 3.2 (b) shows the intersection between the space of values for α, δ and
the new threshold for A’s conjecture, β. From a Decision Theory point of view,
the shadowed area represents the space of values where a rational exchange may
take place. This is the space for which entities, individually committed to achieve
the best results for themselves without considering the other participant’s reactions,
would decide to carry on with the exchange.
There exist a strong correlation between variables α, β and δ as they will be
affected by the same publicly known reputation factors or other similar parameters.
That is, if A’s reputation is not good or if it is the first time A participates in an
exchange, B will show a high level of distrust, but A will be aware of this and will
adjust the value of β accordingly. When considering a repeated scenario, the total
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profit for participants A and B is calculated as an average of the profits obtained
at each one of the protocol executions. Misbehaving will then have a global impact
on the total expected payoff.
3.3.4 Interpretation and Graphical Representations
The following figures will help to better understand the implications that
calculations in section 3.3.3 will have in real scenarios. Equations (3.10) and (3.12)
express in mathematical terms the relationship between the different parameters
defined in the formal model. Representing those relations graphically will assists in
identifying such links.
Let us consider a rational merchant Alice and a rational buyer Bob, who want
to exchange itemA and itemB using Syverson’s protocol. Let us also assume that
these two entities have never exchanged any items previously to this point and that
they have never been participants in the same protocol run before, in particular
Syverson’s protocol. The following graphs will explain phenomena such as why in
some instances, merchant Alice, having found vulnerabilities in Syverson’s protocol,
will be rationally forced to ignore these and carry on with the actual protocol
description. The graphs will also describe the context in which Bob, not trusting
merchant Alice, will still be part of the protocol if the profit Bob expects to obtain
is sufficiently high.
From Bob’s point of view, calculations in Section 3.3.3 –particularly equation
(3.10)– provide a threshold between sending message m2 or quitting the protocol
at stage two. By contrast, from Alice’s point of view, calculations in Section 3.3.3
–particularly equation (3.12)– provide a threshold between behaving honestly at
protocol stage one or taking the risk of committing fraud.
The following analysis can be carried out from the buyer’s point of view.
Analysis of the Correlation between Cost and Profit for B
Let us assume Syverson’s protocol to be reasonably robust and flawless. In this case,
Bob will probably assign α a low value, for example of α = 0.1, (α is the probability
of Alice breaking the protocol and sending Bob an unpredictable fraudulent message
m1). Moreover, δ is the parameter representing the level of trust entityBob places on
merchant Alice delivering message m3 as the last step in the protocol. For different
values of δ, equation (3.10) gives us the upper bound for the ratio between cost u−B
and profit u+B(3). Within this range, Bob would be rationally forced to enter the
protocol as the expected payoff would be higher than the one obtained by quitting.
In particular, Fig. 3.3 shows how when the level of trust on merchant Alice is
high (e.g. δ = 0.9), the limit for the ratio u−B/u
+
B(3) increases (cost could be a high
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proportion of the profit). In the case of Bob not being able to trust Alice, the limit
for the ratio decreases (cost could only be a small proportion of the profit). In this
last context, Bob would only be part of the protocol when the margin between profit
and lost is sufficiently high.
In Fig. 3.4, different values of α are considered. The parameter α represents the
level of trust that entity B places on the robustness and correctness of the protocol.
Considering as well different values of δ (level of trust on merchant Alice to deliver
message 3), the shadowed area is showing the set of values for the ratio between
cost and profit, for which Bob would rationally choose to participate in the protocol
with Alice.
Analysis of the Correlation between α and δ
Equation (3.10) does also establish the correlation between parameters α and δ
(entity’s B conjectures). Fig. 3.5 shows how for each given ratio between cost and
profit for exchanging items itemA and itemB, the level of trust Bob places on the
protocol’s robustness will determine the pattern for rational behavior.
As an example, consider the case when the cost is 10% of the profit Bob obtains
when exchanging itemB (u−B/u
+
B(3) = 0.1). Then, for Bob not to quit the protocol
at step 2, α must be below the limit [1− 0.10 ∗ (1/δ)], given by equation (3.10).
Likewise, when the cost is 90% of the profit that Bob obtains exchanging itemB,
α must be below the limit [1 − 0.90 ∗ (1/δ)] given by the same equation (3.10).
Figure Fig. 3.5 shows how the threshold for parameter α decreases when the margin
between cost and profit decreases and vice versa. In other words, when the benefit
expected is high, Bob will be part of the protocol even when it is quite probable
that the protocol presents vulnerabilities. The shadowed area represents the values
for which Bob will rationally choose to be a participant in the protocol.
As mentioned before, from Alice’s point of view, calculations in Section 3.3.3
and in particular equation (3.12) provide a threshold between behaving honestly
and taking the risk of committing fraud at stage one in the protocol. Alice, having
found vulnerabilities in the protocol design will rationally choose to ignore them
and carry on with the protocol description, when β (probability of Bob sending m2)
drops below the limit given by equation (3.12). In other words, Alice would only
try to cheat on Bob when she has enough guarantees that Bob is going to respond
sending m2 instead of quitting at stage two. The probability of Bob detecting the
fraud and quitting the protocol must be sufficiently low for A to take advantages of
possible protocol design faults. What follow is an analysis from entity Alice’s point
of view.
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Analysis of the Correlation between Cost and Penalty for A
Fig. 3.6 shows how the limit given for β in equation (3.12) is dependant on the ratio
between the cost of sending itemA (u−A) and the penalty for committing fraud (FA).
Equation (3.12) can also be expressed as:
EPA(ugm1, quitA) 6 EPA(m1,m3)⇔
β 6 1− u−A/FA ⇔ u−A/FA 6 1− β
(3.13)
Therefore, for example when β = 0.2, Alice is rationally forced to behave
honestly if the cost of sending itemA does not exceed 80% of the value of the penalty.
Otherwise, if the cost exceeds 80% of the value of the penalty and Alice knows how
to break the protocol, she would be better off by doing so in the context of a single
protocol execution. Likewise when β = 0.9, merchant Alice is rationally forced to
behave honestly if the cost does not exceed 10% of the value of the penalty. In other
words, if it is unlikely that B detects the fraud and quits, and the cost of sending
itemA exceeds 10% of the value of the penalty, A is rationally forced to commit
fraud as it is the most profitable option. In Fig. 3.6 the shadowed areas represent
the space of values for which, given different values of β, Alice will ignore possible
protocol flaws and behave honestly with entity B, sending the correct m1 at stage
one of the protocol.
Figure Fig. 3.7 does also represent the correlation expressed by equation (3.12),
though in terms of value β and the ratio between cost and penalty.
Summarizing, the correlations just studied have served to:
(1) Establish the existing relation between the different areas of uncertainty
surrounding Syverson’s protocol execution; and
(2) Establish the criteria for feasible solutions from each player’s individual point
of view.
Formally, an outcome is feasible if it can be obtained as a combination of
actions in the game, or more generally from a probability distribution over
combinations of actions. However, most of these possible outcomes can only
occur when pre-execution agreements take place between players as they do not
conform a Nash equilibrium of the game. The computation of Nash equilibria
points (rational solutions) require further considerations.
3.3.5 Nash Equilibrium
In Section 3.3.3, we analytically calculated the set of values for α, β and δ for which
rational entities A and B would unilaterally decide to be participants of Syverson’s
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protocol. The result is expressed by equations (3.10) and (3.12). Furthermore,
we also represented graphically such a space as the intersection between the set of
values for entity’s B conjectures over A’s behavior (α, δ) and the set of values for
A’s conjectures over B’s behavior (β) (see Fig. 3.2 b). However, because other
participant’s actions have an impact on the overall expected–payoff value of all
players, further refinements to these values are needed to evaluate the consequences
of all possible actions.
In this section we formally compute the Nash equilibrium for the new protocol
game depicted in Fig. 3.1.
As in previous sections, we first consider α to be a fixed value α0 > 0, known by
both entities, as the probability of the protocol being faulted and vulnerable. This
value will be equivalent to the probability of entity A being able to send ugm1 at
stage one of the protocol. Finally, FA is a public and fixed value, greater than zero.
A Nash equilibrium of the Syverson’s protocol game requires of the following
formalisms:
Definition 3.3.5 (Probabilistic strategy profile). A probabilistic strategy profile in
Syverson’s protocol game is a vector s = (p, q, β, δ) where:
• p and q define a probability distribution function over the set of individual
strategies that entity A holds at step one of the protocol game.
• β defines a probability distribution function over the set of individual strategies
that entity B holds at step two of the protocol game.
• δ defines a probability distribution function over the set of individual strategies
that entity A holds at step three of the protocol game.
When appropriate, a probabilistic strategy profile in Syverson’s protocol game
can also be represented by the tuple (α, β, δ) where α = p/(p + q). For example,
the tuple (α, β, δ) represents a probabilistic strategy profile, in which Alice chooses
to send unpredictable garbage at step one of the protocol with probability α, Bob
sends m2 at round two with probability β and finally, Alice sends m3 at round three
with probability δ.
The functions expected payoff EPA(·) for entity A and expected payoff EPB(·)
for entity B, defined in Section 3.3.3, can also be defined to express the expected
payoff obtained by individual entities when following a specific probabilistic strategy
profile:
Definition 3.3.6 (Expected payoff for entity A). Given a probabilistic strategy
profile in the Syverson’s protocol game defined by the tuple (α, β, δ), the expected
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payoff obtained by entity A when A and B follow such profile is:
EPA(α, β, δ) = −α ∗ FA + α ∗ β ∗ FA + β ∗ u+A (3.14)
−α ∗ β ∗ δ ∗ FA − u−A + α ∗ u−A
Definition 3.3.7 (Expected payoff for entity B). Given a probabilistic strategy
profile in the Syverson’s protocol game defined by the tuple (α, β, δ), the expected
payoff obtained by entity B when A and B follow such profile is:
EPB(α, β, δ) = β ∗ [u+B(3) ∗ δ ∗ (1− α)− u−B] (3.15)
Definition 3.3.8 (Nash equilibrium of Syverson’s protocol game). Let S be the
space of all probabilistic strategy profiles in Syverson’s protocol game, each one of
them represented by a vector (p, q, β, δ).
A tuple (α0, β∗, δ∗) ∈ S, where α0 = p/(p+q) > 0, represents a Nash equilibrium
of the protocol game if and only if:
a) EPA(α0, β∗, δ∗) > EPA(α0, β∗, δ) for all probability distribution δ; and
b) EPB(α0, β∗, δ∗) > EPB(α0, β, δ∗) for all probability distribution β.
Note that, the equilibrium just defined represents a Nash equilibrium perfect
in subgames, (see Section A.4.1) which is a refinement for the Nash equilibria in
dynamic games.
According to this definition, in tuple (α0, β∗, δ∗), δ∗ represents the best response
Alice can give to Bob′s strategy β∗; likewise, β∗ represents the best response Bob can
give to Alice′s strategy δ∗. We will now enunciate and formally proof the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.3.1. When parameter α0 > 0, the strategy [(quitA, ·), quitB] constitutes
the only Nash Equilibrium of Syverson’s protocol game.
Proof. According to definition 3.3.8, for a tuple (α0, β∗, δ∗), where α0 > 0, to
represent a Nash Equilibrium of Syverson’s protocol game, it would have to satisfy
requirements 3.3.8.a) and 3.3.8.b).
• Requirement 3.3.8.a):
We consider the following equation:
EPA(α0, β∗, δ) = −α0 ∗ FA + α0 ∗ β∗ ∗ FA+
β∗ ∗ u+A − α0 ∗ β∗ ∗ δ ∗ FA − u−A + α0 ∗ u−A
(3.16)
where α0 > 0.
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Note that, the partial derivative of EPA(α0, β∗, δ) with respect to δ is zero or
negative:
∂EPA(α0, β∗, δ)
∂δ
= (−α0 ∗ β∗ ∗ FA) (3.17)
This allows us to establish the following results:
– When equation 3.17 is negative, the maximum payoff value for entity A
is obtained when δ = 0.
– When equation 3.17 is zero, the payoff obtained by entity A is the same
as when δ = 0.
Therefore, a dominant strategy for entity A is to follow the distribution δ∗ = 0.
Note that parameter δ∗ represents the probability of merchant Alice sending
message m3 at the last step of the protocol. The value δ∗ = 0 represents
the strategy quitA at step three of Syverson’s protocol. Hence, for a rational
merchant Alice the best response to any strategy buyer Bob might follow, is
to quit at step three not sending message m3.
• Requirement 3.3.8.b):
Likewise, to satisfy requirement 3.3.8.b we consider the following relation:
EPB(α0, β, δ∗) = β ∗ [u+B(3) ∗ δ∗ ∗ (1− α0)− u−B] (3.18)
where α0 > 0.
Next equation is the partial derivative of EPB(α0, β, δ∗) with respect to β:
∂EPB(α0, β, δ∗)
∂β
= [u+B(3) ∗ δ∗ ∗ (1− α0)− u−B] (3.19)
Hence, Entity B knows that for entity Alice the dominant strategy is δ∗ = 0.
Equation 3.19 allows to establish the following statement:
– The maximum payoff value for entity B in Syverson’s protocol game is
reached when β∗ = 0.
– The payoff B obtains is EPB(α0, β∗ = 0, δ∗) = 0.
Parameter β∗ represents the probability of buyer Bob sending message m2 at
step two of the protocol. The value, β∗ = 0 represents the strategy quitB at
step two of Syverson’s protocol. Therefore, for a rational entity B, the best
response to the dominant strategy from merchant A is to quit at step two, not
sending message m2.
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However, A carries out the following further calculations. For β = 0:
EPA(α0, β∗ = 0, δ∗ = 0) = −α0 ∗ FA + u−A ∗ (α0 − 1) < 0 (3.20)
Whereas:
EPA(quitA, ·) = 0 (3.21)
Therefore, there is no tuple (α0, β∗, δ∗) where α0 > 0 that constitutes a
Nash equilibrium of Syverson’s protocol game. The strategy [(quitA, ·), quitB]
constitutes the only Nash Equilibrium, when parameter α0 > 0.
When α0 > 0, although there are many other probabilistic strategy profiles by
which Syverson’s participants can gain higher benefits, none of them constitute a
Nash equilibrium. In particular, if α0 > 0 for all β > 0, entity A would be inclined
to deviate from the protocol description to gain greater profit forcing entity B to
reconsider their position and change their behavior.
The following corollary can be directly derived from Theorem 3.3.1.
Corollary 3.3.1. The following probabilistic strategy profiles represent different
Nash equilibria in Syverson’s protocol game.
N1 ≡ (p = 0, q = 0, β∗ = 0, δ∗ = 0)
N2 ≡ (p = 0, q = 1, β∗ = u−A/u+A, δ∗ = u−B/u+B(3))
N3 ≡ (p = 0, q = 1, β∗ = 1, δ∗ = 1)
(3.22)
Note α = p/(p+ q) = 0 in all three equilibria.
Proof. The proof will consist of graphically calculating all Nash equilibria in the
game.
When parameter α is equal to zero, the protocol game gets reduced to the game
analyzed by Buttya´n et al., shown in Fig. (2.2). However, participant’s reputation,
past experience or network reliability are still valuable parameters to be considered
in the analysis. We will use a graph to proof that apart from the Nash equilibrium
identified by Buttya´n et al.’s analysis, there are two other equilibria besides that
one. These two new equilibria stem from the ability within our extended model,
to represent the different reactions entities have when confronting uncertainty and
distrust at each step in the protocol execution.
The following expressions are evaluated:
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EPA(m1, ·) = β ∗ (u+A − u−A) + (1− β) ∗ (−u−A)
= β ∗ (u+A)− u−A
EPA(quitA, ·) = 0
(3.23)
So:
EPA(m1, ·) = β ∗ (u+A)− u−A > 0⇔ β > u−A/u+A (3.24)
That implies that for values of β below u−A/u
+
A, entity A’s best response to B
is to quit the protocol at round one. See Figure Fig. 3.8(top–left) for a graphical
representation of entity’s A best–response function.
Likewise, the following expressions are also evaluated:
EPB(m2) = δ ∗ (u+B(3)− u−B) + (1− δ) ∗ (−u−B)
= δ ∗ (u+B(3))− u−B
EPB(quitB) = 0
(3.25)
So:
EPB(m2) = δ ∗ (u+B(3))− u−B > 0⇔ δ > u−B/u+B(3) (3.26)
That implies that for values of δ below u−B/u
+
B(3), entity B’s best response to A
is to quit the protocol. See Figure Fig. 3.8 (top–right) for a graphical representation
of entity’s B best–response function.
In Fig. 3.8 (bottom) we represent the two best–response functions for entities A
and B and the points of intersection. Such points represent all possible equilibria
in the game of imperfect information described in Fig. 2.2.
The points circled in Fig. 3.8(bottom) correspond to the following probabilistic
strategy profiles:
N1 ≡ (p = 0, q = 0, β∗ = 0, δ∗ = 0)
N2 ≡ (p = 0, q = 1, β∗ = u−A/u+A, δ∗ = u−B/u+B(3))
N3 ≡ (p = 0, q = 1, β∗ = 1, δ∗ = 1)
Where:
N1 represents pure strategies (quitA, ·) and (quitB) for entities A and B
respectively.
N2 represents mixed strategies
(
m1,m3, 1, u−B/u
+
B(3)
)
and (m2, u−A/u
+
A) for
entities A and B respectively.
N3 represents pure strategies (m1,m3) and (m2) for entities A and B
respectively.
Equilibrium N3 had already been identified by Buttya´n et al.’s analysis.
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However, we find their analysis to be both simplistic and unrealistic. The new
equilibria found, N1 and N2, stem from a more complex and complete analysis.
Considering factors such as trust amongst participants or network reliability results
in two new equilibria. In N1, entities simply do not find a way to interact in
equilibrium and both decide to quit. On the other hand, in N2, the equilibrium
depends on the values of itemA and itemB and the cost of the exchange. We believe
this to be a more accurate result, as entities, in real scenarios, would indeed behave
differently depending on the value of the items to be exchanged.
3.4 Conclusions
A number of conclusions have risen at the end of this work. We present them from
a series of different angles:
A more flexible and complete analytical framework:
Syverson’s rational–exchange protocol was first analyzed by Buttya´n et al.
in [Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2004], using the definition of rationality within a
game–theoretical model. The model proposed was based on the representation
of rational–exchange protocols as dynamic games of perfect information. In
Section 2.6 we identified a few drawbacks and limitations, propelling an
extension to the model using further and more advanced concepts within
Game Theory. In particular, using games of imperfect information, we have
formalized and analyzed the effect that factors such as participant reputation,
protocol robustness and unpredictable participant behavior, have on the
outcome of the protocol execution.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such parameters have been
formalized and considered when analyzing a security protocol. In particular,
the conjecture about the protocol’s robustness is specially important, as what
we have presented in this chapter is a novel way to express participant
unpredictable behavior.
Moreover, our new extended model presents high levels of flexibility to
formalize other factors apart from the ones analyzed in this chapter, for
example parameters to do with network reliability.
Individually rational outcomes: From a Decision Theory point of view (Section
3.3.3), the premise of individual rationality is based on the assumption that
each individual is committed to achieving the best outcome for itself, regardless
of the effect doing so has on others. From this angle, we have obtained
interesting results such as for example, in some instances, a participant B
3.4 Conclusions 63
would be inclined to participate of Syverson’s protocol even it is very likely that
the protocol presents flaws that the other participant could take advantage of.
Nash Equilibria: From a Game Theory point of view, the concept of Nash
Equilibrium had to be extended to evaluate probabilistic strategy profiles. The
conclusions derived when computing all Nash Equilibria in the new protocol
game are very determinant: When the protocol is not 100% flawless, although
the exchange can take place, such an outcome does not constitute a Nash
Equilibrium, which means that entities are motivated to deviate from the
protocol description and it is beyond the formal model to asses the reasons
why they would not do so. By contrast, if the protocol is considered to be
completely safe, three points constitute Nash equilibria in the protocol game:
when both entities quit the protocol without carrying the exchange, when both
entities behave correctly, or when the conjectures about each other’s behavior
take a certain value (u−A/u
+
A, u
−
B/u
+
B(3)). These values depend on the ratio
between the cost and the profit entities expect to gain when exchanging items
itemA and itemB.
Repeated Scenarios: Finally, although the current model described in this
chapter has only served to analyze single instances of a rational exchange
protocol, we believe this is only part of its significance, as it is necessary
to analyze single executions before studying player’s strategies in iterated
scenarios. The work in this chapter represents the basis for any further analysis
in that direction.
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Figure 3.2: Feasible outcomes for Syverson’s protocol game.
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Figure 3.3: For different values of δ (level of trust on merchant Alice to deliver
message 3), the shadowed area gives the set of values for which Bob would rationally
choose to participate in the protocol as the profit is sufficiently higher than the cost.
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Figure 3.4: The level of trust on the protocol design, coupled with the level of trust
on merchant Alice determines the threshold for the ratio cost/profit. For a poor
level of trust on the protocol design, only a high profit and a high level of trust on
Alice will motivate B not to quit the protocol.
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Figure 3.5: When the benefit expected is high, Bob will be part of the protocol even
when it is quite probable that the protocol presents vulnerabilities. When the cost
is 90% of the profit, both the protocol and the merchant must offer the maximum
guarantee. The shadowed areas represent the values for which Bob will rationally
choose to be part of the protocol.
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Figure 3.6: The limit for the ratio between cost and penalty decreases as β increases.
In other words, committing fraud is not attractive when the cost of the penalty is
much greater than the cost of sending itemA and if B is increasingly more likely to
detect the fraud.
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Figure 3.7: Note how when β = 0 (B is definitely quitting at stage two), Alice is
rationally forced to behave honestly unless the ratio is 1 (cost is equal to the value
of the penalty). Similarly, when β = 1 (B is definitely sending m2 at stage two),
Alice would only misbehave if the cost exceeds the value of the penalty.
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Chapter 4
A Model based on Bayesian
Games
4.1 Introduction
In previous chapters we described how some aspects of Buttya´n et al.’s model seemed
too restrictive and unrealistic. Moreover, we extended such a formalism to capture
issues of a rational protocol execution never considered before in formal analysis. In
this chapter we intend to further elaborate on the extensions of the model proposed
by Buttya´n et al.
4.1.1 Chapter Overview
In particular, we will propose and extension to the model based on representing
rational–exchange protocols as games of incomplete information or Bayesian games.
In the following sections, we will analyze Syverson’s protocol in order to illustrate
our proposal.
The so–called games of incomplete information or Bayesian games are those in
which players do not have all the information about their opponents; for example,
other players’ payoff functions. In such a case, player’s conjectures over other
participants’ payoff values can be taken into account when making the optimal
decision at any given point during the protocol execution.
Several Game Theory results allow us to predict the outcome of such a game and
therefore the outcome of the protocol execution it represents. Despite the analysis
becoming more complex than by using basic Game Theory, we find it more realistic
and more informative.
A rational–exchange protocol can be defined in terms of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of a dynamic game of incomplete information. Our model enables us to
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consider different classes of protocol parties within the protocol game (e.g. honest
and dishonest parties) as well as modeling attributes such as reputation or any other
belief that could have an effect on the protocol outcome. The resulting new model
let us reason about exchange protocols from the point of view of Bayesian rationality,
a notion that may be in some scenarios more appropriate than that defined in terms
of Nash equilibrium.
4.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1.1, we give an overview of our
approach. Section 4.2 is devoted to formally present the new model. Section 4.3
serves to illustrate how this framework can be used to analyze Syverson’s protocol
and finally, in Section 4.4 we describe the conclusions to this work.
4.2 Extended Model Based on Dynamic Games of
Incomplete Information
Please refer to Section A.5 for a detailed description of the most relevant concepts
in Bayesian games: player’s type, player’s beliefs and the notion of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium –a generalization of Nash equilibrium for this kind of games. In this
section, we will give an informal introduction to some of these concepts.
In a Bayesian game, each player is allowed to have some private information that
affects the overall game play but which is not known by others. This information is
usually related to their payoff values (what players receive at the end of the game,
depending on what strategies all players play). Players have initial beliefs about the
type of their opponents and can update their beliefs on the basis of the actions they
have played. Both concepts are informally defined in the next paragraphs:
• Player’s type. The type of a player univocally determines that player’s
payoff function, so that different types will be associated with different payoff
functions. A Bayesian game is modeled by introducing Nature as a player in
the game. Nature randomly chooses a type for each player according to the
probability distribution across each player’s type space.
• Player’s beliefs. Every player defines a belief system over the type of player
their opponents are. Player’s set of beliefs will assist them in the process of
choosing the best–response strategies to confront other participants.
The main advantage of this formalism is that it allows us to introduce diverse
forms of uncertainty in the analysis. For instance, in the simplest case, we can
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consider that players can be either honest or dishonest, thus having a type space
with just two elements. Of course, executing a protocol against a dishonest party
will surely be different that dealing with an honest one. This fact is modeled by
means of different payoff functions for each type, in such a way that the strategies
to follow during the protocol run will be different in each case.
Furthermore, types can also be useful when considering features regarding
network behavior. In Buttya´n et al.’s model, the network is considered reliable, so
it has a fixed strategy: To deliver messages. However, it is not difficult to conceive
a more realistic scenario in which messages are not always properly delivered. In
this case, the effects of an unreliable network can be easily incorporated into the
analysis by considering different types of network.
In the next section, we will discuss how this extension of basic Game Theory
can be incorporated into Buttya´n et al.’s formalism to analyze rational–exchange
protocols in a more powerful manner.
4.2.1 Bayesian Extended Model
We will extend the definition of Buttya´n et al.’s model by the use of:
(I) Incomplete information in protocol games: Represented by a type space for
every player in the game.
(II) Belief System: Strategies based on probability distribution functions over
players’s type space.
The concept of protocol game was introduced by Buttya´n et al. as a way
to represent an exchange protocol (see Section 2.3.1). The following definitions
will serve to describe the way in which a two–entity exchange protocol Π can be
represented as a protocol game of incomplete information.
Definition 4.2.1 (Bayesian protocol game). Given a two–entity exchange protocol
Π = 〈P,O, T 〉, the following protocol game of incomplete information, denoted as
GBΠ, is defined to represent such a protocol:
GBΠ = 〈P,A,Q, p, (Ii)i∈P , (¹i)i∈P , T 〉 (4.1)
where:
• P = {P1, P2} is a set of players.
• A and Q are the set of actions and set of action sequences respectively,
satisfying:
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a1. ² ∈ Q, where ² is the empty sequence.
a2. if q = (ak)tk=1 ∈ Q and 0 < w < t, then q = (ak)wk=1 ∈ Q
a3. if q = (ak)tk=1 ∈ Q, 0 < t < n and a ∈ A then q · a denotes the action
composed by q followed by a.
a4. A finite sequence of actions q ∈ Q is said to be terminal if there is no
a ∈ A, such that q · a ∈ Q. The set of terminal sequences of actions is
denoted by Z.
a5. A(q) = {a ∈ A : q ·a ∈ Q} denotes the set of available actions after action
sequence q ∈ Q\Z.
a6. In particular, for every q = (ak)t−1k=1 ∈ Q\Z, A(q) = {quit, mt, gmt}
where,
– mt represents action send message mt, where mt is as described in
the protocol.
– gmt represents action send message gmt, where gmt represents a
deviation from message mt.
a7. p is the player function. It assigns a player p(q) ∈ P to every non–
terminal sequence q ∈ Q\Z. The interpretation is that player p(q) has
the turn after the sequence of actions q.
• Ii is an information partition for player Pi ∈ P . It is a partition of the set
{q ∈ Q\Z : p(q) = i} satisfying:
b1. If sequences q and q′ are in the same information set Ii ∈ Ii, then
A(q) = A(q′).
b2. If sequences q and q′ are in the same information set Ii ∈ Ii, then
player Pi is forced to define a probability distribution αi over every action
sequence in Ii, so
∑
q∈Ii αi(q) = 1.
• A preference relation ¹i is defined for each player Pi ∈ P over set Z.
• Ti denotes the type space for each player Pi. It is assumed that each player
Pi ∈ P has a type Ti ∈ Ti. T represents a type–profile space defined as
T = T1 × T2 . A type profile T ∈ T is a tuple of types (T1, T2), one for each
player, which univocally determines the type of every player involved in the
protocol game.
• Finally, a probability distribution function θi is defined over each type space
Ti, i ∈ {1, 2}.
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4.3 A Bayesian Analysis of Syverson’s Protocol
To illustrate the proposed Bayesian model, we will analyze Syverson’s protocol (Fig.
2.1), although assuming a richer set of environmental hypotheses.
We note that in such a protocol entity B always plays a more risky strategy than
player A. Entity B is the first in sending her item, itemB, hoping that A would not
misbehave and that the exchange would take place successfully. Moreover, it is very
difficult for B to be able to misbehave, as m2 is always a fresh message (contains
m1) and it is also a token for non–repudiation of origin, so B will always be proven
responsible for any malicious action. By contrast, A could not be held responsible
for any malicious action until the end of protocol and, in most cases, provided B
gains access to the proof issued by A. Furthermore, A gains access to itemB before
B gains access to itemA. It is B then who has to carefully analyze A’s reputation,
credibility, surroundings, and her current and real intentions.
In such a context, we will only consider the simplest scenario, that in which
participant A can be either an honest or a dishonest protocol party, while B is
always honest.
As in a regular Syverson’s protocol game, the network is considered to be reliable,
so it plays following a fixed strategy delivering all messages.
Throughout this chapter we will refer to Syverson’s Bayesian protocol game
derived from Syverson’s protocol description as GBSy. We will develop the
appropriate specifications for players A and B in GBSy.
4.3.1 Player Types
Definition 4.3.1 (Syverson’s type–profile space). Let T = TA × TB be the type–
profile space in GBSy, where TA = {Ah, Ad} and TB = {Bh} are the type spaces for
players A and B, respectively.
By convention, subscript h denotes an honest participant, while d represents a
dishonest one.
The following are the probability distributions of the different types of the
different entities in relation with each other.
Definition 4.3.2 (Syverson’s type–profile probability distribution). We define the
following probability distribution θ over TA:
θh = Prob(Ah|B)
θd = Prob(Ad|B)
s.t. θh + θd = 1
(4.2)
Note that Prob(B|Ah) = Prob(B|Ad) = 1, since TB has only one element.
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4.3.2 Player Strategies
Since each type is associated to a (possibly different) payoff function, uncertainty
about the opponent’s type has severe implications in the decision-making process,
particularly in computing the best strategy during the protocol execution.
Definition 4.3.3 (Syverson’s player set of actions). The set of actions available to
players A and B in GBSy is:
A = AA ∪AB
where:
AA = {m1,m3, gm1, quitA}
AB = {m2, quitB}
(4.3)
and,
• quitX represents action quit the protocol for an entity X.
• mk represents action send message mk.
• gmk represents action send garbage gmk.
Definition 4.3.4 (Player A pure strategies). A pure strategy for player A is a tuple:
sA =
(
(s1, s3)d, (s1, s3)h
)
(4.4)
where:
• s1 ∈ AA defines an action at round 1 of the protocol, and
• s3 ∈ AA defines an action at round 3.
• The first component in sA represents a strategy for type A honest and the
second one for A dishonest.
Alternatively, player B has two possible pure strategies.
Definition 4.3.5 (Player’s B pure strategies). A pure strategy for player B is:
sB = {quitB,m2} (4.5)
Definition 4.3.6 (Syverson’s strategy profile). A strategy profile in GBSy is a vector
s = (sA, sB) of individual strategies, one for each player.
Note that specifying a strategy profile determines univocally the outcome of the
game.
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4.3.3 Player’s Beliefs
The following probability distributions represent the set of beliefs each entity holds
over their opponent’s type and the set of actions at each particular stage of the
protocol.
Definition 4.3.7 (Player A belief system). Let σB be a probability distribution over
the set of actions AB defined as:
σB ∈ ∆(AB) satisfying: σB(m2) + σB(quitB) = 1 (4.6)
Note that, (∆(AB) denotes the space of probability distributions over the set
AB).
By contrast, B’s attempt to anticipate A’s behavior in the game is represented
by the following functions:
Definition 4.3.8 (Player B belief system). At stage two of the protocol, B’s beliefs
are represented by the following probability distribution functions over A’s set of
actions:
αh, αd ∈ ∆(AA) (4.7)
satisfying:
αh(gm1) + αh(m1) = 1
αd(gm1) + αd(m1) = 1
(4.8)
and,
βh, βd ∈ ∆(AA) (4.9)
satisfying:
βh(quitA|m1) + βh(m3|m1) = 1
βd(quitA|m1) + βd(m3|m1) = 1
(4.10)
We can assume that B also holds the following beliefs representing the fact that,
when A has cheated, A will never sign the token of non–repudiation of origin to
claim responsibility for such misbehavior; instead, A will always quit the protocol.
Therefore:
Prob[quitA|gm1 ∧Ah] = 1
Prob[m3|gm1 ∧Ah] = 0
Prob[quitA|gm1 ∧Ad] = 1
Prob[m3|gm1 ∧Ad] = 0
(4.11)
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4.3.4 Payoff Functions
As stated before, one of the key points of Bayesian games is the fact that each type
of player is associated with a possibly different payoff function. Syverson’s payoff
functions for entities A and B in GBSy are denoted as:
UA, UB : TA ×AA ×AA ×AB → R
Fig. 4.1 represents Syverson’s Bayesian protocol game GBSy in extensive–form.
For each branch in the tree, a payoff value is defined representing the total outcome
that players A and B obtain when taking such a path. Payoff values are defined as
in Section 2.3.3. Note that for entities type Ad, completing the protocol produces a
lower income than uncomplete runs.
As an example, UA(Ad,m1,m3,m2) represents the payoff obtained by a
participant A, type dishonest, when A takes actions m1 and m3 at steps 1 and
3 of the protocol game GBSy and B takes action m2 at stage two.
UA(Ad,m1,m3,m2) = u+Ad − u−Ad (4.12)
By contrast, UA(Ad,m1, quitA,m2) represents the payoff obtained by a
participant A, type dishonest, when A takes actions m1 and quitA at steps 1 and 3
of the protocol game and B takes action m2 at stage two.
UA(Ad,m1, quitA,m2) = u+Ad (4.13)
4.3.5 Expected Payoffs
Definition 4.3.9 (Syverson’s expected payoff values). We denote by EP (i, si) the
expected payoff for player i when following strategy si in GBSy.
Entity A’s expected payoff
We first consider the expected payoffs when players follow pure strategies. For every
strategy profile sA =
(
(s1, s3)d, (s1, s3)h
)
for player A, the expected payoff value is:
EP (Ah, sA) = σB(m2) ∗ UA(Ah, (s1, s3)h,m2)+(
1− σB(m2)
)
∗ UA(Ah, (s1, s3)h, quitB)
(4.14)
EP (Ad, sA) = σB(m2) ∗ UA(Ad, (s1, s3)d,m2)+(
1− σB(m2)
)
∗ UA(Ad, (s1, s3)d, quitB)
(4.15)
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Entity B’s Expected Payoff
In the case of player B, we have:
EP (B, quitB) = 0 (4.16)
()
EP (B,m2) = θh ∗
[
αh(gm1) ∗ (−u−b ) + αh(m1)∗(
βh(quitA|m1) ∗ (−u−B)+
(1− βh(quitA|m1)) ∗ (u+B(3)− u−B)
)]
+
θd ∗
[
αd(gm1) ∗ (−u−b ) + αd(m1)∗(
βd(quitA|m1) ∗ (−u−B)+
(1− βd(quitA|m1)) ∗ (u+B(3)− u−B)
)]
= −u−B + u+B(3) ∗
(
θh ∗ αh(m1)∗
βh(m3|m1) + θd ∗ αd(m1) ∗ βd(m3|m1)
)
(4.17)
Now, we will denote:
LB = θh ∗ αh(m1) ∗ βh(m3|m1) + θd ∗ αd(m1) ∗ βd(m3|m1) (4.18)
Note that we can conclude that:
EP (B,m2) > EP (B, quitB)⇔ −u−B + u+B(3) ∗ LB > 0 (4.19)
or, equivalently:
EP (B,m2) > EP (B, quitB)⇔ LB > u−B/u+B(3) (4.20)
Therefore, B would play action send message m2 at round 2 of the protocol,
instead of action quitB, iff a linear combination, denoted as LB, of her set of beliefs
verifies the relation given by expression (4.20).
4.3.6 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole formally defined the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) for extensive Bayesian games in [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991b]. PBE adds to
Nash equilibrium the requirement that players choose optimally given their beliefs
about the rest of the game. In extensive Bayesian games of incomplete information,
each player is not only aware of the informational uncertainties over the other
participants, but also analyzes their implications. Thus, each player looks for the
best response, anticipating other party’s reaction. Please refer to Section A.5.3 for
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an extended exposition on the topic.
Bayes Requirements
We will formally define candidates to be a PBE in the extensive–form game GBSy
depicted in Fig. 4.1:
Definition 4.3.10 (PBE candidate). Candidates to be PBE in GBSy will be of the
form strategy-belief profile, denoted as (S; ρ) where:
S = (sA, sB) with sA ∈ SA, sB ∈ SB.
and
ρ = (αh, αd, βh, βd, σB, θ)
is a tuple containing both participant’s belief systems.
Definition 4.3.11 (PBE). A given profile (S∗; ρ∗) represents a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in GBSy if it defines a set of strategies such that, for every player i and
every information set Ii, player’s i strategy is her best response to the opponent’s
strategy, given her beliefs at set Ii.
In other words, to be a PBE, the strategies and beliefs defined by (S∗; ρ∗) must
satisfy what it is called Bayes requirements 1 to 4. Please find formal description of
these requirements in Appendix A.
PBE Candidates in Syverson’s Bayesian Protocol Game
To assist us in finding the appropriate PBE candidates in our particular case, we
will formulate the following set of requirements:
To be a PBE candidate for Syverson’s Bayesian protocol game, the strategies and
beliefs defined by (S∗; ρ∗) = (s∗A, s
∗
B;α
∗
h, α
∗
d, β
∗
h, β
∗
d , σ
∗
B, θ
∗) must satisfy the following
formulæ:
• For every strategy sA of Ad and for all αd and βd probability distributions:
EP (Ad, s∗A) ∗ α∗d(s∗1) ∗ β∗d(s∗3) > EP (Ad, sA) ∗ αd(s1) ∗ βd(s3) (4.21)
• For every strategy sA of Ah and for all αh and βh probability distributions:
EP (Ah, s∗A) ∗ α∗h(s∗1) ∗ β∗h(s∗3) > EP (Ah, sA) ∗ αh(s1) ∗ βh(s3) (4.22)
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• And finally, for all σB probability distribution:
EP (B, quitB) ∗ σ∗B(quitB) + EP (B,m2) ∗ σ∗B(m2) >
EP (B, quitB) ∗ σB(quitB) + EP (B,m2) ∗ σB(m2)
(4.23)
Since EP (B, quitB) = 0, expression (4.23) can be reduced to:
EP (B,m2) ∗ σ∗B(m2) > EP (B,m2) ∗ σB(m2) (4.24)
for all σB probability distribution.
Note that, when EP (B,m2) > 0, expression (4.24) is satisfied iff σ∗B(m2) = 1.
Likewise, when EP (B,m2) < 0, expression (4.24) is satisfied iff σ∗B(m2) = 0.
In previous calculations –see expressions (4.18) and (4.20)–, we have computed
a value LB which represents a threshold to determine a value for EP (B,m2). B’s
best response to all possible A’s strategies will be determined by the value of the
linear combination LB. Observe that, this is a stronger result than equation (4.20)
as we are now considering all possible mixed strategies for A and B.
Therefore, we will present the following strategy-belief profile (S∗; ρ∗) as our first
candidate to PBE for the game in Fig. 4.1:
(S∗; ρ∗) =
(
(m1,m3)h, (m1,m3)d,m2;α∗h, α
∗
d, β
∗
h, β
∗
d , σ
∗
B, θ
∗
)
(4.25)
with σ∗B(m2) = 1 and L
∗
B > u−B/u
+
B(3), being L
∗
B the linear combination defined in
equation (4.18).
Note that the presented candidate expresses the participant B’s intention to
succeed in the exchange of itemA and itemB.
The next PBE candidate to be considered represents the set of strategies for A
and B when A believes that B is likely to leave the protocol at round 2. Then, A’s
best response is to quit too:
(S0; ρ0) =
(
(quitA, quitA)h, (quitA, quitA)d, quitB;α0h, α
0
d, β
0
h, β
0
d , σ
0
B, θ
0
)
(4.26)
with σ0B(m2) = 0 and L
0
B < u
−
B/u
+
B(3), being L
0
B the linear combination defined in
equation (4.18).
PBE in Syverson’s Bayesian Protocol Game
In order to prove that each one of the previous profiles conforms a PBE, they must
satisfy Bayesian requirements 1 to 4. The reader will find formal description of these
requirements in Section A.5.3 of the Appendix.
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We will commence with the case of (S∗; ρ∗) defined in equation (4.25), as (S0; ρ0)
(equation (4.26)) can be trivially derived from the following steps.
Lemma 4.3.1. The strategy-believe profile (S∗; ρ∗) in Syverson’s Bayesian game
satisfies Bayes requirement 1.
Proof. It is required that each player A and B assigns a probability distribution
over the nodes in each information set Ii ∈ Ii.
The set IB ∈ IB identified at round 2 of the protocol is the only information
set with more than one element. Indeed, the requirement 1 is satisfied as,
considering the belief profile ρ∗, B defines the distributions α∗d and α
∗
h to satisfy
α∗h(gm1) +α
∗
h(m1) = 1 and α
∗
d(gm1) +α
∗
d(m1) = 1. Since θ
∗
h + θ
∗
d = 1 (see equation
(4.2)), then
θ∗h ∗ α∗h(gm1) + θ∗h ∗ α∗h(m1)+
θ∗d ∗ α∗d(gm1) + θ∗d ∗ α∗d(m1) = 1
(4.27)
Lemma 4.3.2. The strategy-belief profile (S∗; ρ∗) in Syverson’s Bayesian game
satisfies Bayes requirement 2.
Proof. Requirement 2 forces B to be rational and to behave accordingly to its beliefs
once B has reached the information set IB and for the rest of the game.
Let CGBSy be the continuation game starting at the information set IB ∈ IB,
and let ρ∗(IB) be the conditional beliefs at IB. Then, the strategy-belief profile
(S∗; ρ∗(IB)) must be a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game CGBSy. Evaluating
the payoff vectors we obtain:
EP (B, quitB, CGBSy) = 0 (4.28)
EP (B,m2, CGBSy) > 0 ⇔ θh ∗ α∗h(m1) ∗ β∗h(m3|m1)+
θd ∗ α∗d(m1) ∗ β∗d(m3|m1) >
u−B/u
+
B(3)
(4.29)
which it is, in fact, the value of LB described in the candidate’s definition (equation
(4.17)).
Therefore, the profile strategy given by (S∗; ρ∗(IB)) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium of the continuation game CGBSy.
Lemma 4.3.3. The strategy-believe profile (S∗; ρ∗) in Syverson’s Bayesian game
satisfies Bayes requirement 3.
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Proof. Requirement 3 forces B to establish sensible beliefs at the on–equilibrium–
path information set IB. This set of beliefs must be determined from the strategy
profile according to Bayes’ rule.
Therefore, B has to establish probability distributions α∗d and α
∗
h in terms of the
different actions that A can take at round 1 of the protocol. This is, if B believes
that Ad would choose the action of sending m1 with probability qd1, the action of
sending gm1 with probability qd2 and action quitA with probability 1 − qd1 − qd2,
then α∗d(m1) and α
∗
d(gm1) must take the following values:
α∗d(m1) =
qd1
(qd1 + qd2)
α∗d(gm1) =
qd2
(qd1 + qd2)
(4.30)
Likewise, B is forced to define:
α∗h(m1) =
qh1
(qh1 + qh2)
α∗h(gm1) =
qh2
(qh1 + qh2)
(4.31)
Lemma 4.3.4. The strategy-believe profile (S∗; ρ∗) in Syverson’s Bayesian game
satisfies Bayes requirement 4.
Proof. Requirement 4 forces B to establish sensible beliefs at any off–equilibrium–
path information set.
There are no information sets off the equilibrium path, so requirement 4 is
trivially satisfied.
Theorem 4.3.1. The strategy-believe profile (S∗; ρ∗) (equation (4.25)) is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of Syverson’s Bayesian protocol game.
Proof. Immediate by Definition A.5.9 and Lemmas 1 to 4.
A similar rationale can be applied to prove the strategy-belief profile (S0; ρ0)
(equation (4.26)) does also constitute a PBE in the protocol game. In this case,
however, the gains obtained are less than that obtained following (S∗; ρ∗). As a
result, the strategy to be followed will depend on the specific values of the items
and the beliefs that player B holds about the behavior of the other party.
4.3.7 Discussion
What Theorem 4.3.1 tell us is that the strategy S∗ is an equilibrium (i.e. will
constitute a successful exchange for both parties), but it depends on the specific
values taken by the beliefs of each participant, ρ∗. To be precise, the series of B′s
beliefs would have to form a linear combination which would determine the best
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response participant B can give to a player A. At the same time, A would create
its own set of beliefs to confront participant B. There could be more than one
equilibrium, as many as linear combinations LB there are, such that LB > u−B/u
+
B(3).
Next we provide an example with a set of values for which an equilibrium is
reached when both entities, behaving rationally, carry out a successful exchange
(see Fig. 4.1). We also present a scenario where B does not see justification in
exchanging items with A, as the price to pay for itemA is too high to justify the
risk.
Let us suppose that entity B has reasons (past experience, reputation factor,
etc.) to believe that entity A is not always honest. B estimates A to be honest
with probability θh = 0.85. Let us suppose that entity B does also hold enough
evidence to estimate that, when A is honest, the probability of A misbehaving
at step one of the protocol is very low, i.e. the probability of sending the correct
messagem1 at step one is very high, αh(m1) = 0.9. Let B suppose that, by contrast,
when A is dishonest, the probability of sending the correct message m1 is also high,
αd(m1) = 0.7. Given the previous set of values, B computes LB and establishes
a decision-making criteria. For instance, when the value u−B = 3.5, LB is not big
enough to encourage B to follow an exchanging strategy; instead, B would be better
off quitting the protocol without sending payment. A, aware ofB calculations, would
execute the strategy which best responds to B, this is, to also quit (see the analysis
for cases 1 and 2 in Fig. 4.1). By contrast, when u−B = 2.5, the payment B is asked to
pay for itemA is lower and satisfies the required criteria given by expression (4.20).
Entity B would then participate in the protocol following a strategy to complete
the exchange successfully.
4.4 Conclusions
It has been established in previous chapters that the formal framework provided
by basic (i.e. extensive–form) games and related concepts (Nash equilibrium) is
somewhat narrow to capture some of the complexities that could be relevant for an
in-depth analysis of rational exchange protocols.
In this chapter we provided an extended framework based on the notion of
dynamic games of incomplete information and the associated PBE, that can be
easily adapted to a variety of more realistic and more complex scenarios.
We introduced the notion of player type which it is a novel way in which represent
participant dishonest behavior, radically different from the way it was represented in
previous model based on games of imperfect information (further details are given in
the section below). In this case, a dishonest player will behave rationally according
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Payoffs
u+Ah = 3 u
−
Ah = 2 FAh = 6
u+Ad = 3 u
−
Ad = 1 FAd = 6
Beliefs
θh = 0.85 αh(m1) = 0.9 βh(m3|m1) = 0.9
θd = 0.15 αd(m1) = 0.7 βd(m3|m1) = 0.7
}
⇒ LB = 0.76
Case 1:
u+B(3) = 4
u−B = 3.5
⇒ u−B/u+B(3) = 0.875
Since LB < 0.875⇒ B would not participate.
Case 2:
u+B(3) = 4
u−B = 2.5
⇒ u−B/u+B(3) = 0.625
Since LB > 0.625⇒ B would participate.
Table 4.1: A numerical example of a Bayesian analysis.
to a set of fixed goals (set of payoff values) different from the set of goals of an
honest participant. A dishonest participant has no interest in behaving correctly
as it will never represent an increase in its payoff value. In a similar way, honest
participants will not misbehave, as misbehaving will not result beneficial. However,
the difficulty and the level of uncertainty is placed in not knowing which type of
player our opponent is and whether his behavior is driven by what we consider
honest or dishonest motives.
Our new model was applied to the formal analysis of Syverson’s rational exchange
protocol. Few interesting results were encountered and a practical example served
to illustrate possible real outcomes.
Our model is not exempted from inconveniences. In practice, dealing with
incomplete information implies that participants have to take an active role when
applying and implemented the model and each participant has to individually
decide whether there exits a secure context in which the rational exchange could be
successfully completed.
4.4.1 Differences Between the Two Proposed Models
Finally, we state the differences between the formalism described in previous Chapter
3, based on games of imperfect information, and the current Bayesian model.
On the one hand, the model described in Chapter 3, based on games of imperfect
information, is used for the formal analysis of rational schemes when executed in
environments of the following characteristics:
• There exists an unique set of protocol payoff values, which is the same for all
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instances of the protocol. This is, for every protocol run, both entities are
informed of the utility values each obtains, for every possible outcome of the
scheme and, this is the same in all different executions.
• To predict the outcome of the protocol, the model will analyze participant
actions at every step of the scheme, subject to environmental factors such as
trust, reputation, network reliability, protocol robustness, etc.)
On the other hand, the model based on games of incomplete information, is used
for the formal analysis of rational schemes when executed in environments of the
following characteristics:
• There exists different sets of protocol payoff values and participant entities
cannot be sure which particular set is used in each run of the protocol. In
other words, entities are only aware of the benefits or loses they obtain for
every possible protocol outcome, but they do not know what other entities
will obtain.
• To analyze the outcome of the protocol, the model will analyze participant
actions at every step of the scheme, subject to a conjecture about what set
of payoff values is part of the game and, environmental factors such as trust,
reputation, network reliability, protocol robustness, etc.)
The formal analysis of a given protocol will be carried out with one model or
another, depending on the characteristics of the particular execution environment.
In the next chapter, we will use this proposed Bayesian model to analyze a secure
P2P file sharing system, in which peers can be of two different types.
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Chapter 5
Bayesian Analysis of a Secure
P2P Content Distribution
Protocol
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, Game Theory has in other instances been used to model nodes’
behavior in P2P systems (see e.g. [Buragohain et al., 2003] and [Golle et al., 2001]).
In the latter, Golle et al. analyze free-riding situations using a model based on basic
Game Theory. However, they find perturbations –e.g. users joining and leaving the
system– when reaching for a Nash Equilibrium. Other Game–theoretical models
have also been introduced to formalize trust and reputation in secure P2P systems
([Gupta and Somani, 2005] and [Nurmi, 2006]).
5.1.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter we show how our model, based on Bayesian games, can be an useful
tool to analyze in a formal manner a P2P system. We will apply our formalism to
the analysis of a secure P2P content distribution protocol ([Palomar et al., 2006b]),
showing how nodes can dynamically adapt their strategies to highly transient
communities and how some security aspects rest on the formal proof of notions
such as rationality or best–response strategies.
The scheme we intent to analyze was first introduced by Palomar et al. in
[Palomar et al., 2006b]. In this work, the authors presented a two–phase protocol
ensuring file content integrity and content access control in a P2P file sharing system.
We will formally analyze the second part of the scheme based on rational content
access control.
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5.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we give a brief resume of the
terms most commonly used in P2P systems and particular notation used in Palomar
et al.’s work. In Section 5.3 we describe the scheme focus of our analysis. Section
5.4 is devoted to the formal analysis of the protocol described and, finally, in Section
5.6 we discuss the main conclusions to this work.
5.2 P2P Terms and Specific Notation
• N is the number of nodes (also denoted peers) in the P2P network. Each node
is denoted by ni.
• Each ni has a pair of public and private keys, denoted by Kni and K−1ni ,
respectively.
• m denotes the content that a specific node wishes to publish.
• h(m) represents a cryptographic hash function applied to content m.
• EK−1ni (m) is the asymmetric encryption of content m using Kni as key.
Similarly, we denote by EKS (m) the symmetric encryption of message m using
a secret key KS .
• sni(m) represents ni’s signature over m, i.e.:
sni(m) = EK−1ni
(h(m)) (5.1)
• Finally, we denote snjni (m), ni’s signature onm concatenated with nj ’s identity,
i.e.:
s
nj
ni (m) = EK−1ni
(nj ||h(m)) (5.2)
5.3 P2P File Sharing Protocol Description
Palomar et al.’s protocol offered content integrity based on the collaboration among
a fraction of peers in the system. Moreover, the model establishes a rational content
access control by means of a challenge–response mechanism, whereby nodes may
achieve good reputation and privileges. Contrary to classic trust systems where
trust decisions are directly or indirectly given by nodes’ past behavior, the scheme
uses cryptographic proofs of work to discourage selfish behavior and to reward
cooperation.
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5.3.1 Content Access Protocol
Although as mentioned before the scheme is structured in two main phases (content
authentication and content access), we will only illustrate the latter, as that will be
the focus of our analysis. For further and more detailed description of the whole
scheme please refer to [Palomar et al., 2006a] and [Palomar et al., 2006b].
Collaborative and Non–Collaborative Peers
Let us consider a P2P file sharing system in which participant nodes are typified to
be collaborative and non–collaborative and which are supposed to interact following
a specific interacting protocol.
A collaborative node is one which is not expected to deviate from the protocol
specified for the interaction between peers. In other words, a collaborative node
does not find reward in misbehaving. By contrast, a non–collaborative node will be
expected to deviate from the specified file sharing protocol as in doing so the node
presupposes to obtain bigger payoff value.
Access to File Content
Let R be a requester node who requires a specific filem. At this point, node R would
launch a search query across the community which would lead to a list of sources
(provider nodes) that keep an encrypted replica of the desired content. Each node
in the list would also publish proof of the required content’s integrity. Requester R
must select a source P according to some criterion and then ask P for a trapdoor
to access content m. For this, R must initiate a four-step protocol in which P must
also participate.
Asking for a Trapdoor
Briefly explained, before R can reach the trapdoor (l bits out of the secret key KS
used to encrypt the required content m), she has to solve a challenge issued by P .
The challenge represents a proof-of-work for granting permission to access the file
content and its complexity depends on the content security level and a conjecture
over the community’s collaboration nature.
We further elaborate on the protocol steps in the best possible case, i.e. in which
both main parties are motivated to behave correctly and to follow the protocol
faithfully (both nodes are collaborative). The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 5.1.
The requester R contacts the provider P using the last part of the content’s
integrity proof been published, EKP
(
h(m)
)
, and signs it (Fig. 5.1 –message m1).
With this message m1, P can check R’s identity (implicit in the notation used) and
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1. R→ P : m1 = EKP
(
h(m)
)
, σ1
2. P → R: m2 = EKR(ςj), σ2
3. R→ P : m3 = EKP (τj), σ3
4. P → R: m4 = EKR(ω(KS), σ4
where σ1 = sPR
(
EKP
(
h(m)
))
σ2 = sRP
(
EKR(ςj)
)
σ3 = sPR
(
EKP (τj)
)
and σ4 = sRP
(
EKR(ω(KS))
)
Figure 5.1: Content access scheme: Asking for a trapdoor.
the required content’s hash. After this, P elaborates a conjecture θ over requester
R’s real nature. The estimation will be based on:
1. R’s collaborative attitude (i.e. if P believes that R is collaborative or non–
collaborative).
2. The results of past interactions: past experience within the same community
will allow P to adjust new estimates.
This conjecture can take the form of a numerical value, so if the computed
value is higher than a given threshold P decides to continue with the protocol
otherwise, P would ignore R’s request. Note that the decision of interacting with R
depends on time-varying factors, such as the accumulated experience of P within this
community. As a consequence, it seems reasonable to update these beliefs regularly.
The underlying idea is that P will try to reduce the cost when she estimates it is
highly possible to interact with non–collaborative peers.
If R is estimated to be collaborative, P computes a challenge ς and sends it
to R (message m2). Upon receiving it, R sends back the corresponding response
τ (message m3) to P . If P considers τ correct, she sends R the trapdoor ω(KS)
necessary to recover the key KS (message m4).
Concerning the challenge itself, there exist a number of primitives which can
be used for this purpose. The basic idea is that the verification by the challenger
should be fast, but the computation by the requester has to be fairly slow.
5.4 Formal Analysis: Bayesian Framework
Our analysis of the scheme introduced in the previous section is an application
of Chapter 4’s formal model based on Bayesian games. We will only reproduce
those aspects of the formal model which are essential to the goals and scope of
this chapter using the same notation whenever possible. The main goals of this
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analysis are based on supporting rationality proof of the protocol and also studying
the dynamics created when nodes interact in a file sharing P2P system using the
proposed scheme.
5.4.1 Players and Types
The following definitions formalize some of the Bayesian concepts for our specific
P2P system.
Each protocol participant becomes a player in the corresponding protocol game.
Let provider P and requester R be the players of the protocol game, denoted as GBRP
and created from the protocol description given in Fig. 5.1. We consider {P,R} as
the complete set of players.
Definition 5.4.1 (Players type profiles). Let T = TP ×TR be the type–profile space
in GBRP , where Tp = {C} and TR = {C,NC} are the type spaces for players P
and R, respectively. A type C denotes a collaborative node, while NC denotes a
non–collaborative one.
In other words, in our particular instance, a provider node P has a single type,
collaborative. By contrast, requester nodes R have two different types. We will
denote by P a collaborative provider, and by RC and RNC a collaborative and a
non–collaborative requester, respectively.
We consider the following probability distribution over the space T :
θC = Prob(RC |P )
θNC = Prob(RNC |P )
s.t. θC + θNC = 1
(5.3)
Note that Prob(P |RC) = Prob(P |RNC) = 1.
5.4.2 Strategies and Beliefs
As previously explained, a pure strategy for a player E in a game G is a complete
contingency plan which describes the series of actions that player E would take at
each possible decision point in the game G. For our specific instance we define:
Definition 5.4.2 (Players set of actions). Let AP = {m2,m4, quitP } and AR =
{m1,m3, quitR} be the sets of actions for players P and R, respectively.
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Definition 5.4.3 (Pure strategies for player P ). In GBRP , the complete set of pure
strategies for player P , denoted as SP , is defined as SP = {sP1 , sP2 , sP3 }, where: sP1
= (m2, quitP ), sP2 = (m2,m4) and s
P
3 = (quitP , ·).
The first component of each tuple represents the action taken by player P at
round 2 of the protocol (P ’s first turn to move). In a similar way, the second
component represents the action taken by P at round 4 of the protocol (player P ’s
second chance to make a move).
Definition 5.4.4 (Pure strategies for player R). In GBRP , a pure strategy for player
R is represented by a tuple sR= (sRC , sRNC ) where:
• sRC represents the strategy to follow by a node R of type collaborative,
• sRNC represents the strategy to follow by a node R of type non–collaborative,
Each (sRC , sRNC ) ∈ SR × SR where:
• SR = {sR1 , sR2 }
• sR1 = (m1, quitR) and sR2 = (m1,m3).
Then, the complete set of pure strategies for player R is then described as:
{(sR1 , sR1 ), (sR2 , sR2 ), (sR1 , sR2 ), (sR2 , sR1 )} (5.4)
In this case, the first component of each tuple represents the action player R
takes at stage one in the protocol game, and the second describes the action at
stage three (first and second turns for R to move).
Definition 5.4.5 (Strategy profile). A strategy profile in the GBRP game is a vector
s = (sR, sP ) of individual strategies, one for each player, where sR ∈ SR × SR and
sP ∈ SP .
Note that, specifying a strategy profile univocally determines the outcome of the
game.
The following probability distributions represent the set of beliefs each entity
holds over the opponent’s type and actions at each particular stage of the protocol.
Definition 5.4.6 (Node P belief system). At stage two of the protocol, P ’s
conjecture over peer R’s real nature (requester R could be collaborative or non–
collaborative) is represented by the following probability distribution function over
TR:
θ = Prob(RNC |m1) 1− θ = Prob(RC |m1) (5.5)
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p− Cost for node P to elaborate a puzzle to include in m2.
p+ Profit for node P when completing the protocol sending the trapdoor included
in m4. This value represents the potential new business generated by well
behaved providers ensuring the continuation of the current system.
rt Value it has for requester R to have received a puzzle. When R is non–
collaborative, this value represents the reward to having misled provider P to
enter the protocol, when R had no intention to send back a response.
r+ When the requester is collaborative, this value represents the gain after
receiving the trapdoor included in m4.
r− Cost for player R to elaborate an answer to the P ’s challenge.
Table 5.1: Payoffs in the GBRP game.
Likewise, requester nodes are able to form conjectures over the provider’s
intention to quit the protocol at round two of the protocol. We define the following
probability distribution function to represent such a belief:
Definition 5.4.7 (Node R belief system). At stage two of the protocol, R’s
conjecture over peer P ’s actions is represented by the following probability
distribution function:
α = Prob(quitP |P ) 1− α = Prob(m2|P ) (5.6)
Note that, at stages three and four of the protocol, entities are rationally forced
to follow the protocol description as they obtain a better payoff value by doing so.
Hence, there is no need for opponent’s nodes to form conjectures over any other
kind of behavior at those steps. Therefore, rationality is therefore forcing nodes to
take specific actions. We will give formal proof of this statement in further sections.
5.4.3 Payoff Functions
As stated before, one of the key points of Bayesian games is the fact that each
type of player is associated with a different payoff function. We define the following
payoff functions:
UR, UP : TR × SR × SP → R
Table 5.1 relates all possible payoff values obtained by players in the GBRP game.
In addition, we impose the following constraints:
r− > rt
p+ > p− > 0
0 6 ω, θ, α 6 1
(5.7)
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Figure 5.2: GBRP in extensive–form.
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R
1= (m1, quitR)
Table 5.2: Dominant and dominated strategies for player R.
Moreover, a detailed representation in extensive–form of the protocol game GBRP
is provided in Fig. 5.2. Briefly, the common interpretation of an extensive–form
game is the following: The game can be thought of as a tree, where the edges
and the vertices are associated to actions and sequences of actions, respectively.
Terminal vertices are those that cannot be followed by any other actions. When a
sequence of actions reaches a terminal vertex, the game ends. For each branch in
the tree, the payoff value associated to its final node represents the total outcome
that players R and P obtain when following such a path. The reader is referred to
Appendix A for further details on Games in extensive–form.
5.4.4 Dominated Strategies and Expected Gains
In this section, we will compute the gains each player expects to obtain when
following a specific strategy.
There are cases when it is possible to anticipate the moves that rational players
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P
1= (m2, quitP)
Table 5.3: Dominant and dominated strategies for player P .
will or will not take during the protocol game execution. All those actions for which
the expected payoff is lower than the one obtained following other options are called
dominated strategies. By contrast, a dominant strategy is such that, a rational player
will always choose to follow it, as the expected gain by doing so is greater than by
taking a different move (see Section A.1.2 for further details).
Dominated strategies can be eliminated from the formal analysis as self-
interested rational players will never follow them. In our specific analysis of the
GBRP protocol game, we can clearly identify one dominated strategy for player P at
the final stage of the protocol game:
• Action send m4 dominates the last round of the protocol game. Every rational
provider P , having reached stage four in the protocol game, will always choose
to send message m4 as the expected payoff is greater by doing so than by
quitting the game. Both a reputation system and the prospect of future
profitable interactions are represented by the positive value p+.
We compute the Expected payoff values EP (·) for each player involved and the
remaining set of moves, by multiplying the probability of following a specific branch
of the tree and corresponding payoff expected at the final node.
The following are the expected payoff values from entity R’s point of view. Table
5.2 summarizes the following results:
EP (RC , sR1 , α) = (1− α) · (rt)
EP (RC , sR2 , α) = (1− α) · r+
EP (RNC , sR1 , α) = (1− α) · rt
EP (RNC , sR2 , α) = (1− α) · (−ωr−)
(5.8)
Equations (5.8) let us formally reason and establish the following statements:
• Action quitR is dominated by action send m3 at stage three of the protocol
game, when R type is collaborative. At this stage in the protocol game, R
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is sure of P ’s latest move (participant rationality is public information) so
choosing to send m3 offers R a greater payoff value. Note EP (RC , sR1 , α) <
EP (RC , sR2 , α). Strategy s
R
2 is therefore a dominant strategy for RC .
• By contrast, action quitR dominates strategy send m3 at stage three of the
protocol game and for player R, type non–collaborative. Choosing quitR offers
RNC a positive payoff value of (1 − α) ∗ rt ∀ 0 < α < 1, whereas choosing
m3 will only get a negative payoff value. Strategy sR1 is therefore a dominant
strategy for player RNC .
Similar calculations can be carried out from player P ’s point of view. For this
we have:
EP (P, sP1 , θ) = −p−
EP (P, sP2 , θ) = θ · (−p−) + (1− θ) · p+ =
p+ − θ · (p+ + p−)
EP (P, sP3 , θ) = 0
(5.9)
Table 5.3 summarizes these results.
Equations (5.9) let us formally reasoning and establishing the following
statements:
• Strategy sP1 is clearly a dominated strategy for player P , as the expected payoff
is negative ∀ 0 6 θ 6 1.
• Strategy SP2 is a dominant strategy over SP3 if and only if EP (P, sP2 , θ) > 0
⇔ θ < p+/(p+ + p−).
5.5 Evaluation of Rationality
As described above, the formal model will serve to formally prove that Palomar et
al.’s scheme is rational, that is, rational (self-interested) entities will always follow
the steps described by the protocol.
5.5.1 Nash Equilibrium.
An equilibrium of the system will be represented by an equilibrium of the game. An
equilibrium of the system will be a certain state which self-interested parties will
not want to unilaterally move from. An equilibrium of the game is a set of strategies
from which players would not want to individually deviate to obtain better payoff
values.
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Figure 5.3: (Left) Best–response function for P . (Right) Intersection of best–
response functions for P and R (both RC and RNC).
We will consider a best–response function for each player and type. The best–
response function offers players the best strategies when responding to all possible
types of an opponent and all their possible strategies.
Figure Fig. 5.3 (left) depicts graphically the best–response function for player
P , according to the expected payoff values calculated in equations (5.9).
Best–response function for peer R can also be defined from equations (5.8).
Figure Fig. 5.3(right) shows the intersection with player P ’s best–response function.
The left vertical line correspond to requester type C, while the right vertical line
correspond to requester type NC. It is precisely in these intersection points, where
both best–response functions cross each other that the equilibrium is reached.
Neither the provider nor the requester would want to modify their strategies
unilaterally, as by doing so they would not obtain better results. Note that
one of the equilibrium points is reached when all players complete all steps in
the protocol. This serves to formally prove that our scheme is a rational one
([Buttya´n and Hubaux, 2001]).
Furthermore, note that the reasoning in Section 5.4.4 allows us to conclude that
such equilibria represent Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium points as defined by Bayesian
requirements in Section A.5.3.
5.5.2 Impact of Non–collaboration.
Additionally, the formal model let us formally identify and measure two main factors
of the proposed content access scheme.
• Firstly, the system dynamics depends upon the conjecture θ that player P
makes on the type of community in which it is immersed. This conjecture
could vary and it can be dynamically adjusted while the system is operative.
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• Secondly, the ratio p−/p+ (cost over profit) does also influence the system
behavior. Both parameters are used as control parameters for the dynamics
of the system.
• Figure Fig. 5.4 shows the relationship between the ratio cost over profit
(p−/p+) and the threshold computed by P (θ < p+/(p+ + p−)) to accept the
request and enter the protocol. Note that P ’s conjecture over the proportion
of non–collaborative nodes within the community θ = Prob(“R being no-
collaborative”) must always be lower than 0.5. P uses these calculations
as a defense mechanism against communities where the number of non–
collaborative nodes is greater that the number of collaborative ones.
5.6 Conclusions
Infrastructure-less networks on which in general, one cannot assume the existence
of centralized services such as those provided by TTPs, present a challenge in terms
of formalizing collaboration-based security protocols.
In this paper we have analyzed the protocol game of a rational content
sharing scheme modeling all possible interactions of the protocol participants and
establishing formal proof of its rationality.
Although we are assuming participant rational behavior, we are able to consider
non–collaborative players and to measure the effect they might have on the overall
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system performance.
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Part II
Automated Design of
Multi–party Rational–Exchange
Security (M–RES) Protocols

Chapter 6
Introduction to the Automated
Synthesis of Cryptographic
Protocols
6.1 Introduction
Evolutionary Computation is the general term for several computational techniques
which are based, to some extent, on natural phenomena from the real world and
which are most commonly deployed for the purpose of heuristic search.
Heuristic search is concerned with the development and application of general
purpose optimization techniques in search of optimal solutions to very difficult
problems. In the absence of the best possible answer to a question, an heuristic
technique is sometimes able to produce optimal solutions within feasible and
tractable computational settings.
Heuristic techniques have been successfully applied across many scientific and
engineering domains. In particular, they have been very successful when applied
to cryptology. Hao, Clark and Jacob were the first ones to show in a series
of works ([Clark and Jacob, 2000], [Clark and Jacob, 2001], [Chen et al., 2004] and
[Chen et al., 2005]), how heuristic search can be used to automatically synthesize
cryptographic protocols that are demonstrably correct and satisfy various security
and efficiency criteria. Moreover, in [Herna´ndez-Castro et al., 2006] the authors
presented a general scheme for the design of block ciphers by means of genetic
programming. Also, applied to cryptanalysis, in [Este´vez-Tapiador et al., 2007a]
and [Este´vez-Tapiador et al., 2007b] the authors applied heuristic techniques for the
cryptanalysis of S-boxes, hash functions and stream ciphers.
The aim of this chapter is to give the reader a basic understanding of what an
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heuristic search technique consists of, its applications and most common types. We
will also introduce several related concepts, which will be used in future chapters for
the presentation of our proposed synthesis model. In particular, we will present an
introduction to fitness landscapes and random walks. Both are techniques, within
the Evolutionary Computation area, closely linked to any heuristic approach. The
use of these techniques provides us with valuable information to determine the main
components of any heuristic algorithm to be applied.
6.1.1 Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we give a brief introduction
to the most commonly used heuristic search algorithms. In Section 6.3 we present
fitness landscapes and random walks. These two concepts together with the notion
of fitness autocorrelation provide the basics for the applied techniques. Finally, in
Section 6.4 we will offer a survey on the existing work on applying heuristic search
to the automated synthesis of security protocols.
6.2 Heuristic Search
Formally, the general aim of an heuristic technique is to find optimal solutions to
problems that are structured as a function of some variables, in the presence of some
constraints. These can be formulated as:
Maximize F (x) subject to
x ∈ C ⊂ X
where:
• X represents the set of all possible vectors x = (x1, . . . , xn) of decision
variables, usually referred to as the solution space.
• Set C represents the set of imposed constraints and,
• Function F is defined such that it computes the fitness1 of a given vector
x. The fitness function is usually defined to measure how good a vector x is
and whether it represents an optimal solution to the maximization problem in
hand. In other cases, it is defined so it provides guidance to the search.
In other words, given a space X of vectors and some measurable characteristic
value F (x) associated to each vector, the problem is to find a solution with the
maximum possible F (x) value, subject to a set of constraints.
Different approaches can be taken when confronting such a maximization
problem. In the next section we analyze the most common.
1For minimization problems this function is denoted as cost function.
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6.2.1 Search Methods for Optimal Solutions
Brute force is the least sophisticated of search methods. It consists in evaluating
F (x) for every vector x ∈ X in turn. Either a solution with the sought F (x)
value is found or there is no solution to the problem. The method presents clear
disadvantages. In some instances, one simply cannot evaluate every single possible
point in the solution space as these are too numerous. In other instances, it is not
even possible to enumerate every solution. In both cases, a statistical search could
be more effective.
A statistical search consists in randomly selecting a sample of the solution space
evaluating each one of the sampling vectors. This type of search is usually applied
when the fitness value F (x) of any vector x, provides little exploitable information
about which vector x′, from the solution space, should be evaluated next. This has
been the standard method for many years and it is still commonly used, in particular
for the design of security protocols as protocol designers do usually take a proposal
from the space of protocols, and then check for the required security properties.
Finally, a completely different approach denoted as guided search consists in
selecting an individual from the solution space and, via a neighboring operator,
generating a series of consecutive neighbor vectors in such a way that, for two
neighbor points in the solution space, we expect to obtain similar fitness values.
Note that the way in which the neighboring operator is defined will determine the
outcome of the search. Likewise, the fitness function chosen must show some degree
of linearity and continuity over the space of possible solutions. The search process
progresses moving from one solution to a neighbor solution trying to improve the
fitness value.
An heuristic search is a guided search. Examples of heuristic techniques for the
search of optimal solutions are:
Hill Climbing: Techniques based on Hill Climbing evaluate the fitness values in the
neighborhood of a current solution and make the search move to a neighbor
solution if and only if, the move improves the current fitness value. The
problem with this technique and its derivatives is quite obvious: if the search
starts in the wrong place the result might end up being a local rather than a
global optimum.
Simulated Annealing: Simulated
Annealing ([Kirkpatrick et al., 1983]), is inspired by the cooling processes of
molten metals. It merges a basic Hill Climbing technique with a probabilistic
acceptance of non–improving solutions, which allows the search to escape from
local optima. We introduce the basic scheme in Fig. 6.1 and detail the process
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S ← S0
T ← T0
repeat until stopping criterion is met
repeat MIL times
Pick C ∈ N(S) with uniform probability
if F (C) > F (S) then
S ← C
else
Pick U ∈ (0, 1) with uniform probability
if F (C) > F (S) + T lnU then
S ← C
T ← αT
where:
S0 represents the initial individual
T0 is the initial temperature
MIL defines the number of moves in the inner loop.
N(S) represents S’s neighborhood
F (·) represents the fitness function
0 < α < 1 is the cooling factor
Figure 6.1: Basic Simulated Annealing algorithm.
in the following paragraphs.
Roughly, this technique requires a first individual S0 which is randomly
generated and presented for evaluation. Each individual’s evaluation consists
of computing its fitness value F (·). There is also a control parameter T ∈ R+
known as temperature, which takes an initial value T0 and which dynamically
decreases its value during the annealing process. The first randomly generated
S0 is evolved to a different solution C in the neighborhood of S0. The new
scheme is also evaluated. If the new individual C reaches a higher level of
overall fitness than the original one, then it is accepted as a new valid scheme
from which to generate the next one. If the new individual represents a solution
worse than the previous one, the new scheme could only be accepted if the
control parameter T is above a specific value. In other words, better solutions
are always accepted and worse solutions are accepted when the temperature
is still above a certain threshold. The process is repeated a fixed number of
times depending on the initial temperature and the number of solutions being
accepted.
Tabu search: Tabu search [Glover, 1987], is a widely used modern search
technique. If merges a best improvement local search algorithm with some
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S ← Generate Initial Solution()
TL ← Initialize Tabu list
repeat until stopping criterion is met
Compute AllowedSet(S) = {C ∈ N(S)|C 6∈ TL}
Select best C in AllowedSet(S)
Update TL
S ← C
where:
N(S) represents S’s neighborhood and,
TL is the Tabu list.
Figure 6.2: Basic Tabu algorithm.
historical search information, that is, it uses some form of memory of the
evolution of the search. If a particular solution S is reached, then it becomes
tabu for a number Ts of transactions, generally referred to as tabu tenure. If
a solution is tabu, then the search is prevented from moving to that solution.
This way, the local space of a given solution is thoroughly explored before
making a move avoiding cycles. The basic scheme is formally described in
Figure 6.2.1.
Generally, some aspiration criterion is also introduced to allow tabu solutions
to abandon the tabu list in less than Ts moves. Also, in practise, maintaining
lists of tabu solutions is very inefficient and this is usually overcome by keeping
lists of attributes, for example, the fitness value of a solution. In this case,
the search will be prevented from visiting neighboring solutions with the same
fitness for a fixed number of moves. Many different variants of a general tabu
procedure exist ([Glover, 1990], [de Werra et al., 1995]).
Iterated local search : Iterated local search can be considered one of many hybrid
techniques aimed to search over the space of local optima, before moving on
to the search of global optima. A random solution S0 is generated and local
search is applied to reach a local optimum S∗. This local optimum is perturbed
in some way to obtain S′ and local search applied again to reach another local
optimum S∗′ . Then, some criterion is applied to determine if the search should
move from S∗ to S∗′ . A variety of moving criteria can be adopted (always
accept, only accept improving moves, probabilistic acceptance in a annealing–
like manner, etc.) Figure 6.2.1 explicitly describes the general process.
Genetic algorithms: Genetic algorithms [Goldberg, 1989], are heuristic search
techniques based on natural selection. Figure 6.4 describes the pseudo–code
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S0 ← Generate Initial Solution()
S∗ ← Local Search(S0)
repeat until stopping criterion is met
S′ ← Perturbation(S∗)
S∗′ ← Local Search(S′)
S∗ ← Apply acceptance criterion(S∗,S∗′)
Figure 6.3: Basic ILS algorithm.
Choose initial population
Evaluate the fitness of each individual in the population
repeat until stopping criterion is met
Select best fitness individuals to reproduce
Breed new generation through crossover and mutation and
give birth to offspring
Evaluate the fitness of each offspring
Replace worst ranked part of population with offspring
Figure 6.4: Basic Genetic algorithm.
of a basic genetic algorithm.
Most frequently, solutions are represented as binary strings, but other
encodings are also possible. The process usually starts from a randomly
generated population of individuals and successive generations are produced
using a combination of evolutionary operators (crossover and mutation). The
population size depends on the nature of the problem, but typically contains
several hundreds or thousands of possible solutions.
In each successive generation, the fitness of every individual in the population
is evaluated. A proportion of the population is then selected in a way such that,
fitter solutions (as measured by a fitness function) are typically more likely to
be selected. Each pair of selected individuals produces a child solution using
methods of crossover and mutation, creating new solutions which share many
of the characteristics of its parents. A new generation of individuals is created
which is different from the previous one. Generally, the average fitness of the
new population will have increased since only the best organisms are selected
for breeding, along with a small proportion of less fit solutions. Commonly,
the algorithm terminates when either a maximum number of generations has
been produced, or a satisfactory fitness level has been reached amongst the
population.
Combined techniques: Techniques like the ones described in the previous
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paragraphs are often used in combination. It is common to apply a specific
heuristic algorithm to find the start point for a different technique to carry
on with the search. It is also usual to finish the last moves of a search with a
variant over the technique applied for the search up to that point.
6.3 Fitness Landscape Analysis
Taken from biology, the notion of fitness landscape has become an important concept
in Evolutionary Computation. Recently, the landscapes of a range of problems have
been analyzed in an attempt to determine the relationship between fitness landscape
structure and the performance of a particular heuristic technique. In other words,
the analysis of landscape structures could allow us to determine the difficulty of a
task and hence apply the most appropriate heuristic search algorithm.
To study the fitness landscape properties of a given problem the following
components have to be defined:
1. A neighboring operator which, given a vector in the solution space, generates
a neighbor. The neighboring operator will have a large effect on determining
the fitness landscape for a particular problem.
2. A technique to produce a number of consecutive neighboring vectors within
the solution space. (For example, the random walk technique).
3. A fitness function which assigns each generated vector a fitness value.
The mapping provided by the fitness function over neighbor points of the solution
space constitutes the landscape.
6.3.1 The Random Walk Technique and the Autocorrelation
Function
The random walk technique produces a number of consecutive neighboring vectors
within the solution space. In the initial phase of a random walk a random solution
is produced and evaluated. Then, using the neighbor operator a neighbor individual
is generated and calculated its fitness. The same step is repeated k times, this
representing the length of the walk.
A number of techniques for the analysis of landscape structures exist. In
particular, Weinberger in [Wenberger, 1990] investigated how the autocorrelation
function of the fitness values along the steps of a random walk relates to the
ruggedness of the examined landscape.
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In the coming paragraphs we will provide details on the definition of a fitness
autocorrelation function and its most representative shapes resulting in significant
landscape properties.
Fitness Autocorrelation Function
Definition 6.3.1. The autocorrelation of a random walk relates the fitness of any
two individuals which are s steps apart. We denote:
R(t, s) =
E(ft ∗ ft+s)−E(ft) ∗ E(ft+s)
var(f)
(6.1)
where
• ft is the fitness of the t–th individual along the walk,
• ft+s is the fitness of the individual s steps further along the walk and,
• var(f) represents the variance of the entire series.
This value is calculated for all possible pairs (t, s) in each walk.
Some characteristic shapes for the autocorrelation function can be interpreted
as described below:
• Most correlation values are close to zero. This is characteristic of a random
landscape where there is no correlation between fitness values. It is usually
representative of extremely rugged fitness landscapes wherein any guided
search is likely to operate as a random search.
• A second characteristic form is the fast decaying form. It is usually
representative of moderately rugged fitness landscapes in which guided search
algorithms can often obtain good solutions in less time than a classic random
search.
• The third characteristic form of an autocorrelation function is the slow
decaying form. This corresponds to highly correlated fitness values and it
is usually representative of even fitness landscapes. In other words, neighbor
solution points offer very similar fitness which will probably make any guided
search quite slow.
• Finally, a constant or periodic autocorrelation function often indicates a badly
defined neighboring operator which would periodically generate individuals
which are too similar to one another.
6.4 Heuristic Search Applied to the Synthesis of Security Protocols 113
A desirable fitness autocorrelation function lies somewhere in between the second
and third type. At the same time, one also has to take into account that the study
of fitness autocorrelation is not determinant of the difficulty of the task to be solved
by any heuristic search algorithm.
6.4 Heuristic Search Applied to the Synthesis of
Security Protocols
Finally, we will also provide a brief survey on some of the work already developed
in the area of automated design of security protocols.
It is clear that the number of possible protocols achieving a set of goals from a
set of initial assumptions grows exponentially as the number of goals or the number
of participant entities rise. Therefore, for a protocol designing technique to be
scalable and feasible it cannot be based on simple enumeration. In this context, a
methodology based on an heuristic search represents a good compromise between
optimal solutions and computational tractability.
As mentioned before, Hao, Clark and Jacob were the first ones to show how
heuristic search can be used to automatically synthesize cryptographic protocols,
that are provably secure and satisfy various other efficiency and effectiveness criteria.
Their approach is novel in the design of security protocols, providing an excellent
framework for the automated exploration of very large design spaces, far greater
than could be considered using manual design.
In their first work ([Clark and Jacob, 2000]), the authors show how evolutionary
search, in the form of a Genetic algorithm, can be used to generate correct and
efficient protocols. They describe and implement an automated process by which,
given a set of assumptions and goals, security protocols achieving those goals are
automatically synthesized. In their model, they use BAN logic or logic of beliefs
(Section 2.5.1 and [Burrows et al., 1990]), to represent protocol assumptions, as
well as participants’ individual goals and other security requirements. Protocols are
represented by bit strings. These strings are subject to the genetic evolutionary
mechanisms (crossover and mutation) over different populations, so protocols
satisfying the required goals, emerge through evolution. The resulting protocols
are evaluated according to two different properties:
• Correctness, in terms of how many of the security goals a protocol achieves
and,
• Efficiency, in terms of how early in the protocol the goals are attained. In this
regard, different evaluation strategies are adopted to guide the search. Some
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of these are detailed in what follows:
– Early Credit (EC): This strategy assigns better fitness to protocols which
achieve more security goals at early stages of the protocol.
– Uniform Credit (UC): It applies an uniform weight to all security goals,
regardless at what stage they are achieved during a protocol run.
– Delayed Gratification (DG): This strategy captures the idea that early
gratification of goals may not necessarily be a good thing.
– Destination Judgement (DJ): It does not matter when a protocol satisfies
the set of stated goals, the important thing is how many it satisfies in
the end.
Clark et al. apply the previously described formalism for the synthesis of a three
entity symmetric key distribution protocol, with six or fewer messages.
Further refinements to this initial model are provided in subsequent works. In
[Clark and Jacob, 2001] the authors present a process for the automated synthesis of
symmetric key distribution protocols based on heuristic search algorithm Simulated
Annealing (SA). A protocol is represented by a list of integers representing the
messages being exchanged between two of the participant entities. Each message
contains a sequence of beliefs that one entity sends to another (by construction,
senders only send beliefs they actually hold). Associated with every entity is a
vector of its current beliefs. After a message is sent, the beliefs vector for the current
receiver is updated and entities check whether their goals have been satisfied. This
representation allows a very simple move strategy for a SA search which randomly
changes any of the beliefs involved in any of the messages. Initially, the search
algorithm applies perturbations to a randomly generated protocol to generate new
schemes. Sequentially, similar changes are applied to each intermediate protocol
measuring their fitness.
Furthermore, in [Chen et al., 2004], Chen, Clark and Jacob use SA for the
synthesis of provably secure protocols in which principals are able to use asymmetric
encryption.
Finally, in [Chen et al., 2005] authors extend previous works in several ways:
(1) They use a subset of the SVO logic to represent protocol assumptions,
participants’ individual goals and, as a proof system. SVO logic
([Syverson and van Oorschot, 1994a]) is an extension to BAN logic presenting
some additional features.
(2) Additional factors are considered for the evaluation of synthesized protocols:
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• Security, in terms of how many security goals a protocol achieves and
how early in the protocol. Two strategies are evaluated: early credit
(EC) and uniform credit (UC).
• Efficiency, in terms of number of messages, number of encryptions and
the number of interactions with particular principals (servers, TTP, etc.)
In this case, the fitness function is defined as the sum of a security fitness value
and an efficiency fitness value. The first will reward protocols that achieve
greater proportion of stated goals, whilst the second will punish protocols with
many messages, protocols with more encryption and protocols with higher
number of interactions with particular protocol participants.
A similar technique based on Genetic algorithms is also applied by Park et al.
in [Park and Hong, 2005], to the synthesis of cryptographic protocols for a fault-
tolerant agent replication system.
Finally, some of the protocols synthesized by these techniques are already well
known schemes in their fields.
6.5 Conclusions
The above work indicates that the mechanisms of Evolutionary Computation and
other heuristic algorithms can provide a plausibly tool for the automated generation
of secure and efficient protocols. Although most of the schemes and solutions
generated by these tools need further refinements and, these final touches might
need additional security analysis, the new methodology can be used to search the
design space and provide input to human designers, who would then derive concrete
refinements of the abstract protocols.
In the next chapters we will define a methodology based on Simulated Annealing,
for the automated synthesis of rational–exchange cryptographic protocols.
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Chapter 7
Foundations for the Automated
Synthesis of M–RES Protocols
7.1 Introduction
In Part I of this thesis we provided a formalism by which rational cryptographic
protocols could be analyzed. The model was based on Game Theory; in particular,
protocols were represented as games in extensive–form (trees) and rationality was
described in terms of the Nash equilibria in the game.
In Part II of the document we will be focusing on the automated design of
cryptographic rational schemes. For this, new tools will be defined to represent
exchange problems and rational protocols, which will be complementary to the
extensive–form games used in Part I. This new representation will allow us to:
• Facilitate the automated synthesis of cryptographic rational protocols by
means of heuristic search techniques.
• Formally analyze new schemes using Part I analytical model. We will refer to
this as the proof system of our design methodology.
• Define a taxonomy aimed at classifying rational exchange protocols and
problems, according to different environmental factors and participant’s
nature.
As it is only recently that cryptographic protocols have been designed under the
sole assumption that the parties are rational – an introduction to a new adversarial
model from a Rational Cryptography point of view is given in Section 1.1– very
few rational solutions exist. Furthermore, these have not been designed to solve
exchange problems but other types of questions, such as secret sharing or multi–
party computation ([Nielsen et al., 2007] provides an excellent survey). In this part
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of our work new rational exchange schemes will be automatically designed under
the sole assumption of participant rationality.
7.1.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we describe in detail the formal foundations for the automated
synthesis of multi–party rational–exchange security protocols (M–RES protocols).
In particular, the formalism here described satisfies the following main properties:
• It is highly flexible and scalable in multi–party environments as it will serve
to represent any given multi–party exchange scenario, with any number of
participant agents.
• Only rational (self-interested) entities are considered in the formalism.
• The undercurrent proof system is based on Game Theoretical results, in
particular, on previous models described in Part I. This way the schemes
synthesized by the proposed methodology can be provably rational. (Existing
works by other authors described in Section 6.4 based their proof system on
logics of beliefs.)
• Given an exchange problem, the model defines a framework suitable for a
heuristic technique to search for an optimal rational solution.
• Simple linear structures such as vectors and matrices will be used to represent
all aspects of a multi–party exchange problem.
• Finally, it allows us to define a taxonomy to classify M–RES protocols
considering criteria such as incentives and coalitions. This taxonomy will be
based on:
(a) Identifying whether protocol participants are part of any incentive scheme
which would make them behave in a certain, predetermined way; and,
(b) Identifying whether participants are members of a coalition.
7.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 will describe the way in which
candidate solutions (exchange protocols) are represented. In Section 7.3, we will
define a utility function to be able to evaluate and assess how good a protocol is
in solving a particular multi–party exchange problem. In Section 7.4 we formally
express the goals of any heuristic algorithm used in the search and estimate the size
of the solution space. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 depict a taxonomy for M–RES protocols
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based on the formalism previously defined and propose a classification of M–RES
protocols. Finally, Section 7.7 presents the main conclusions of this work.
7.1.3 Preliminaries
Prior to describing the model in detail, the following definition extends Definition
3.2.1 to multi-party environments and serves to unify notation throughout this
chapter:
Definition 7.1.1 (Exchange protocol). We notate a multi–party exchange protocol
as a tuple Π = 〈P,O, T 〉 where:
• P = {P0, . . . , Pv−1} is the set of protocol participants,
• O = {o0, . . . , om−1} is the set of all items/tokens being exchanged during the
protocol execution; and
• T is an ordered collection of n protocol steps describing the scheme, each of
the form:
(t) Pi → Pj : ot1 , . . . , otkt (7.1)
where:
– t = 0, . . . , n− 1 is the step number.
– Pi, Pj ∈ P , i 6= j, are the sender and receiver of the message, respectively.
– {ot1 , . . . , otkt} ⊆ O are the items Pi sends to Pj, subject to Pi owning
those items at step t of the protocol.
Note that this definition does not mention rationality, fairness or feasibility of
the exchange. It merely describes a series of messages being exchanged between
participants. At the end of the protocol execution some entities would have lost
control over some of their items as well as having gained access over new ones.
7.2 Representation of Candidate Solutions
Informally, a candidate solution to a given multi–party exchange problem is a multi–
party exchange protocol dictating the steps that each participant has to follow to
interchange their commodities in a certain way. Further along, the utility function
will decide how good a candidate protocol is in giving a solution to the specific
exchange problem, or how close the scheme is to an optimal solution. A solution will
be considered optimal when (1) it is rational and, (2) it satisfies every participant’s
set of requirements.
Initially, we will describe the way to represent protocols within the model.
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SΠ =

sender receiver o0 o1 o2
0 1 1 0 0
1 2 0 1 0
2 0 0 1 1

Figure 7.1: Example of a protocol matrix.
7.2.1 Protocol Matrix
A protocol Π, defined as in 7.1.1, is represented by a matrix SΠ ∈Mn×(m+2) = [sΠt,j ]
of integers, where each row st (t ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}) is interpreted as a message in
which the first two components identify the sender and the receiver of the message,
respectively, and the rest of the row components represent the items being sent.
Formally:
• ∀ t ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
sΠt,0 represents the sender entity of message st,
sΠt,1 represents the receiver entity of message st and,
(7.2)
• ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1},
sΠt,(2+j) =

1 iff entity sΠt,0 sends entity
sΠt,1 item oj at step t in the protocol
0 otherwise
(7.3)
As an example, the matrix shown in Fig. 7.1 represents a three step exchange
protocol involving three entities. At step zero, entity P0 sends entity P1 item o0
then, entity P1 sends entity P2 item o1 and finally, at step two, entity P2 sends
entity P0 items o1 and o2.
Matrix SΠ serves to represent the series of steps that participant entities have to
take along a protocol execution. However, the actual real message content being sent
at each step in the protocol is subject to: (1) the sender entity holding the referred
items sΠt,(2+j) at that point in the protocol run and (2) the items being accessible
to that entity. During the protocol execution this information will be captured in a
new matrix H(t) denoted state matrix.
7.2.2 State Matrix
The protocol is executed in a fixed number of n steps. Matrix H(t) = [hi,j(t)] ∈
Mv×m captures the possessions of each party at the end of step t−1 of the protocol
7.2 Representation of Candidate Solutions 121
with 1 6 t 6 n, where:
hi,j(t) =

ACC iff Pi holds and has complete access to item oj
NO ACC iff Pi holds item oj but has no access to it
LOST iff Pi has lost control over item oj
UNKNO iff item oj is unknown to entity Pi
(7.4)
As an example: H(1) represents the possessions of each participant entity after
step zero of the protocol. A matrix denoted H(0) will represent the possessions of
each different entity at the initial point, this is, prior to the exchange. At this stage,
no hi,j(0) value could be set to LOST as no lost could have taken place at t = 0.
Moreover, the following are the numerical values for each one of the possible
elements in the state matrix. These values will allow us to compute partial and final
benefits for each entity with a simple scalar product of vectors. The values are:
ACC = 1 Multipliedbyapayoffvaluewillincrementthetotalutility.
UNKNO = 0 Multipliedbyapayoffvaluewillannullthetotalutility.
LOST = −1 Multipliedbyapayoffvaluewilldecrementthetotalutility.
(7.5)
The state NO ACC could take any value different from the previous ones. This
state will serve to annull the utility until a certain event takes place and it is never
multiplied by the corresponding utility value. Different situations could derive in a
non–accessible status of an item oj for a particular entity Pi (i.e. hi,j(t) = NO ACC).
Some of these are:
1. If item oj is encrypted and entity Pi holds oj but it does not hold the decryption
key.
2. If entity Pi is able to generate item oj but it needs to gain access to other
items in order to do so. In this case, item oj must remain non–accessible until
gaining control over the rest of the required tokens.
3. If item oj is a type of e-good such that it only becomes available when other
events take place, so entity Pi will only gain access to item oj when such events
have occurred.
As an example, matrix H(0) shown in Fig. 7.2 represents an initial state matrix
in which an entity P0 holds and has access to item o0. By contrast, entity P1 holds
item o1 but has no access to it, and P2 holds and has access to an item o2.
The non–accessibility indicates that there might be dependency relationships
between different possessed items as well as between the items that different entities
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H(0) =

o0 o1 o2
ACC UNKNO UNKNO
UNKNO NO ACC UNKNO
UNKNO UNKNO ACC

Figure 7.2: Example of a state matrix.
hold. A matrix R will capture the dependency relationships for every element in
the state matrix H and for the particular exchange problem in hand.
7.2.3 Dependency Matrix
A matrix R = [ri,j ] ∈ M(v·m)×(v·m) will capture the dependency relations for each
hi,j ∈ H for a given exchange problem.
The following function will assist in representing such links. We notate ς(i,m) a
function which returns a tuple of two components: the first component corresponds
to the quotient of the integer division between i and m and, the second component
to the remainder of that division.
ς(i,m) = (bi/mc , mod(i,m)) (7.6)
Three different types of dependency can be expressed within the model: positive
(POS DR), negative (NEG DR), and non–existent (NO DR). They are defined as follows:
• ri,j = POS DR if and only if:
(hς(i,m) = ACC) ∧ (hς(j,m) = NO ACC)⇒ hς(j,m) = ACC (7.7)
In other words, item omod(j,m) becomes accessible to entity Pbj/mc once entity
Pbi/mc has gained access to item omod(i,m). We refer to this as a positive
relationship for Pbi/mc.
• ri,j = NEG DR if and only if:
(hς(i,m) = ACC) ∧(
(hς(j,m) = NO ACC) ∨ (hς(j,m) = UNKNO)
) }⇒ hς(i,m) = NO ACC (7.8)
In other words, item omod(i,m) cannot be accessible to entity Pbi/mc until
entity Pbj/mc has gained access to item omod(j,m). We denote this a negative
relationship for Pbi/mc.
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• Additionally, ri,j = NO DR will represent the absence of any dependency
relationships. Note that, ∀i, 0 6 i < v · m, ri,i = NO DR as no item can be
neither positive nor negative related to itself.
Matrix R shown in Fig. 7.3 can serve as an example of the possible dependency
relationships when considering matrix H from previous example 7.2. This matrix
represents a positive relationship (r3,4 = POS DR) for entity Pb3/3c = P1 with regard
to items omod(3,3) = o0 and omod(4,3) = o1. Informally, this dependency connection
expresses the fact that if entity P1 gains access to item o0 then item o1 becomes
accessible to P1. Formally, as defined in (7.7), we can write:
(hς(3,3) = ACC) ∧ (hς(4,3) = NO ACC)⇒ hς(4,3) = ACC (7.9)
Which is equivalent to:
(h1,0 = ACC) ∧ (h1,1 = NO ACC)⇒ h1,1 = ACC (7.10)
Likewise, matrix R shown in Fig. 7.3 indicates that there exists a negative
dependency relationship (r7,2 = NEG DR) for entity Pb7/3c = P2 with regard to items
omod(7,3) = o1 and omod(2,3) = o2. Informally, this indicates that upon receiving item
o1, this will only become accessible to entity Pb7/3c = P2 when item o2 is available
to entity Pb2/3c = P0. Formally, as defined in (7.8), we can write:
(hς(7,3) = ACC) ∧(
(hς(2,3) = NO ACC) ∨ (hς(2,3) = UNKNO)
) }⇒ hς(7,3) = NO ACC (7.11)
Which is equivalent to:
(h2,1 = ACC) ∧(
(h0,2 = NO ACC) ∨ (h0,2 = UNKNO)
) }⇒ h2,1 = NO ACC (7.12)
7.2.4 Expressing More Complex Dependency Relationships and
Applying Matrix R
Further and more complex dependency links may exist involving several items.
However, in that case, important considerations must be taken into account.
If a dependency relationship involves more than one item:
1. All dependencies must be grouped by sign so that all negative relationships
are considered independently from the positive ones.
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R =

NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR POS DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR POS DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NEG DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR
NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR NO DR

Figure 7.3: Example of an dependency matrix.
2. All negative relationships with regard to one element of matrix H(t) must be
combined to satisfy one single negative constraint. In other words, if an item
is only accessible when other events take place, the absence of only one of
these events will make the item non–accessible. This is formally captured by
the following expression:
if (hς(i,m) = ACC) ∧(∃j such that:
rij = NEG DR ∧
((hς(j,m) = NO ACC) ∨ (hς(j,m) = UNKNO))
)
}⇒ hς(i,m) = NO ACC (7.13)
3. If for a given negative dependency relationship (rij = NEG DR) the
corresponding opposite positive dependency (rji = POS DR) is not defined,
then a certain sequence of events is being forced in the protocol and particular
messages could invalidate certain tokens for ever. In other words, if a token
is made invalid because a previous event has not taken place and there is no
rule to make that token available again, then the item will stay non-accessible
until the end of the protocol execution. Hence, a negative dependency link
without the corresponding positive rule forces a certain sequence of steps in
any valid protocol solution.
4. All positive dependencies must be evaluated recursively, as positive changes
in an item status can trigger other changes across the state matrix.
5. Negative relationships must always be evaluated before the positive ones.
Note that, the only restriction imposed by this representation is that negative
and positive dependencies between any two given elements cannot be expressed
simultaneously. By contrast, the representation provides a powerful method to
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For each step denoted spii 〈H(i)〉 → H(i+ 1) do:
(1) Extract sender (read spii,0)
(2) Extract receiver (read spii,1)
(3) For k = 0, . . . ,m− 1
if
(
spii,2+k = 1 and hsender,2+k(i) = ACC
)
then
hsender,2+k(i+ 1) = LOST
hreceiver,2+k(i+ 1) = ACC
apply dependencies to hreceiver,2+k(i+ 1)
Figure 7.4: Algorithm for the transference of items applying dependency
relationships expressed in matrix R, as described in Section 7.2.4.
represent complex dependency relationships between all tokens involved in the
exchange.
7.2.5 Updating the State Matrix
Initially, a candidate solution consists of a protocol matrix SΠ, a state matrix H(0)
and a dependency matrix R specific to the exchanging environment. As the protocol
execution progresses, the state matrix H(0) is updated according to the instructions
given in each row of the protocol matrix and the positive and negative restrictions
imposed by matrix R. The last of the sequence of matrices H, i.e. H(n) will reflect
the possessions that each entity holds at the end of the protocol and also those items
that each entity has lost control over.
The following expression (7.14) serves to formally denote the updating of the
state matrix H(0) as indicated by the first row spi0 of the protocol matrix S
Π. H(1)
is the result of this operation representing the possessions of each participant entity
after step zero is executed.
spi0 〈H(0)〉 → H(1) (7.14)
Expression (7.15) shows the consecutive updates being carried until the last row
of the protocol matrix spin−1 is interpreted:
spin−1〈spin−2〈. . . spi0 〈H(0)〉〉〉 = spin−1〈H(n− 1)〉 → H(n) (7.15)
Finally, each step denoted spii 〈H(i)〉 → H(i+1) can be detailed in the algorithm
for the transference of items shown in Figure 7.4.
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Protocol State matrix H(t+ 1) State matrix H(t+ 1)
step t after step t after applying
dependency matrix
t = 0
P0 → P1 : o0
LOST UNKNO UNKNO
ACC NO ACC UNKNO
UNKNO UNKNO ACC
LOST UNKNO UNKNO
ACC ACC UNKNO
UNKNO UNKNO ACC
t = 1
P1 → P2 : o1
LOST UNKNO UNKNO
ACC LOST UNKNO
UNKNO ACC ACC
LOST UNKNO UNKNO
ACC LOST UNKNO
UNKNO NO ACC ACC
t = 2
P2 → P0 : o1, o2
LOST UNKNO ACC
ACC LOST UNKNO
UNKNO NO ACC LOST
LOST UNKNO ACC
ACC LOST UNKNO
UNKNO ACC LOST
Figure 7.5: Algorithm for the transference of items applied to protocol matrix SΠ
given in Fig. 7.1, initial state matrix H(0) described in Fig. 7.2 and dependency
matrix R shown in Fig. 7.3.
Example
As an example, Figure 7.5 illustrates the application of the algorithm shown in
Fig. 7.4 to the protocol matrix SΠ given in Fig. 7.1, the initial state matrix H(0)
described in Fig. 7.2 and the dependency matrix R shown in Fig. 7.3.
In the example note that the protocol dictates a series of instructions for all
participant entities but, at each step, the real message content is subject to other
factors specified in the state matrix and in the dependency matrix. For instance, at
step three in the protocol, entity P2 is supposed to send entity P0 items o1 and o2.
However, entity P2 has no access to item o1 at that point in the protocol execution
so message 3 only contains item o2.
How good the protocol SΠ (example Fig. 7.1) is in giving solution to a particular
exchange problem, or whether the protocol is rational will be decided when defining
a benefit matrix and a utility function. These two concepts are described in the
following section.
7.3 Utility Function
A utility function is individually defined for each participant of the protocol to
evaluate the gains obtained at each step of the scheme.
7.3.1 Benefit Matrix
In our model, all participants assign every item involved in the exchange a particular
value depending on whether that entity is interested in gaining access to that item
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B =

o0 o1 o2
COST NO COST 5
3 COST NO COST
NO COST 3 BENEF

Figure 7.6: Example of a benefit matrix.
and, furthermore, whether the entity increases cost by sending that item, or by
keeping it. Those values also serve to represent each individual’s set of requirements
and are captured in the following matrix.
Matrix B = [bi,j ] ∈Mv×m is defined as:
bi,j =

COST iff Pi incurs cost when losing control over oj
NO COST iff item oj is of no value to participant Pi
BENEF iff Pi obtains benefit when losing control over oj
> 1 iff item oj is required by participant Pi
(7.16)
In the case of bij being greater than one, bij also represents the value that item
oj is worth to entity Pi if and only if oj becomes accessible to Pi.
The following numerical values assigned to each element in matrix B will allow
us to compute entities’ partial and final benefits, by multiplying each row of matrices
H and B. The values are:
COST = 1
NO COST = 0
BENEF = −1
(7.17)
As an example, matrix B shown in Fig. 7.6 represents a benefit matrix in which
entity P0 increases cost when losing control over item o0 and item o2 is worth five
units to P0. In a similar way, item o0 is worth three units to entity P1 and losing
control over item o1 decreases P1’s payoff. Finally, entity P2 values item o1 with
three units while holding onto item o2 does not result profitable.
7.3.2 Maximum and Minimum Benefit Values
The following criteria will serve: (1) to compute the maximum benefit that an entity
can obtain in a single protocol run; and (2) to compute the minimum benefit that
each entity Pi will obtain, which satisfies its requirements.
• The maximum benefit bˆi represents the payoff obtained when the outcome of
the protocol run is the most favorable for entity Pi. It is computed considering
that the entity has gained access to all its required items, plus it has sent all
items for which losing control over is beneficial, and has kept all items for
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which sending represents a cost.
bˆi =
m−1∑
j=0
| bij | (7.18)
• A minimum benefit value b¯i represents the minimum payoff that entity Pi
would expect to obtain with the exchange. The minimum that a rational entity
will consider as satisfactory is that in which: the entity has gained access to all
required items, has had to lose control over items for which sending represents
a cost, and it does not possess any of the items for which replaying is beneficial.
b¯i =
∑
bij>1
bij −
∑
bij=COST
bij (7.19)
Furthermore, we denote b¯ =
(
b¯0, . . . , b¯v−1
)
, the vector of minimum payoff
values for each entity Pi, i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}.
We will now define a utility function to compute participants’ payoff values after
each step in the protocol, as well as global protocol payoff value at the end of a
protocol run.
7.3.3 Participant Payoff and Differential Payoff
At each step of the protocol (after updating the state matrix according to the
algorithm for the transference of items), we can compute the gains achieved by a
player so far and refer to those as “utility” or “payoff” values.
Definition 7.3.1 (Participant payoff). Given a protocol matrix of the form SΠ, the
payoff value for participant Pi after step t− 1, (1 6 t 6 n), can be computed as:
ui(t) =
m−1∑
j = 0
hi,j 6= NO ACC
bijhij(t), i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1} (7.20)
As an example, ui(1) represents participant Pi’s payoff after step zero of the
protocol and ui(n) is the payoff attained by Pi after the last step t− 1.
Also note that:
• ui(0) denotes the initial utility for entity Pi
• non–accessible items do not increase the overall utility.
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Furthermore, we denote u(t) =
(
u0(t), . . . , uv−1(t)
)
, the vector of payoff values
for each entity Pi, i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}, at step t.
Definition 7.3.2 (Participant differential payoff). Given a protocol matrix of the
form SΠ, the differential payoff value for a player Pi between steps t1 and t2, with
0 6 t1 6 t2 6 n, is defined as:
dui(t1, t2) = ui(t2)− ui(t1) (7.21)
During a protocol execution, there may be steps at which players go into a
temporarily “worst” state (i.e. dui(t, t + 1) 6 0). The relevant fact, however, is
whether at the end of the protocol run Pi gets enough differential utility:
- If dui(0, n) > 0, the exchange is profitable to Pi,
- If dui(0, n) < 0, the exchange is non–profitable to Pi,
- If dui(0, n) = 0, the exchange is of no use to Pi,
7.3.4 Protocol Global Payoff and Protocol Differential Payoff
Additionally, a global protocol utility function will be defined to describe the overall
payoff of a protocol solution SΠ.
Definition 7.3.3 (Protocol global payoff). Given the space of all protocol matrices
of the form SΠ, we define a function U : SΠ → R which assigns a utility value to
every given protocol, such that:
U(SΠ) =
v−1∑
i=0
ui(n) =
v−1∑
i=0
m−1∑
j = 0
hi,j 6= NO ACC
bijhij(n) (7.22)
Likewise, an overall differential utility is defined.
Definition 7.3.4 (Protocol global differential payoff). Given a protocol matrix of
the form SΠ, the protocol global differential utility is defined as:
dU(SΠ) =
v−1∑
i=0
dui(0, n) (7.23)
7.3.5 Protocol Matrix Concatenation
Given two exchange protocols Π1 and Π2 with equal number of participants and
number of tokens, these can be concatenated by adding the set of instructions of
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protocol Π2 to the end of protocol Π1. Similarly, two protocol matrices can be
concatenated to describe a new protocol.
The following operator formally expresses protocol matrix concatenation.
Definition 7.3.5 (Protocol matrix concatenation). Let P be a set of entities
and O a set of exchangeable tokens. Given two protocols Π1 = 〈P,O, T1〉 and
Π2 = 〈P,O, T2〉, the protocol resulting of concatenating Π1 and Π2 is denoted as:
Π1 ◦Π2 = 〈P,O, T1 ◦ T2〉 (7.24)
where T1 ◦ T2 denotes the concatenation of sequences T1 and T2 of protocol steps,
from protocols Π1 and Π2 respectively.
The protocol matrix resulting from concatenating protocols Π1 and Π2 is denoted
as: SΠ1◦Π2.
The following theorem serves to prove the non–linearity of utility function U
defined in Definition 7.3.3.
Theorem 7.3.1. Given two protocol matrices SΠ1 and SΠ2 with the same number
v of entities and the same number m of tokens, the utility function U is non–linear
with respect to protocol concatenation:
U(SΠ1◦Π2) 6= U(SΠ1) + U(SΠ2) (7.25)
Proof. Let p and q be the number of steps of protocols Π1 and Π2 respectively. The
process of executing protocol Π1 over an initial state described by a matrix H(0),
can be expressed using the notation from Section 7.2.5. This is:
spi1p−1〈spi1p−2〈. . . spi10 〈H(0)〉〉〉 → H(p) (7.26)
Utility value U(SΠ1) will then be computed with elements from matrix H(p).
In a similar way, the process of executing protocol Π2 over an initial state
described by matrix H(0) can be expressed as:
spi2q−1〈spi2q−2〈. . . spi20 〈H(0)〉〉〉 → H(q) (7.27)
and the corresponding utility value U(SΠ2) will be computed with elements from
matrix H(q).
By contrast, the process of executing protocol Π1 ◦Π2 can be expressed as:
spi2q−1〈spi2q−2〈. . . 〈spi20 〈spi1p−1〈spi1p−2〈. . . spi10 〈H(0)〉〉〉〉〉〉 =
spi2q−1〈spi2q−2〈. . . 〈spi20 〈H(p)〉〉〉
(7.28)
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Note that, the execution of protocol Π2 starts over an initial matrix H(p) which
will, in most cases, be different from the original H(0). Hence, applying the utility
function to evaluate the protocol matrix SΠ1◦Π2 will produce a different result than
evaluating SΠ1 and SΠ2 separately.
7.4 Solution Space – Goals and Dimension
In simple terms, our goal will be to explore the space of all exchange protocols to
find rational schemes for which all participants’ utility values are maximum or the
nearest possible, and above the minimum required.
We formalize the previous statement in the following definition.
Definition 7.4.1 (Search goal). Given the space of all protocol matrices of the form
SΠ, the goal of the search is to find SΠ such that U(SΠ) is maximum, subject to SΠ
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) The final payoff value must be above the minimum required by each entity Pi.
This is:
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}, b¯i 6 ui(n) (7.29)
(2) Any entity that has obtained its minimum payoff required, would only maintain
an active role in the protocol (being sender or recipient of messages) when the
benefit attained for that action directly increases its individual payoff. This is:
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}, if ∃t < n such that b¯i 6 ui(t) then
∀k, t < k 6 n: (sΠk,0 = i ∨ sΠk,1 = i)⇒ ui(t) < ui(k)
(7.30)
As previously stated, our proof system will rely on the model described in part I
of this thesis. That formalism, based on Game Theory, will allow us to ensure that
the schemes satisfying the search goals are in fact rational solutions to the exchange
problem in hand.
7.4.1 Rationality Proof
The basic idea is to represent synthesized exchange protocols satisfying conditions
(1) and (2) as dynamic games of perfect information.
Informally, a given exchange protocol represents a feasible solution to an
exchange problem when the protocol describes a series of steps allowing entities
to exchange their commodities. However, most of these feasible solutions can only
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occur when pre-execution agreements take place between agents, typically in private
environments.
On the other hand, a given exchange protocol represents a rational solution
to an exchange problem when the protocol allows entities to exchange the desired
commodities and the protocol outcome constitutes a Nash equilibrium (perfect in
sub–games) of the corresponding protocol game. Ensuring that the protocol outcome
is a Nash equilibrium of the protocol game will ensure that entities do not deviate
from such an outcome, as unilaterally changing strategy does not result in a higher
payoff value.
Next we will proof that the goals of the search render rational schemes for any
given multi–party exchange problem.
Theorem 7.4.1. Any given exchange protocol Π, represented by protocol matrix
SΠ and satisfying conditions (1) and (2) in Definition 7.4.1, is a rational–exchange
protocol.
Proof. Let GSΠ represent the protocol game derived from the description of protocol
SΠ. The Nash equilibrium points of the game GSΠ can be computed applying a very
simple backward induction algorithm. The process would proceed by first considering
the last actions of the final participant of the protocol. It determines which action
the final entity would take to maximize its utility. Using this information and taking
the induction one step backward, one can then determine what the second to last
participant will do to maximize its own utility function too. This process continues
until one reaches the first participant of the protocol, hence determining the actions
of all consecutive participants.
Formally, the process can be sketched as follows:
• At the last step in the protocol:
Let
[
Psn → Prn : mn where sn 6= rn with sn, rn ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}
]
be the last
step in the protocol Π. At that point, the sender Psn has to choose between
two possible strategies: quit or send mn. The following are Psn ’s final payoffs:
Strategy Final Payoff
Psn sends message mn usn(n)
Psn quits usn(n− 1)
Let us suppose that:
usn(n− 1) > usn(n) (7.31)
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Note that in this case, the protocol could not be called rational as it would
be dictating Psn to take an irrational action which would go against its own
self-interest.
However, satisfying conditions (1) and (2) will imply that:
usn(n− 1) > ¯bsn ⇒ usn(n− 1) < usn(n) (7.32)
This clearly contradicts assumption 7.31. So rational entity Psn is forced to
choose strategy send mn, as in doing so the payoff value obtained is greater.
• At the step before last in the protocol:
Let
[
Psn−1 → Prn−1 : mn−1 where sn−1 6= rn−1 with sn−1, rn−1 ∈ {0, . . . , v −
1}] be the step before last in the protocol. Then, Psn−1 will have to choose
between two possible strategies: {quit, send mn−1}.
As Psn−1 knows that, given the opportunity, rational entity Psn will choose
action send mn at the last step of the protocol. The following are the final
payoffs obtained by following each of the strategies:
Strategy Final Payoff
Psn−1 sends message mn−1 usn−1(n)
Psn−1 quits usn−1(n− 2)
Let us suppose that:
usn−1(n− 2) > usn−1(n) (7.33)
Then, satisfying conditions (1) and (2) imply that:
⇒ usn−1(n− 2) < usn−1(n− 1) (7.34)
Furthermore, if Psn−1 is the sender at the last step of the protocol then:
usn−1(n− 1) < usn−1(n)⇒ usn−1(n− 2) < usn−1(n) (7.35)
and, if Psn−1 is not sender again then:
usn−1(n− 1) = usn−1(n)⇒ usn−1(n− 2) < usn−1(n) (7.36)
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Both results contradict initial assumption 7.33. So, entity Psn−1 is forced to
choose strategy send mn−1, as in doing so the expected payoff value obtained
at the end of the protocol is greater.
• In general, at any intermediate step in the protocol:
Let
[
Psk → Prk : mk where sk 6= rk with sk, rk ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}
]
be the
last step in the protocol. At that point, Psk will have to choose between two
possible strategies: quit or send mk.
As Psk knows how rational participants will behave in future steps, the
following are the final payoffs obtained by following each of the two possible
strategies:
Strategy Final Payoff
Psk sends message mk usk(n)
Psk quits usk(k − 1)
Suppose that:
usk(k − 1) > usk(n) (7.37)
Then, applying conditions (1) and (2) we have that:
usk(k − 1) > ¯bsk ⇒ usk(k − 1) < usk(k) (7.38)
a. If Psk is sender again in future steps then:
usk(k) < usk(n)⇒ usk(k − 1) < usk(n) (7.39)
This clearly contradicts initial assumption 7.37.
b. If Psk is not sender again then:
usk(k) = usk(n)⇒ usk(k − 1) < usk(n) (7.40)
Contradicting our initial assumption 7.37.
So, at any intermediate step in the protocol any entity Psk is forced to choose
strategy send mk as in doing so, the expected payoff value obtained at the
end of the protocol is greater.
• At the first step in the protocol: The same reasoning applies to all
consecutive steps until one reaches the first step in the protocol. At step
one, the sender entity can predict every other participant future action so, no
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entity would deviate from the protocol description, as the highest payoff values
are obtained when participants choose strategies according to the protocol
instructions.
This way, by definition, the protocol outcome attained when following the
steps of the protocol constitutes a Nash equilibrium perfect in sub-games for the
corresponding protocol game GSΠ . This being the formal proof that any synthesized
protocol, result of our proposed design technique, is rational.
7.4.2 How Many Exchange Protocols Exist?
As described in Section 7.2, a protocol is represented by a matrix SΠ ∈Mn×(m+2),
where n is the number of protocol steps and m is the number of tokens involved
in the exchange. Each row represents a message in the protocol such that, the
first two components of each row describe the sender and receiver of that message
respectively, so the number of possible combinations sender–recipient amongst v
entities is v!(v−2)! . Furthermore, in each row, elements three to m are in {0,1} and
represent the items being sent. In this case, there are 2nm possible combinations.
We can then compute an estimate of the total number of exchange protocols subject
to evaluation as:
O( v!
(v − 2)!2
nm
)
= O(v(v − 1)2nm) = O(v22nm) (7.41)
For example, for a 3 entity scenario, a maximum of 10 messages exchanged and
a total of 6 items in each message, the search space has an estimated complexity of
263 possible protocols.
Although, the aforementioned expression gives an estimate of how many
exchange protocols there are, it is difficult to determine how many of these
protocols represent feasible solutions to the specific exchange problem, and even
more challenging is to estimate how many of those feasible solutions represent a
rational exchange.
7.4.3 Finding a Solution is Hard
Definition 7.4.1 describes a optimization problem of the form introduced in Section
6.2. However, two main aspects make the problem of finding the maximum solution
hard. These are:
1. The size of the solution space. As the number of entities or the number of
exchangeable items grows, this makes it impossible to evaluate every possible
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candidate solution, in search of a protocol matrix with maximum global payoff
value.
2. The problem is a non–linear programming problem. Indeed, Theorem 7.3.1
proved utility function U to be a non–linear function with respect to protocol
concatenation. In this case then, well established linear programming
algorithms (simplex-based methods or interior point methods) cannot be
applied to resolve this particular optimization problem.
Our approach (further detailed in subsequent chapters) will be to apply
optimization techniques based on heuristic search algorithms.
7.5 A Taxonomy for M–RES Protocols
In this section, we use the formal model just described, in particular the combination
of values in state matrix H and benefit matrix B, to classify M–RES protocols.
Traditionally, in any given exchange scheme, once the exchanging objectives
have been achieved, motivation is derived from incentive schemes of many kinds
(reputation factors, loyalty schemes, etc.) and/or, the presence of coalitions between
participant entities.
Informally, an incentive scheme is an external, artificial reinforcement to make
entities behave in a certain way which a priori would not appear to be rational.
In an environment where entities are self-interested and aimed at maximizing their
own utility values, an incentive scheme must always represent a bonus on entities’
payoff values.
In a similar way, when an entity is part of a coalition, helping other members of
the same coalition to achieve their goals must also report an increase in the payoff
values of the coalition members.
In this section we will give formal definitions of these concepts (incentives and
coalitions) and we will classify protocol participants according to whether entities
are incentivized and/or members of a coalition.
7.5.1 Incentive Schemes
Within our taxonomy, an incentive scheme is considered to be a mechanism by which
entities are motivated to exchange their own items.
Usually, participants of an exchange protocol are driven by the desire of gaining
access to their required items and will be eager to receive those without sending
anything in return. An incentive scheme will motivate participants to lose control
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over the items they own, so other entities can gain access to them. The incentive
represents a bonus over their payoff if their own items are sent to other participants.
For example, a reputable e-merchant will send the corresponding e-goods after
receiving payment from a buyer, as its future business might depend on the outcome
of the current transaction. In this case, an incentive scheme could be an external
reputation system forcing the merchant to behave honestly in each transaction.
Usually, participants of a protocol are not all motivated by the same incentive
factor. Some protocol participants might be motivated by a reputation factor while
others might respond to some kind of legal enforcement. In other words, for a given
protocol, it could be that an incentive program is applicable to only one portion of
the participant entities leaving the rest out of any incentive schemes.
Furthermore, an entity might be incentivized towards the exchange of a
particular item whereas there could be no incentive in losing control over a different
one.
With regard to this definition of incentive scheme we can identify and classify
two types of entity: Incentivized and Non–incentivized.
Definition 7.5.1 (Incentivized entity). Given an entity Pi and an item oj which Pi
initially owns or is capable to generate, entity Pi is incentivized towards the exchange
of item oj, if Pi can increase its payoff value by losing control over oj.
In other words, sending item oj represents a benefit for Pi.
Definition 7.5.2 (Non–incentivized entity). Given an entity Pi and an item oj
which Pi initially owns or is capable to generate, entity Pi is non–incentivized
towards the exchange of item oj, if Pi’s payoff value decreases by losing control
over oj.
In other words, sending item oj represents a cost for Pi. A non–incentivized
entity towards and item oj is motivated to keep control over that item.
7.5.2 Coalition Schemes
Within our taxonomy, a coalition scheme is considered a mechanism by which
entities are rationally forced to help allied participants to achieve their goals. This
is done by forwarding other participant’s items when these are required by allied
members.
Typically, there could be different coalitions formed amongst several participants
of a given protocol while others entities might stay single. Furthermore, these
coalitions might intersect (one entity belongs to more than one coalition) or they
might form disjointed groups.
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With regard to this definition of coalition and in relation to protocol participants
we can identify and classify two types of entities: Collaborative and Non–
collaborative.
Definition 7.5.3 (Collaborative entity). An entity Pi is collaborative towards
another entity Pj, if Pi can increase its payoff by forwarding those items required
Pj, subject to having received them and having got access to them at some earlier
point in the protocol.
Note that this is only related to items which Pi does not previously own or is not
able to generate, but items which are sent to Pi by other entities. A collaborative
entity Pi towards another entity Pj represents a coalition between entities Pi and
Pj with regard all items required by each one of them.
Definition 7.5.4 (Non–Collaborative entity). An entity Pi is non–collaborative
towards another entity Pj, if Pi’s payoff value decreases by forwarding those items
required Pj subject to having received them and having got access to them at some
earlier point in the protocol.
In other words, if entities Pi and Pj are not part of a coalition then relying the
items required by each other, represents a decrease in their payoff values.
7.5.3 Formal Representation of Incentives and Coalitions
The combination of the values from initial state matrix H(0) (Equation (7.4)) and
benefit matrix B (Equation (7.16)) are used to represent and identify different
types of entity and therefore different types of exchanging scenarios. Equations
7.4 and 7.16 gave the semantics for the different values that these matrices could
hold during the protocol execution. In this section we will add significance to all
possible combinations of these values as follows:
• If hi,j(0)=ACC or hi,j(0)=NO ACC (i.e. item oj belongs to entity Pi at the initial
state of the protocol or Pi will be able to generate oj at some stage along the
protocol execution).
In either case, the corresponding bi,j value will have the following semantics:
– If bi,j = BENEF, entity Pi is incentivized to carry the exchange of item oj .
This is, sending item oj represents an increase in Pi’s payoff value.
– If bi,j = COST, entity Pi is not incentivized to carry the exchange of item
oj . This is, losing control over item oj represents a decrease on Pi’s payoff
value.
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bi,j = NO COST bi,j = COST bi,j = BENEF bi,j > 1
hi,j(0) = ACC ∨ Pi indifferent Pi non–incentivized Pi incentivized Non–
hi,j(0) = NO ACC to the exchange to exchange oj to exchange oj applicable
Pi indifferent Pi not allied Pi allied Item oj
hi,j(0) = UNKNO towards with Pk with Pk required
forwarding if Pk if Pk by Pi
oj requires oj requires oj
Table 7.1: Incentives and coalitions table.
– If bi,j = NO COST, entity Pi is indifferent towards item oj .
Note that Pi losing control over an item oj at step t in the protocol execution
decreases its utility value defined in equation (7.20) by two units. By contrast,
if bi,j = BENEF, the payoff value is increased by two.
• If hi,j(0) = UNKNO (i.e. item oj is unknown to entity Pi at the initial state of
the protocol).
The corresponding bi,j value will have the following semantics:
– If bi,j > 1, item oj is one of the required items by entity Pi and bi,j
represents how much item oj is worth to entity Pi.
– If bi,j = BENEF, entity Pi is part of a coalition with whatever entity is
requiring item oj .
– If bi,j = COST, entity Pi is not part of any coalition with whatever entity
is requiring item oj .
– If bi,j = NO COST, entity Pi is indifferent towards forwarding item oj .
Note that if Pi is not part of a coalition with entity Pk requiring oj , then relaying
item oj represents a cost for entity Pi according to equation (7.20). By contrast, if
Pi and Pk are allies, and Pi has got the chance to forward item oj required by entity
Pk then, Pi immediate utility value is increased.
Table 7.1 summarizes every possible combination of values.
7.6 Protocol Classification
Rational–exchange protocols can be typified attending the different types of entity
involved in the exchange. Our taxonomy is based on identifying two main aspects:
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(1) whether entities are incentivized and (2) whether they are part of any coalition.
These criteria define different types of environments in which a protocol is executed.
7.6.1 Classification Attending Incentives
Symmetrically Incentivized. All participants are rational and part of an
incentive scheme of one kind or another. That is, all entities derive a positive
payoff when losing control over each one of their own items.
We can formally represent this type of environment as follows:
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1} and ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
(hi,j(0) = ACC ∨ hi,j(0) = NO ACC)⇒ bi,j = BENEF
(7.42)
Symmetrically Non–Incentivized. All entities are rational and increase their
costs when losing control over their own items.
We can formally represent this type of environment as follows:
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1} and ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
(hi,j(0) = ACC ∨ hi,j(0) = NO ACC)⇒ bi,j = COST
(7.43)
Mixed with respect to incentives. All entities are rational but some entities
could be incentivized with respect to one or more of their items as well as
there will be entities which are not incentivized at all.
7.6.2 Examples
To illustrate the previous classification, we will consider the following example: a
two–entity scenario, each entity in possession of one single item which is required
by the other participant. Additionally, an arbitrary value val1 = 3 is chosen to
represent what item o1 is worth to entity P0 and, a value of val2 = 5 will correspond
to what item o0 is worth to entity P1.
The following are the initial state and the benefit matrices representing the
exchange problem described:
H(0) =
(
ACC UNKNO
UNKNO ACC
)
B =
(
– val1
val2 –
)
(7.44)
Finally, the following are the sequence of matrices H(t), when executing a
protocol in which P0 sends P1 item o0 and then P1 sends P0 item o1:
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H(0) =
(
LOST UNKNO
ACC ACC
)
H(1) =
(
LOST ACC
ACC LOST
)
(7.45)
• Example of a symmetrically incentivized exchange. All participants are
considered to be part of an incentive scheme, i.e. all entities derive a positive
payoff when losing control over each one of their owned items. The diagonal
of the benefit matrix B will be set to −1.
Benefit matrix B =
(
BENEF val1
val2 BENEF
)
The following are the differential utilities for each participant entity when
executing the protocol defined by matrices (7.45):
u0(0) = −1
u0(1) = 1
u0(2) = 4
du0(0, 2) = u0(2)− u0(0) = 5
(7.46)
u1(0) = −1
u1(1) = 4
u1(2) = 6
du1(0, 2) = u1(2)− u1(0) = 7
(7.47)
Note that the protocol defined by matrices (7.45), when executed by the type
of entity defined in this example, results beneficial for both participants.
• Example of a symmetrically non–incentivized exchange. All entities incur cost
when sending their items. In this case, the diagonal of the benefit matrix will
be set to 1.
Benefit matrix B =
(
COST val1
val2 COST
)
The following are the differential utilities for each participant entity when
executing the protocol defined by matrices (7.45):
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u0(0) = 1
u0(1) = −1
u0(2) = 2
du0(0, 2) = u0(2)− u0(0) = 1
(7.48)
u1(0) = 1
u1(1) = 6
u1(2) = 4
du1(0, 2) = u1(2)− u1(0) = 3
(7.49)
By contrast, in the type of exchange scenario described in this example, the
exchange does not result in any benefit for participant P0 whereas, for entity
P1, the exchange is profitable. However, also note that P1 is not motivated to
execute the last step of the protocol as the payoff value encountered at step
one is greater than the final. The scheme does not result rational from entity’s
P1 point of view.
• Example of a mixed exchange. Mixed environment for the exchange, there is
no symmetry with regard incentives. The diagonal of the benefit matrix will
contain −1 and 1 values.
Benefit matrix B =
(
COST val1
val2 BENEF
)
The following are the differential utilities for each participant entity, when
executing the protocol defined by matrices (7.45):
u0(0) = 1
u0(1) = −1
u0(2) = 2
du0(0, 2) = u0(2)− u0(0) = 1
(7.50)
u1(0) = −1
u1(1) = 4
u1(2) = 6
du1(0, 2) = u1(2)− u1(0) = 7
(7.51)
Note that, for entity P0, the protocol defined by matrices (7.45), in a mixed
exchange scenario of the type described in this example, does not result in any
benefit. By contrast, for entity P1, the exchange reports a substantial profit.
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7.6.3 Classification Attending Coalitions
Attending to whether there exist coalitions amongst participants, we propose the
following classification to distinguish all possible exchanging scenarios:
Coalition free. All participants are rational and none of them are part of any
coalitions.
We can formally represent this type of environment as follows:
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1} and ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
(hi,j(0) = UNKNO) ∧ ¬(bi,j > 1)⇒ (bi,j = COST) ∨ (bi,j = NO COST)
(7.52)
In other words, an entity Pi cannot increase its payoff by forwarding other
participant’s items which are not required by Pi.
With coalitions. We can formally represent this type of environment as follows:
∃i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1} and ∃j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} s.t.
(hi,j(0) = UNKNO) ∧ (bi,j = BENEF)
(7.53)
In other words, at least one entity Pi is able to increase its payoff by forwarding
other participant’s item oj . In this case, Pi is said to form coalition with every Pk
such that oj is an item required by Pk (i.e. bk,j > 1).
Note that for some matrices B we will be able to quickly identify the existence
of intersections between different coalitions. If there exists a column j in B and two
indices i, i′ ∈ {0, . . . , v − 1}, i 6= i′, such that:
(hi,j(0) = UNKNO) ∧ (hi′,j(0) = UNKNO) ∧ (bi,j = BENEF) ∧ (bi′,j = BENEF)
(7.54)
Then, Pi and P ′i will form two different coalitions with Pk, if entity Pk requires
item oj .
Note that, although the total number of possible coalitions is 2v, an exchanging
scenario could be characterized by more than one alliance, and these could easily
intersect in zero, one or more participants increasing the total number of possible
different scenarios to 22
v
.
7.6.4 Examples
To illustrate the previous classification, we will consider the following example: a
four–entity scenario, each entity in possession of one single item to be exchanged,
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such that: P0 requires o3, P1 requires o0, P2 requires o1 and P3 requires o2. The
same arbitrary value val is chosen to represent what each the required items is worth
to each requiring entity. Also, we consider a symmetrically incentivized exchange,
i.e. participants are incentivized towards the exchange of their items.
The following matrices define such a scenario:
Initial state matrix H(0) =

ACC UNKNO UNKNO UNKNO
UNKNO ACC UNKNO UNKNO
UNKNO UNKNO ACC UNKNO
UNKNO UNKNO UNKNO ACC

Benefit matrix B =

BENEF – – val
val BENEF – –
– val BENEF –
– – val BENEF

• Example coalition free. No participant is member of a coalition with any other
entity. Therefore, the benefit matrix B will be such that there will be no
BENEF values outside the main diagonal.
Benefit matrix B =

BENEF NO COST COST val
val BENEF COST COST
NO COST val BENEF COST
COST COST val BENEF

• Example with coalitions. For example two intersecting coalitions are part of
the exchange: P0 with P2 and P0 with P3; P1 stays single; and P2 and P3 are
not allied. Figure 7.7 is a graphical visualization of these intersections. Next
is their representation in the benefit matrix B.
Benefit matrix B =

BENEF BENEF BENEF val
val BENEF COST COST
NO COST val BENEF BENEF
NO COST COST val BENEF

7.7 Conclusions
The formalism here described is a novel approach to the way in which exchange
security protocols are described and represented. Traditionally, automated tools
have always been applied to the analysis and verification of existing security
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Figure 7.7: Example with coalitions.
Matrix of initial and consecutive possessions.
State matrix H(t) It captures what each entity holds at each step
t in the protocol.
Matrix of dependency relationships.
Dependency matrix R It contains what relationships exist between the different
items and how these affect other holders.
Matrix of benefit values.
For each entity it captures:
Benefit matrix B the set of required items, the set
of items for which relaying is beneficial and,
the set of items for which not relaying is beneficial.
Matrix representing the protocol steps.
Protocol matrix SΠ For each step of the protocol it describes
the sender, the receiver and the message content.
Table 7.2: Main components of formal model for the representation of multi–party
exchange problems and candidate solutions.
protocols. In this chapter we have adopted a new approach, ensuring rationality
as part of the design of an exchange scheme.
Protocols and some surrounding execution considerations have been structured
and formatted in very simple linear structures. Besides the simplicity of the model,
it allows us to formally represent and parameterize any given multi–party exchange
scenario. The main components of the model are summarized in the Table 7.2.
Moreover, two relevant theoretical results ensure the soundness of our approach:
• Theorem 7.4.1 ensures that all synthesized protocols are demonstrably
rational. A formal proof, based on backward induction is used to prove that
protocols, satisfying the goals of the search, are all rational.
• Theorem 7.3.1 formally establishes the non–linearity of the chosen utility
function. This makes the usage of heuristic optimization techniques totally
appropriate for the search problem in hand.
Finally, this formalism sets the basis to consider further and traditionally very
complex factors when designing a solution to an exchange problem. Issues such
as entity coalitions or incentive schemes are easily defined and encountered within
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the described model. In this sense, the work provides us with a simple taxonomy
according to which synthesized rational–exchange protocols can be easily classified.
In the next chapter we will present our experimental work and we will observe
how, in some of the instances, the presence of certain coalitions will determine the
success of a particular search, whereas in other cases the absence of these coalitions
or the presence of what we can denote as bad coalitions will prevent the search from
succeeding. Therefore, being able to represent and identify such factors in a given
exchanging scenario will help in understanding the outcome of a synthesis process.
In this sense, the taxonomy represents an extra tool when studying complex entity
relations.
Chapter 8
Heuristic Synthesis of v–RES
Protocols
8.1 Introduction
The formalism described in previous chapters allows for the application of a general
purpose optimization technique to explore the space of protocols and, to potentially
find rational solutions to a given multi–party exchange problem.
In this chapter we present the first results obtained when automatically
synthesizing a three–party rational–exchange protocol, by applying a meta–heuristic
search algorithm based on Simulated Annealing. These, we have called 3–RES
protocol. Such protocol can be easily extended to a family of v–RES protocols for
any number v of protocol participants.
8.1.1 Chapter Overview
The focus of our experimental work will be placed on a particular three–entity
exchange problem. For every participant we will be giving a series of initial
assumptions and requirements, which will be represented using the matrices
described in Chapter 7. A heuristic search algorithm will then try to find a rational
scheme as defined by goals in Definition 7.4.1, to solve the specific exchange problem.
As a result, an automatically synthesized 3–RES protocol will be produced.
Furthermore, a whole family of multi–party security protocols can be derived
from the 3–RES protocol just synthesized and, a formal analysis based on Game
Theory, will serve to prove rationality of every protocol in the family.
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8.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we apply the formalism described
in Chapter 7 to the parametrization of a particular three–entity exchange problem.
We also propose an heuristic search technique, based on Simulated Annealing, for
the synthesis of a rational–exchange protocol to give solution to the specific exchange
problem in hand. In Section 8.4 we use Theory of Landscapes to determine the level
of difficulty of the task. Sections 8.5 and 8.6 serve to describe the result obtained by
the proposed search technique and, to compare these with results attained using
other search algorithms. Section 8.7 presents the resulting synthesized 3–RES
protocol. Furthermore, in Section 8.8 the protocol is extended to a family of multi–
party rational protocols for which a formal proof of rationality is given in Section
8.8.5. Finally, in Section 8.9 we present the main conclusions of this experimental
work.
8.2 3–RES Problem Description
We will first give an informal description of a series of initial assumptions and other
aspects of the three–entity exchanging problem in hand.
1. The specific exchange problem will consist of an entity P0 which aims to collect
a series of electronic items from entities P1 and P2, delivering the appropriate
tokens in return. All entities, P0, P1 and P2, are considered to be rational.
The following items are involved in the scheme:
• o0: Request token issued by P0 containing a description of the item that
P0 requires from P1.
• o1: Request token issued by P0 containing a description of the item that
P0 requires from P2.
• o2: Return token issued by P0 for P1 in return for o4.
• o3: Return token issued by P0 for P2 in return for o5.
• o4: Customized item issued by entity P1 as specified by P0 in o0.
• o5: Customized item issued by entity P2 as specified by P0 in o1.
2. None of the collected items in isolation is of any value to entity P0. In other
words, P0 is interested in collecting all (i.e. o4 and o5) or none of these items.
3. No entity is part of any incentive scheme, i.e. the scenario is symmetrically
non–incentivized.
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4. All messages sent by P1 and P2 must be signed with their corresponding private
keys and all messages received by these entities must be encrypted with their
corresponding public keys.
5. Additionally, each entity assigns a value to each required item:
• Entity P0 requires items o4 and o5 each worth an arbitrary value I VAL.
• Entity P1 requires items o0 to be able to generate o4 and it also requires
o2 in return for issuing o4. Thus, item o0 will be worth REQ VAL and o2
will be worth I VAL to P1.
• Entity P2 requires items o1 to be able to generate o5 and it also requires
o3 in return for issuing o5. Thus, item o1 will be worth REQ VAL and o3
will be worth I VAL to P2.
6. Finally, the nature of these items is such that their utilities only become
available when the corresponding tokens are delivered in return. Although
this restriction seems hard and unrealistic, there are a few real life examples
where items are of this nature. For example, P0 could be an user trying to
book a holiday package consisting of accommodation, flights and tickets for
several local tourist attractions. User P0 needs either all or none of the required
items and, additionally no item becomes available unless the providers of the
required services have received payment.
8.3 3–RES Data Representation
This section will be used to parameterize the information given in Section 8.2
describing the particular exchanging problem. Of course, other type of problem
or scenario could have also been formatted rendering a completely different result.
8.3.1 Entities and Items
The following are the main parameters of the exchange problem:
• v = 3 represents the number of entities,
• m = 6 represents the number of items involved in the exchange and,
• n = 10 is the maximum number of messages in the protocol solution.
Matrices H(t), B and R will then be of the following dimensions:
• H(t), B ∈M3×6 and,
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• R ∈M18×18
Note that, according to expression (7.41), with these parameters the search space
has a complexity of O(263).
8.3.2 Initial State Matrix
At a initial state (t=0), P0 holds request tokens (o0 and o1) for the required items
(o4 and o5). Additionally, P0 does also hold return tokens o2 and o3 at this stage.
Since items o4 and o5 must be individually tailored by P1 and P2 to satisfy P0’s
requirements, a non–accessible status is assigned to them until the request tokens
are received by the appropriate entities.
Matrix H(0) defines this initial state of possessions:
H(0) =
 ACC ACC ACC ACC UNKNO UNKNOUNKNO UNKNO UNKNO UNKNO NO ACC UNKNO
UNKNO UNKNO UNKNO UNKNO UNKNO NO ACC

8.3.3 Dependency Matrix
Section 8.2 describes a specific scenario and the nature of the e-items involved in
such a particular exchange problem. The following list enumerates the dependencies
inferred from that description. Further below, Table 8.1 expresses the logical
formulae for each one of them.
1. The utility value for item o4 cannot be made accessible to entity P0 if entity
P1 has not received item o2.
2. The utility value for item o5 cannot be made accessible to entity P0 if entity
P2 has not received item o3.
3. If entity P1 receives item o0 then entity P1 can access item o4 (once the request
is received, P1 can generate item o4 according to the instructions described in
item o0).
4. If entity P1 receives item o2 then entity P0 can access item o4.
5. If entity P2 receives item o1 then entity P2 can access item o5 (once the request
is received, P2 can generate item o5 according to the instructions described in
item o1).
6. If entity P2 receives item o3 then entity P0 can access item o5.
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ri,j Sign of the relation Formula
r4,8 = NEG DR Negative (h0,4 = ACC) ∧
(
(h1,2 = NO ACC) ∨ (h1,2 = UNKNO)
)
⇒ h0,4 = NO ACC
r5,15 = NEG DR Negative (h0,5 = ACC) ∧
(
(h2,3 = NO ACC) ∨ (h2,3 = UNKNO)
)
⇒ h0,5 = NO ACC
r6,10 = POS DR Positive (h1,0 = ACC) ∧ (h1,4 = NO ACC)
⇒ h1,4 = ACC
r8,4 = POS DR Positive (h1,2 = ACC) ∧ (h0,4 = NO ACC)
⇒ h0,4 = ACC
r13,17 = POS DR Positive (h2,1 = ACC) ∧ (h2,5 = NO ACC)
⇒ h2,5 = ACC
r15,5 = POS DR Positive (h2,3 = ACC) ∧ (h0,5 = NO ACC)
⇒ h0,5 = ACC
Table 8.1: Logical formula for 3–RES dependency relationships.
Matrix R for the dependency relations described in Section 8.2 will be of this
form:
ri,j(t) =

NEG DR iff (i = 4 ∧ j = 8) ∨ (i = 5 ∧ j = 15)
POS DR iff (i = 6 ∧ j = 10) ∨ (i = 8 ∧ j = 4)∨
(i = 13 ∧ j = 17) ∨ (i = 15 ∧ j = 5)∨
NO DR Otherwise
(8.1)
8.3.4 Benefit Matrix
The values that each entity assigns to each item involved in the exchange, together
with information about incentive schemes, have been defined when describing the
problem. All that information determines the benefit matrix B for a given synthesis
process.
For the purpose of exploring the space of 3–RES solutions, we will consider four
different scenarios (so four different B matrices), each one of them described below
and summarized in Figure 8.1.
Types of scenario considered in the search are:
(A). There exist three intersecting coalitions amongst participants: P0 and P1, P1
and P2 and, P2 with P0. The benefit matrix which represents such a scenario
is:
B =
 NO COST NO COST COST COST I VAL I VALREQ VAL BENEF I VAL BENEF COST BENEF
BENEF REQ VAL BENEF I VAL BENEF COST

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Figure 8.1: Four different scenarios considered in the process of synthesis.
Note that the values of NO COST, COST and BENEF were defined in Definition
7.16 and also, values REQ VAL and I VAL were introduced in Section 8.2.
(B). There exist two intersecting coalitions: P0 with P1 and P1 with P2. The benefit
matrix which represents such a scenario is:
B =
 NO COST NO COST COST COST I VAL I VALREQ VAL BENEF I VAL BENEF COST BENEF
BENEF REQ VAL BENEF I VAL COST COST

(C). There exists only one coalition: P1 with P2. The benefit matrix which
represents such a scenario is:
B =
 NO COST NO COST COST COST I VAL I VALREQ VAL BENEF I VAL BENEF COST COST
BENEF REQ VAL BENEF I VAL COST COST

(D). There are no coalitions between the participant entities. The benefit matrix
which represents such a scenario is:
B =
 NO COST NO COST COST COST I VAL I VALREQ VAL COST I VAL COST COST COST
COST REQ VAL COST I VAL COST COST

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Entity bˆi b¯i
P0 12 8
P1 11 6
P2 11 6
Entity bˆi b¯i
P0 12 8
P1 11 6
P2 11 5
Type (A) Type (B)
Entity bˆi b¯i
P0 12 8
P1 11 5
P2 11 5
Entity bˆi b¯i
P0 12 8
P1 11 3
P2 11 3
Type (C) Type (D)
Figure 8.2: Minimum and maximum expected payoffs for each type of scenario and
values REQ VAL = 2 and I VAL = 5.
8.3.5 Computing Entities’ Minimum Requirements
For each entity Pi, values bˆi and b¯i (Definitions 7.18 and 7.19) represent the
maximum and minimum payoff values respectively, that entity Pi would expect
to obtain with the exchange.
Considering each one of the four different scenarios previously described, and
the following arbitrary values (REQ VAL = 2 and I VAL = 5), we obtain the set of
values shown in Fig. 8.2.
8.3.6 Computing Fitness
Utility values are calculated as defined in equation (7.20) at each step in the protocol
and for every participant entity. In a similar way, the overall protocol fitness value
is computed as defined in equation (7.22) at the end of the protocol run.
However, Definition 7.4.1 indirectly forces the fitness function to adopt the
following approach: when evaluating a given protocol, the fitness taken will be
the maximum utility value obtained along the whole execution. That is, if along
a protocol execution the maximum global fitness was reached at a step before the
final, then the protocol will only be considered a possible rational solution up to
that step. For example, if along a protocol execution a maximum global fitness value
was reached at step 4. Even though the protocol might consist of 20 instructions,
the protocol could only be considered a possible rational solution up to step 4, and
its global fitness value will be the fitness value attained at that stage.
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Figure 8.3: Autocorrelation functions of the fitness landscape of different moving
rates.
8.4 3–RES Fitness Landscape
Before presenting our final results we will make use of Theory of Landscapes to proof
the efficiency of our global formalism and in particular for the synthesis of 3–RES
protocols.
8.4.1 Move Operator
The following routine is our candidate neighboring operator:
Random Mutation: A random mutation is a modification of a fixed number
(determined by a moving rate) of elements in the protocol matrix SΠ.
Different moving rates will be considered in the experimental work. These are: 1%,
5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 80%.
8.4.2 Fitness Autocorrelation.
The function used to evaluate autocorrelation of a set of fitness values was defined
by equation (6.1). For the purposes of our current work we are presenting
the autocorrelation functions obtained when evaluating the different neighboring
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operators previously described. In all cases, the autocorrelation is computed by
averaging 200 random walks of length 2000 individuals each. Figure 8.4.2 shows the
plots of each of these autocorrelation functions. See Section 6.3 for a more in–depth
discussion on autocorrelation curves.
Moving rates of 10% and 20% seem to offer higher guarantee of success for
any given guided search. For lower rates, the autocorrelation functions represent
landscapes too flat. By contrast, autocorrelation values for moving rates higher
than 20% start representing rough fitness landscapes, where any guided search could
easily degenerate into a random algorithm.
Finally note that although the autocorrelation functions shown in the graph
correspond to an scenario type (A) (scenario with three intersecting coalitions), the
fitness function is the same in every type of exchange, so it projects the same kind of
landscape. The same results are therefore obtained in every other type of scenario.
8.5 Search Technique and Parametrization
Simulated Annealing (SA) shown in Figure 6.1 will be used as search technique. The
basic algorithm has been slightly modified to stop when the first rational–exchange
protocol which satisfies the requirements is found. (This can be done by previously
computing the minimum required global fitness).
As described in Section 8.4, given a candidate solution (specified by a protocol
matrix SΠ), a neighbor SΠ
′
is obtained by randomly modifying a percentage (moving
rate) of its elements.
The acceptance criterion in SA is given by:
SΠ
′
is accepted if U(SΠ
′
)− U(SΠ) > Ti lnu (8.2)
where:
• SΠ and SΠ′ are the current and mutated solutions respectively,
• U(·) is the global protocol fitness function as defined in equation (7.22),
• Ti is the current temperature and,
• u is a random number uniformly generated in [0, 1].
At each cycle, the temperature is geometrically decreased by:
Ti+1 = αTi (8.3)
0 < α < 1 being the cooling factor.
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After m cycles the temperature is Tm = αmT0, where T0 is the initial
temperature. For Tm to be very close to 0 (say ² = 10−6) after m cycles, a cooling
rate of:
α =
(
²
T0
) 1
m
(8.4)
is needed.
The experimental work has been carried out adjusting those SA parameters (T0,
m and α) according to the definition of two different profiles:
I. In profile (I), an initial temperature of T0 = 1.44 is decreased by a cooling
factor of 0.9705 satisfying the following properties:
(a) In the first cycle, the probability of accepting a bad move which decreases
the global protocol fitness value by just one unit is approximately 0.5.
(b) By half the total number of cycles, the probability of accepting a bad
move which decreases the global protocol fitness value by more than one
unit is almost zero. So from exactly half the total number of cycles
onwards, the search behaves as a pure Hill Climbing (HC) algorithm.
II. In profile (II), an initial temperature of T0 = 1.44 is decreased by a cooling
factor of 0.9419 satisfying the following properties:
(a) In the first cycle, the probability of accepting a bad move which decreases
the global protocol fitness value by just one unit is approximately 0.5.
(b) By one quarter of the total number of cycles, the probability of accepting
a bad move which decreases the global protocol fitness value by more
than one unit is almost zero. So from exactly one forth of the total
number of cycles onwards, the search behaves as a pure Hill Climbing
(HC) algorithm.
Extensive experimentation has demonstrated that around 200 cycles with 1000
moves in the SA inner loop are sufficient to reach solutions in reasonable time. Table
8.2 summarizes all experimental parameters.
8.6 Results
Experimental work has been carried out for each one of the scenarios described in
Section 8.3.4 and Figure 8.1.
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SA Parameter Value
Number of cycles 210
Number attempts 1000
Initial temperature 1.44
PRNG Mersenne Twister
SA Parameter Profile (I) Profile (II)
Cooling rate 0.9705 0.9419
(i)
3–RES Parameter Value
No. parties 3
Max. No. of messages per protocol 10
Max. No. of items per message 6
Total No. of items to exchange 6
(ii)
Table 8.2: (i) General SA parameters. (ii) 3–RES parameters.
8.6.1 With Three Intersecting Coalitions and No Incentives
Figure 8.4(a) shows the results obtained for the two SA profiles and different
moving rates (column MR), in an scenario type (A). Additionally, both SA profiles
(I and II) are compared with the results obtained when applying a classic Hill
Climbing algorithm (HC). The success rate (column SR) represents the percentage
of executions attaining a feasible rational protocol over 500 trials. The average
number of protocols evaluated in each of those 500 trials is indicated in column
Avg.NPE.
In both SA profiles, the best results are obtained with a moving rate of 0.1,
attaining more than 99% of success (i.e. almost every execution produces a valid
solution) by evaluating approximately only 24, 500 protocols. These numbers imply
synthesizing a protocol for this scenario in less than 1 minute in a common laptop.
Success rates for slightly lower or higher mutation rates are similar, though the
number of total candidates evaluated before reaching a solution grows considerably,
thus resulting in a more inefficient search. As expected, higher mutation rates
transform the search in an almost random procedure with fewer chances to succeed.
Fig. 8.4(b) serves to compare the data shown in Fig. 8.4(a). An efficiency
parameter considering the ratio between success rate and number of protocols
evaluated has been defined to measure and compare the three different search modes.
The curves show how for each search mode the efficiency decreases as the moving
rate increases and how applying simulated annealing profile I renders better results
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than any other approach.
Finally, further comparatives are shown in Fig. 8.4(c) where a random search is
applied to resolve the same exchange problem. The table shows how for a random
process evaluating ten times more protocols than in a guided search, the rate of
success is still below 25%.
8.6.2 With Two Intersecting Coalitions and No Incentives
Figure 8.5(a) shows the results obtained for the two SA profiles and HC, for different
moving rates (column MR) and in an scenario type (B). Also as previously, the
success rate (column SR) represents the percentage of executions attaining a feasible
rational protocol over 500 trials. The average number of protocols evaluated in each
trial is indicated in column Avg. NPE.
Again, shown in Fig. 8.5(b), a moving rate of 0.1 seems to perform better than
any other and, although success rates do not reach such high values as in previous
experiments, still the tool is able to synthesize a rational scheme in less than 1
minute in almost all instances.
Finally, further comparatives are shown in Fig. 8.4(c) where a random search is
applied to resolve the same problem and the same type of scenario.
8.6.3 With One Coalition and No Incentives
Figure 8.6(a) shows the results obtained for the two SA profiles and HC in an
scenario type (C). Likewise, Fig.8.6(b) shows the results on a graph with three
curves. Again in this case, SA out performs HC (0.1% is the best moving rate) and
any guided search is overwhelmingly more efficient than a classic random approach
(see Fig. 8.6(c)).
8.6.4 With No Coalitions and No Incentives
Surprisingly, no schemes are found in this type of scenario. However, intuitively
one can argue that if entities are neither incentivized to exchange their items, nor
motivated to help others in the exchange, then how can rationality act to enforce
participants to follow the steps of any exchange scheme?
Although a formal proof of this result is out of the scope of this experimental
work, a sketch can be easily outlined if we considered the protocol game representing
any exchange protocol in this type of scenario. In such a game, for at least one of
the players (usually the first to play) its final payoff will be less than the utility they
hold at the start of the game. Under these circumstances, such a player will not
enter the game. Consequently, by applying backward induction, we can conclude
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Results with Three Coalitions and No Incentives
HC SA (Profile I) SA (Profile II)
MR SR Avg. NPE SR Avg. NPE SR Avg. NPE
0.01 67.4% 100,640 81.2% 80,294 76.0% 87,952
0.05 89.8% 56,678 98.6% 28,197 97.4% 32,571
0.1 97.6% 32,641 99.6% 24,531 99.2% 26,019
0.2 97.6% 36,412 100.0% 30,305 98.6% 30,737
0.3 92.8% 54,678 98.2% 47,542 95.4% 49,198
0.4 80.4% 87,988 91.2% 81,342 84.8% 83,644
0.5 66.4% 119,520 71.0% 125,366 67.4% 126,732
0.6 47.4% 151,292 48.8% 155,280 45.4% 157,794
0.7 31.8% 172,398 33.2% 175,532 28.4% 180,882
0.8 20.6% 187,248 20.4% 188,870 22.0% 187,372
(a)
(b)
Random Search
SR Avg. NPE
2.0% 19,823
6.4% 96,975
12.4% 186,519
23.0% 355,611
(c)
Figure 8.4: Results on scenario type A. Success rate of success (SR) and average
number of protocols evaluated (Avg. NPE) per trial. Results estimated over 500
trials comparing three different search methods: SA profile I, SA profile II and Hill
Climbing.
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Results with Two Coalitions and No Incentives
HC SA (Profile I) SA (Profile II)
MR SR Avg. NPE SR Avg. NPE SR Avg. NPE
0.01 62.6% 110,272 71.4% 100,990 67.6% 105,360
0.05 66.8% 81,114 95.0% 41,132 81.6% 57,010
0.1 67.2% 80,226 97.6% 30,651 90.0% 39,182
0.2 69.2% 85,208 98.0% 39,296 90.4% 44,838
0.3 77.4% 79,106 94.0% 61,246 87.0% 64,600
0.4 68.2% 125,022 85.0% 94,202 79.2% 92,940
0.5 62.8% 125,022 64.6% 134,358 62.2% 131,916
0.6 44.0% 156,738 50.0% 157,916 41.8% 165,162
0.7 29.0% 179,750 29.2% 179,336 28.2% 178,968
0.8 19.2% 187,082 18.4% 193,296 20.4% 189,398
(a)
(b)
Random Search
SR Avg. NPE
22% 352,950
(c)
Figure 8.5: Results on scenario type B. Success rate (SR) and average number
of protocols evaluated (Avg. NPE) per trial. Results estimated over 500 trials
comparing three different search methods: SA profile I, SA profile II and Hill
Climbing.
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Results with One Coalition and No Incentives
HC SA (Profile I) SA (Profile II)
MR SR Avg. NPE SR Avg. NPE SR Avg. NPE
0.01 64.2% 117,714 65.8% 121,808 64.4% 119,580
0.05 90.4% 61,402 97.6% 46,198 95.0% 48,604
0.1 97.4% 48,708 99.0% 38,694 97.4% 37,606
0.2 96.8% 49,748 99.2% 42,676 97.8% 44,346
0.3 87.8% 76,196 95.2% 68,060 89.0% 70,186
0.4 70.0% 111,474 79.8% 108,774 78.2% 99,718
0.5 56.2% 137,452 64.0% 138,704 60.2% 135,204
0.6 37.2% 165,374 36.8% 172,078 39.0% 167,848
0.7 23.6% 183,298 27.2% 180,896 25.0% 183,390
0.8 16.8% 192,470 17.4% 192,674 16.0% 194,440
(a)
(b)
Random Search
SR Avg. NPE
20.2% 358,869
(b)
Figure 8.6: Results on scenario type C. Success rate (SR) and average number
of protocols evaluated (Avg. NPE) per trial. Results estimated over 500 trials
comparing three different search methods: SA profile I, SA profile II and Hill
Climbing.
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that the Nash equilibrium of the game will be represented by the strategy profile in
which every player plays action “quit”.
8.6.5 Discussion
All in all, the best rates of success are systematically achieved by SA. Even
though a simple HC technique attains very good solutions too, the average number
of protocols evaluated per trial serves as an experimental proof of efficiency, in
favor of a more sophisticated heuristic based on SA. Furthermore, our preliminary
experimentation indicates that this is certainly the case in more complex exchange
scenarios in which the number of entities and the number of items are considerable
larger.
Finally, as for a pure random search, the numbers are several orders of magnitude
below the results obtained by any of the other two techniques.
8.7 Automatically Synthesized 3–RES protocols
In this section we will give details of a particular automatically synthesized protocol
and furthermore, we will sketch a formal rationality proof of the scheme. Describing
in detail this particular protocol will serve to:
1. Illustrate our methodology (further three–entity solutions will be presented in
subsequent Section 8.7.2) and,
2. To present a whole family of multi-party rational exchange security protocols
based on this particular solution (Section 8.8).
8.7.1 A Two Phase 3–RES Protocol
The following protocol is synthesized by the heuristic technique in an scenario type
(A) previously described in Figure 8.1. The steps dictated by the scheme are:
(1) Entity P0 sends entity P1, a message including o0 and o1, descriptions of the
required items.
(2) Entity P1 produces, according to the appropriate description, a customized o4
destined to P0. Entity P1 sends P2 a message containing o4 and the description
token o1.
(3) Entity P2 produces, according to the appropriate description, a customized o5
destined to P0. Entity P2 sends P0 items o4 and o5.
8.7 Automatically Synthesized 3–RES protocols 163
P0
o0,o1 // P1
o1,o4
²²
P0
o2,o3 // P1
o3
²²
P2
o4,o5
``AAAAAAAA
P2
(a)
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1}KP1
(2) P1 → P2 : {{o1, o4}K−1P1 }KP2
(3) P2 → P0 : {o4, o5}K−1P2
(4) P0 → P1 : {o2, o3}KP1
(5) P1 → P2 : {{o3}K−1P1 }KP2
(b)
Figure 8.7: A synthesized 3–entity rational–exchange protocol. The protocol runs
in the two phases illustrated at the top (a). Further security refinements are applied
to the scheme as shown in (b).
(4) Participant P0 sends P1 a message including o2 and o3, the return-tokens for
the items received.
(5) P1 receives a message with two return-tokens. It takes o2 and sends o3 to
entity P2.
Figure 8.7(a) shows an example of a synthesized protocol for the problem
described in Section 8.2.
As established in the initial assumptions of the problem, all messages sent by
entities P1 and P2 must be signed with the corresponding private keys (K−1P1 and
K−1P2 ), as well as all messages being received by these entities must be encrypted
with the appropriate public keys (KP1 and KP2). Applying these further security
refinements to each message of the original scheme results in the protocol shown in
Figure 8.7(b).
Rationality
Rationality of the scheme previously described can be directly inferred by the
methodology used in the synthesis of the protocol. Informally, the following list
describes those aspects of the scheme which ensure rationality and feasibility of the
solution:
- From entity’s P0 point of view. As stated in the initial assumptions, items
o4 and o5 are of no use to entity P0 until the corresponding return items o2 and
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o3 have reached entities P1 and P2 respectively. To this regard, since entity
P0 requires either all or none of these items, entity P0 is rationally forced to
send message 4.
- From entity’s P1 point of view. As previously mentioned, entity P0
requires either all or none of these items. Again, this assumption forces entity
P1 to send P2 messages 2 and 5.
- From entity’s P2 point of view. Similar rationale will force entity P2 to
send message 3 to P0.
Therefore, no entity would unilaterally deviate from the 3–RES protocol as they
could not obtain better utility value in doing so. The scheme is then a rational
solution.
8.7.2 Other Automatically Synthesized Solutions
We will now present other three entity rational exchange protocols, also
automatically synthesized using the described methodology and, which will serve
to resolve the same exchange problem described in Section 8.2. Formal analysis of
these schemes will follow similar rationale as for the protocol in the previous section.
Other solutions for scenario type (A)
Different solutions for scenario type (A) are listed in Table 8.3.
Scheme (a) in Table 8.3 is completely equivalent to the solution described in Fig.
8.7 but in this case, it is entity P2 who first receives the tokens from P0.
Scheme (b) represents a five message protocol in which entity P0 decides to send
P2’s payment before having received the required token and using P1 as intermediary.
By contrast, P1’s payment is sent after the required token is received and without
intermediaries.
Scheme (c) is an interesting solution in which only the first message of the
exchange contains more than one item, the other six messages are composed of only
one item.
Finally, schemes (d) and (e) represent variants of the protocol in (c).
Other solutions scenario type (B)
Other solutions for scenario type (B) are listed in Table 8.7.2.
In this type of scenario the solution described in Fig. 8.7 does also provide
a rational exchange. Furthermore, other schemes of different characteristics and
length are presented in Table 8.7.2 (a) to (f). All were automatically designed to
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(1) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1}
(2) P2 → P1 : {o0, o5}
(3) P1 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P0 → P2 : {o2, o3}
(5) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(a)
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1, o3}
(2) P1 → P2 : {o1, o4}
(3) P2 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P1 → P2 : {o3}
(5) P0 → P1 : {o2}
(1) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1, o2}
(2) P2 → P1 : {o0}
(3) P2 → P0 : {o5}
(4) P1 → P0 : {o4}
(5) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(6) P0 → P2 : {o3}
(b) (c)
(1) P0 → P1 : {o1}
(2) P0 → P2 : {o0}
(3) P2 → P1 : {o0}
(4) P1 → P2 : {o1, o4}
(5) P2 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(6) P0 → P1 : {o2}
(7) P0 → P2 : {o3}
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1}
(2) P1 → P2 : {o1, o4}
(3) P2 → P0 : {o4}
(4) P0 → P2 : {o2}
(5) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(6) P2 → P0 : {o5}
(7) P0 → P2 : {o3}
(d) (e)
Table 8.3: Synthesized 3-entity rational protocols for scenario type (A).
166 Heuristic Synthesis of v–RES Protocols
resolve, in a rational way, the exchange problem presented in Section 8.2 in an
scenario with two coalitions and no incentives.
Finally, it is noticed that no protocol ends with P2 sending P0 a message. As P2
is not an allied of P0, P2 has no incentive to forward the tokens that P0 requires.
However, P1 and P2 serve as intermediaries for P0 to forward each other tokens, as
they are both in coalition.
Other solutions scenario type (C)
In a similar way, the solution described in Fig. 8.7 is also synthesized in this type
of scenario. Furthermore, other solutions are listed in Table 8.7.2 (a) to (c). In this
case, no rational solution ends with entities P1 or P2 sending P0 the corresponding
tokens.
8.8 v–RES Protocol Family
The protocol previously described in Figures 8.7(a) and (b) can be easily extended
to any given v > 3 parties, defining a new family of v–RES protocols.
In general terms, v–RES is a family of multi–party rational–exchange security
protocols by which an entity P0 aims to collect a series of items from other
participant entities (P1, . . . , Pv−1), delivering the appropriate tokens in return and
considering that no item in isolation would be of any use to P0, as this needs all or
none of the required items.
Note that no restrictions such as simultaneous broadcasting or synchronizing
mechanisms are imposed on the system, so we believe there are many other problems
(secret sharing, multiparty function computation, multiple access control, etc.) for
which v–RES provides a framework for a rational solution to the problem.
As v–RES protocols will resolve a similar problem to the one described in Section
8.2, the next sections will serve to present a more general version of the problem and
to describe in detail each message of the scheme. Finally, a proof of rationality will
be provided using the formalism based on Game Theory from Part I of this thesis.
8.8.1 v–RES Initial Assumptions and Formal Notation
Several aspects of the exchange problem extended to any given v parties,are
informally described in what follows:
• Electronic items exchanged: The nature of these items must be such that
their utility only become available when the corresponding token is delivered
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(1) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1}
(2) P2 → P1 : {o0, o5}
(3) P1 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P0 → P2 : {o2, o3}
(5) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1}
(2) P1 → P2 : {o1, o4}
(3) P2 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P0 → P2 : {o2, o3}
(5) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(a) (b)
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1}
(2) P1 → P0 : {o4}
(3) P1 → P2 : {o1}
(4) P0 → P1 : {o2}
(5) P2 → P0 : {o5}
(6) P0 → P2 : {o3}
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0}
(2) P0 → P2 : {o1, o2}
(3) P1 → P0 : {o4}
(4) P2 → P0 : {o5}
(5) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(6) P0 → P2 : {o3}
(c) (d)
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1, o3}
(2) P1 → P2 : {o1}
(3) P2 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P1 → P2 : {o3}
(5) P0 → P1 : {o2}
(1) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1}
(2) P2 → P1 : {o0, o5}
(3) P1 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P0 → P1 : {o3}
(5) P1 → P2 : {o3}
(6) P0 → P1 : {o2}
(e) (f)
Table 8.4: Synthesized 3-entity rational protocols for scenario type (B).
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(1) P0 → P1 : {o3}
(2) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1, o2}
(3) P2 → P1 : {o0, o5}
(4) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(5) P1 → P2 : {o3}
(1) P0 → P1 : {o0, o1, o3}
(2) P1 → P2 : {o1, o4}
(3) P2 → P0 : {o4, o5}
(4) P0 → P2 : {o2}
(5) P1 → P2 : {o3}
(6) P2 → P1 : {o2}
(a) (b)
(1) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1}
(2) P2 → P0 : {o5}
(3) P0 → P1 : {o3}
(4) P2 → P1 : {o0}
(5) P1 → P2 : {o3}
(6) P1 → P0 : {o4}
(7) P0 → P1 : {o2}
(c)
Table 8.5: Synthesized 3-entity rational protocols for scenario type (C).
in return. Additionally, no item in isolation is of any value to entity P0. In
other words, P0 is interested in collecting all or none of these items.
• Providers of e-items: Participant entities Pi providing with the electronic
items, must be part of a visible and recognizable PKI (Public Key
Infrastructure). No other trusted or semi-trusted parties are involved in the
scheme. Note that this is not a restriction on entity P0 who can maintain
anonymous his/her real identity.
• Coalitions and Incentives: As we have seen in previous section, either by
incentives (the potential to gain further business, reputation factors, etc.) or
by coalitions (helping others to achieve better payoff), v–RES participants
must be rewarded when behaving according the protocol description.
We will consider the following notation to represent the previously described
v–party scenario:
• Let P = {P0, . . . , Pv−1} be the set of participant entities.
• Let D = {desc itemi}i=1,...,v−1 represent a list of description-tokens which
user P0 composes, with details on each of the requested items from each entity
Pi, i = 1, . . . , v − 1.
• We assume that in each case, entity Pi will be able to produce a token itemi,
tailored to satisfy user P0’s request, described by desc itemi.
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• Let Y = {payi}i=1,...,v−1 be a set of payment-tokens produced by user P0.
Each payi is destined to entity Pi in return for itemi. Each entity Pi must
specify how token payi should be constructed (it could be of general knowledge
or itemi could include this information for each particular instance) to ensure
immediate or future payment.
8.8.2 v–RES Two–Phase Protocol
The protocol is executed in two main phases informally described in the next
paragraphs.
• Phase I:
– Customer P0 sends entity P1, a message including set D with descriptions
for all the required items.
– Entity P1 produces, according to token desc item1, a customized item1
destined to P0. It also deletes desc item1 from set D and it establishes
who would be the next entity to satisfy the requirement described by
desc item2.
– Entity P1 sends P2 a message containing item1 and the set D with the
remaining description-tokens.
– The process is repeated from any Pi to Pi+1 until all requirements are
satisfied and set D is empty.
– Finally, the last entity Pv−1 sends P0 all items {itemi}1,...,v−1 completing
the first phase of the exchange.
• Phase II:
– User P0 produces n− 1 payment-tokens, one for each participant entity.
P0 sends entity P1 the set of payments P .
– When a participant Pi, i = 1 . . . v − 2, receives a message with a set of
payments P , it takes the appropriate token, deletes it from the list and
forwards the message to the next entity.
The topology to represent a v–RES is a ring, although logically the scheme
resolves a more complex interaction matrix.
Figure Fig. 8.8 depicts the dynamics of a general v–RES protocol.
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Pi+1
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v-1 …….
1..i+1
i+2..v-1
1..v-2
v-1
Item description Item Paym ent
Figure 8.8: Sketch of the v–RES protocol. Different arrows represent different
message content: bold lines represent the description of the requested items, dashed
lines represent tailored itemi destined to P0 and, dotted lines represent payment
messages.
8.8.3 Detailed Message Content
What follows is a detailed description of every message exchanged using the
aforementioned notation.
• Phase I of the v–RES protocol:
In phase I, entity P0 issues a list D with descriptions for all required items. It
also creates a fresh identifier id to uniquely reference the exchange. Finally,
P0 locates the entity she trusts the most, and initiates the protocol by sending
the first message, encrypted with entity P1’s public key KP1 .
At each step in this phase, an entity Pi receives an encrypted message
containing a list of previous participants, the list of items and signatures
already collected and the set of pending requests D. Pi then composes
the corresponding itemi according to desc itemi, signs the item, removes
desc itemi from set D and sends message mIi , encrypted with the next entity’s
public key. At the end of phase I, the last entity Pv−1 sends P0 a single
signed message, including all requested items. The following Figure 8.9 details
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P0 → P1 : mI0 = {id, P0, P1, D}KP1
Pi → Pi+1 : mIi = {id, P0, P1, . . . , Pi, item1, . . . , itemi, D, σ1, . . . , σi}KPi+1
with D = D − {desc itemj}, j = 1, . . . , i
Pv−1 → P0 : mIv−1 = {id, P0, P1, . . . , Pv−1, item1, . . . , itemv−1, σ1, . . . , σv−1}K−1Pv−1
where σk = sig({id, P0, Pk, itemk},K−1Pk ), k = 1, . . . , v − 1
Figure 8.9: Message content. Phase I of the v–RES protocol.
P0 → P1 : mII0 = {id, P0, E, P}KP1
Pi−1 → Pi : mIIi−1 = {id, P0, E, P}KPi
with E = E − Pi−1 , P = P −
{
payi−1
}
, i = 2, . . . , v − 1
Figure 8.10: Message content. Phase II of the v–RES protocol.
message content for phase I of the scheme.
• Phase II of the v–RES protocol:
In phase II, entity P0 sends a list P with all payment-tokens and a list E of
participant entities, so each participant entity Pi receives a payment-token in
return for itemi.
In particular, at each step in phase II, an entity Pi receives an encrypted
message containing a list of P of payment–tokens. Pi must collect the
corresponding payment and forward the rest of the tokens to the next entity
in the list.
Figure 8.10 details the message content for phase II of the scheme.
8.8.4 v–RES Protocol Game
In this section we will apply the formalism described in Chapter 3 to the formal
analysis of the family of v–RES protocols. As stated in the formal model, the
initial description of a rational–exchange protocol can be used to construct the
corresponding protocol game (2.3.1.) The following game can be derived from any
v party protocol instance of the family of v–RES protocols.
Definition 8.8.1 (v–RES protocol game). Let Gv−−RES = {P, S,−→u } be the protocol
game derived from the v–RES protocol description in Section 8.8, where:
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P = {P0, . . . , Pv−1}, a set of participant entities. Each Pi, i ∈
{1, . . . , v − 1} with a pair of keys (KPi ,K−1Pi ).
S = S0 × Sv−1, a set of strategy profiles, where:
• S0 = {(send mI0, send mII0 ), (send mI0, quitII)} is the set
of tuples representing all possible strategies for entity P0.
• Si = {(send mIi , send mIIi ), (send mIi , quitII),
(quitI , send mIIi ), (quit
I , quitII)}, is the set of tuples
representing all possible strategies for entities Pi, ∀i ∈
{1, . . . , v − 2}.
• Sv−1 = {send mIi , quitI} is the set of actions representing
all possible strategies for entity Pv−1.
−→u = (u0, . . . , uv−1) is a vector of v utility functions with domain
over the set S of strategy profiles and range over R.
Note that, superscripts I and II denote phases I and II of the protocol
respectively. Also, send mji represents action send message mi at phase j of the
protocol game and quitj denotes action quit the protocol game at phase j.
Furthermore, the first component of every possible strategy vector si ∈ Si
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v−1}, refers to action taken at phase I of the protocol while component
two of any strategy tuple is referring to action taken at phase II in the protocol game.
Finally, any given strategy profile s = (s0, · · · , sv−1) ∈ S may be represented by
the tuple (si, s−i) in the protocol game.
Definition 8.8.2. The utility function u0(·), for user P0 in Gv−−RES is defined as
follows:
∀s ∈ S where s = (s0, · · · , sv−1):
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u0(s) =

0 if
[
s0 = (send mI0, quit
II)
]∨[∃k ∈ {1, . . . , v − 1} : sk = (quitI , ·)]
−∑ij=1 payj if [s0 = (send mI0, send mII0 )]∧[
sv−1 = (send mIv−1)
]∧[∃i ∈ {1, . . . , v − 2} : [[sk = (send mIi , send mIIi )
∀k < i] ∧ [si = (send mIi , quitII)]
]]
1 if
[
s0 = (send mI0, send m
II
0 )
]∧[
si = (send mIi , send m
II
i ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , v − 2}
]∧[
sv−1 = (send mIv−1)
]
Note that value 1 is taken arbitrarily as the first positive integer greater than
zero.
Next, ui : S → R represents the utility function for entity Pi, with i ∈
{1, . . . , v − 2}.
Note that, as mentioned before, either by incentives (the potential to gain further
business, reputation factors, etc.) or by coalitions (helping others to achieve better
payoff), entities must be rewarded when behaving according the protocol description.
In this case, we have adopted what we consider to be the most realistic approach, in
which entities gain further potential businesses every time they successfully complete
a protocol run. This is represented by a factor 0 < δi 6 1 defined as the percentage
of future payments that entities obtain every time a protocol run is successfully
completed. The following definition formalizes such a concept.
Definition 8.8.3. We define, ∀s = (s0, . . . , sv−1) ∈ S and ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , v − 2} the
following utility function:
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ui(s) =

0 if
[
s0 = (send mI0, quit
II)
]∨[∃k ∈ {1, . . . , v − 1} : sk = (quitI , ·)]∨[∃k < i : sk = (send mIk, quitII)]
payi if
[
s0 = (send mI0, send m
II
0 )
]∧[
sv−1 = (send mIn)
]∧[
sk = (send mIk, send m
II
k )∀k < i
]∧[
si = (send mIi , quit
II)
]
(δi + 1) ∗ payi if
[
s0 = (send mI0, send m
II
0 )
]∧[
sv−1 = (send mIn)
]∧[
sk = (send mIk, send m
II
k )∀k 6 i
]
Finally, we will define an utility function for entity Pv−1.
Definition 8.8.4. The following uv−1 : S → R represents the utility function for
entity Pv−1, ∀s = (s0, . . . , sv−1) ∈ S:
uv−1(s) =

0 if
[
s0 = (send mI0, quit
II)
]∨[∃k ∈ {1, . . . , v − 1} : sk = (quitI , ·)]∨[∃k ∈ {1, . . . , v − 2} : sk = (send mIk, quitII)]
payn if
[
s0 = (send mI0, send m
II
0 )
]∧[
sv−1 = (send mIv−1)
]∧[
sk = (send mIi , send m
II
i )∀k < v − 1
]
Figures 8.11 and 8.12 represent in extensive–form both phases of the Gv−−RES
game. The tree represents the different moves each participant can make and all the
possible outcomes. The vectors assigned to each terminal node represent the values
of the payoff function. The first value corresponds to participant P0 and the rest
are the payoff values for entities P1 to Pv−1.
8.8.5 Rationality by Backward Induction
As in Section 7.4, our formal analysis of the v–RES family will be based on applying
backward induction to the protocol game Gv−−RES .
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The following theorem serves to formulate the main result of this analysis.
Theorem 8.8.1. The strategy profile s∗ ∈ S defined as s∗ = (s∗0, . . . , s∗v−1) where:
s∗i = (send m
I
i , send m
II
i ) ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 2} and,
s∗v−1 = (send mIv−1)
(8.5)
represents a Nash equilibrium perfect in sub–games for the Gv−−RES game.
Proof. The proof is based on applying the backward induction algorithm to
Gv−−RES defined in Section 8.8.
Entity Pv−2 is the last player to move in the last phase of the protocol game.
Entity Pv−2 has to chose between quitting the protocol quitII or sending message
mIIv−2. Each option will render Pv−2 the following different payoff values:
uv−2(sv−2, s−(v−2)) =

payv−2 if
[
sv−2 = (·, quitII)
]
(δv−2 + 1) ∗ payv−2 if
[
sv−2 = (·, send mIIv−2)
] (8.6)
All participant entities are considered to be rational, so all entities play to
maximize their payoffs. Since δv−2 > 0, strategy (·, send mIIv−2) is a dominant1
strategy for Pv−2 in phase II of the protocol. When it is entity Pv−3’s turn to
play, Pv−3 is aware of entity Pv−2’s dominant strategy and behaves accordingly to
maximize her payoff. In general, the backward induction process forces every entity
Pi in phase II of the protocol to choose between the following two strategies with
the following different payoffs:
ui(si, s−i) =

payi if
[
si = (·, quitII)
]
(δi + 1) ∗ payi if
[
si = (·, send mIIi )
] (8.7)
Therefore, in phase II every entity Pi i ∈ {1, . . . , v − 2} is rationally forced to
play send mIIi instead of quit
II .
When it is P0’s turn to initiate phase II, P0 knows the strategies that entities P1
to Pv−2 are going to play and behaves accordingly, maximizing her payoff. What
follows are the values for entity P0’s payoff function at the beginning of phase II.
1See Section A.1.2 for formal descriptions of dominant and dominated strategies of a game.
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u(s0, s−0) =

0 if
[
s0 = (·, quitII)
]
1 if
[
s0 = (·, send mII0 )
] (8.8)
Entity P0 is then rationally forced to follow the protocol description and initiate
phase II choosing strategy s0 = (·, send mII0 ). Considering the space of strategies
S0 defined in Definition 8.8.1, in order to maximize her payoff value, entity P0 is
forced to choose strategy s0 = (send mI0, send m
II
0 ).
Following the backward induction process onto phase I, entity Pv−1 is the last
mover of the first phase. At this point, Pv−1 knows how rational entities P0 and P1
to Pv−2 are going to play in phase II. Next, are entity Pv−1’s two possible strategies
and the corresponding payoffs at the end of phase I:
uv−1(sv−1, s−{v−1}) =

0 if
[
sv−1 = (quitI)
]
payv−1 if
[
sv−1 = (send mIv−1)
] (8.9)
Strategy sv−1 = (send mIv−1) is a dominant strategy since entity Pv−1 would
not choose a different action under any circumstances .
Backing the process to any step in phase I of the protocol, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , v−2},
we obtain the following results:
ui(si, s−i) =

0 if
[
si = (quitI , send mIIi )
]
(δi + 1) ∗ payi if
[
si = (send mIi , send m
II
i )
] (8.10)
Strategy (send mIi , send m
II
i ) is therefore a dominant strategy for all Pi, with
i ∈ {0, . . . , v − 2}.
Summarizing, by applying backward induction to the v–RES protocol game, we
have stated the following results:
a. Strategy s∗ defined in Equation (8.5) is a dominant strategy for each
participant entity.
b. In all sub–games considered during the induction process, the strategy profile
s∗ represents a Nash Equilibrium as no player has anything to gain by changing
her strategy unilaterally.
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Therefore, strategy s∗ defined in Equation (8.5) is a Nash equilibrium perfect in
sub–games as defined in Section A.4.1.
Corollary 8.8.1. For any v > 3, the v–RES protocol, as defined in Section 8.8, is
a multi–party rational–exchange security protocol.
Proof. Theorem 8.8.1 defines a strategy profile representing an unique solution for
the Gv−−RES game. Such a strategy profile corresponds exactly to the v–RES
protocol specification given in Section 8.8.
Such a solution is also a sub–game perfect equilibrium, so no other strategies
result in higher benefits when any of the entities unilaterally change their behavior.
Therefore, deviating from the protocol description does not represent a profitable
option. This being the actual definition of a rational–exchange protocol given in by
Definition 1.3.2, is a conclusive result.
8.9 Conclusions
Although, the formal foundations of our methodology ensure high levels of flexibility
and scalability for any multi–party rational exchange problem, for the purpose of
this chapter, we have designed and implemented a three–entity search algorithm
based on Simulated Annealing.
The methodology has been proven to be extremely efficient (high success rates
in very low running times) for the synthesis of 3–RES protocols.
Furthermore, an automatically discovered three–entity solution has been
extended to a family of v–party protocols for which rationality has been formally
proven. To the best of our knowledge, the protocols of this family are the first
multi–party rational-exchange schemes proposed so far in the literature.
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P1
P0
quit I
Ph a s e I
m I 0
P2
(0)
(0)
quit I
quit I
m I 1
P i
P i+ 1
(0)
quit I
m I i$
Pv- 2
(0)
(0)
quit I
quit I
m I v- 2
Pv- 1
P0
(0)
quit I
m I v- 1
to Ph as e II
(0)
Figure 8.11: Formal representation of the v–RES protocol game, phase I.
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Chapter 9
Solving More Complex
Problems
9.1 Introduction
The formalism described in Chapter 7 allows us to transform the problem of how
to design a multi–party rational exchange protocol into an optimization problem.
Representing multi-parte rational exchange problems and protocols using a set of
matrices is the first step of such a transformation. Additionally, the definition of
several utility functions make it possible to carry out an algebraical evaluation of
all candidate solutions.
In Chapter 8 two heuristic techniques, Hill Climbing and Simulated Annealing,
were successfully applied to the automated synthesis of 3–entity rational exchange
protocols.
In this chapter we present the results when the same approach is adopted for
the synthesis of rational protocols in more complex exchanging scenarios where, not
only the number of entities increases, but also the number of tokens and the possible
dependencies that there might exists amongst these items.
9.1.1 Chapter Overview
Unfortunately, there is no such a thing as a bench marking set of rational exchange
problems. Beyond standard parameters such as number of entities and number of
exchangeable tokens, multi-party rational exchange problems can come in any form
or shape. Each exchanging scenario has got its own peculiarities which may depend
on a variety of factors:
• Value of the items to be exchanged.
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• Level of dependency amongst these items.
• Asymmetrical or non-asymmetrically incentivized environments and,
• Coalition free vs. jointed or disjointed coalited instances.
Therefore, increasing the global scale of a multi–party exchange problem causes
an explosion on the number of variants of the given problem.
In particular, increasing the scale of a problem increases the size of the matrices
of the model (state matrix H, benefit matrix B and dependency matrix R) in which
all environmental factors must be defined and represented by their elements.
In this chapter we have focused on two sets of experimental work:
1. We experiment with the synthesis of v–RES protocols (v > 3) for the problem
described in Section 8.2 and,
2. We describe a tool which will assist us in the automated definition and
generation of multi-party exchange problems. Given a set of input parameters,
the tool produces a series of exchanging problems of certain characteristics
which are represented using matrices H, B and R. Amongst all valid problems
generated and, attending certain criteria, the most difficult ones are selected.
For these the same methodology based on heuristic algorithms is applied in
search of rational solutions.
As in previous chapters, we will also provide the corresponding statistical tables
describing performance rates and, we will present some synthesized multi–party
rational exchange protocols resulting of the experimentation.
9.1.2 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 9.2 we present the results for the
synthesis of v–RES protocols (v > 3) in the particular exchanging scenario described
in previous Section 8.2. In Section 9.3 we describe the necessary parameters and
the main properties of randomly generated multi–party exchange problems. We
also define the criteria followed to select the set of problems which are going to
be resolved using heuristic search techniques and give a graphical representation of
these. In Section 9.4 we apply a heuristic technique, based on Simulated Annealing,
for the synthesis of rational solutions to the previously selected problems and we
present the performance rates attained. Some of the rational solutions synthesized
in previous section are described in Section 9.5. Finally, in Section 9.6 we present
the final conclusions to this experimental work.
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v SR Avg. NPE
3 99.6% 24,531
4 100.0% 35,848
5 100.0% 780,811
6 90.0% 10,213,297
Table 9.1: Automatically synthesized v–RES solutions.
9.2 Automated Generation of v–RES Solutions
In Chapter 8 two heuristic techniques were successfully applied for the automated
synthesis of 3–entity rational exchange protocols. These protocols were constructed
to solve the particular problem described in Section 8.2 referred to as the 3–RES
problem. Furthermore, four different scenarios were considered for the synthesis of
candidate solutions to such a problem.
In this section we present the results obtained when applying a heuristic
technique, based on Simulated Annealing, in search of solutions for v–RES problems
when v > 3. As it was formally established in Section 8.8, for each v–RES problem
there exists a rational solution. These protocols constitute the so called v–RES
protocol family.
Table 9.1 shows, for different values of v (number of entities), the success rate
(column SR) and average number of protocols evaluated in each search (column
Av. NPE.). The experimentation was carried out over 500 trials. Note that the
technique is successful in all instances. For a bigger number of entities, the average
number of protocols evaluated will simply be larger.
9.3 Randomized Multi–party Rational Exchange
Problems
In this section a tool has been implemented which, given a set of parameters
it automatically generates valid exchange problems represented in matrices H(0)
(initial state) , B (benefit matrix) and R (dependency matrix).
We will now describe the set of input parameters as well as the main
characteristics of the problems automatically generated by this tool.
9.3.1 Problem Generation Parameters and Characteristics
When automatically generating a multi–party exchange problem the following
parameters must be determined.
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Input Parameters
1. Number of entities,
2. Number of tokens and,
3. A factor defined as R DENSITY which establishes the density of the
dependency matrix R. More on this parameter will come in the following
paragraphs.
For such a set of input parameters, a series of exchange problems are randomly
generated with the following characteristics.
Characteristics
• Entities’ initial possessions: An initial state matrix H(0) is randomly
generated such that:
– For each item, only one entity is the initial owner of that token.
– Entities can posses zero, one or more than one items.
– Also, all items are accessible to their corresponding owners and no item
can be marked as lost.
• Entities’ final requirements: Entities’ final requirements are randomly
generated and represented in a benefit matrix B such that:
– For each token, only one entity (different from the owner) is randomly
chosen to require this item.
– A positive integer greater than one is randomly generated, representing
how much this item is worth to the requiring entity.
– Entities could require zero, one or more than one items.
• Coalitions: Coalitions between participants are randomly generated and
represented in benefit matrix B.
– Coalitions are such that, sending messages containing tokens required by
an allied entity increases the sender’s utility.
– By contrast, forwarding tokens required by non–allied participants could
be either cost–free or, it could represent a cost for the sender entity.
– Of every possible pair of participant entities, 1/3 are considered to be in
coalition.
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– Of every possible pair of participant entities, 1/3 are considered to be in
a non–coalition form and to have no cost in relaying each other tokens
and,
– Finally, 1/3 of pairs of participants are considered to be in a non–coalition
form, and to incur cost when forwarding each other required–tokens.
• Incentives: Incentives are also represented in benefit matrix B.
– It is randomly chosen whether the owner of a token is incentivized to the
exchange of that item. Each entity will be incentivized to the exchange
of 1/2 of its own tokens.
• Items inter–dependencies: All dependency relationships amongst
exchangeable items of a given problem will also be randomly generated and
represented in matrix R. The density of this matrix will be determined by
the input parameter R DENSITY . R DENSITY will be the percentage
of values in matrix R different from zero. Although other distributions can
apply, the problems generated by this tool will be such that:
– (1/3) ∗ R DENSITY will be negative relationships and (2/3) ∗
R DENSITY are positive ones. Positive and negative dependency
relationships are defined in Section 7.2.3.
– Negative relationships are not necessarily followed by positive ones. This
means that a certain sequence of events in a protocol solution may be
forced by the fact that items could become non-accessible forever when
they are sent in the wrong order.
9.3.2 Difficult Problems
For each set of input parameters, a series of problems are randomly generated of
the previously discussed characteristics. Amongst all these problems only the most
difficult will be selected and an heuristic algorithm will be applied in search of a
rational solution. All rational solutions will be represented by a protocol matrix S
as defined in Section 7.2.1.
The same technique denominated Random Walk technique (see Section 6.3.1)
will be used to determine the difficulty of a randomized multi–party exchange
problem. A value λ will serve to measure difficulty in relation to the fitness landscape
of a given problem. The parameter λ is computed as
∑
i(L/ρi) where L is the
random walk length and ρi are the autocorrelation values for each shift value in the
fitness of neighboring protocols.
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Input Parameters
No. of entities
No. of exchangeable tokens
R DENSITY factor
Output Parameters
Matrix H(0)
Entities initial possessions
Matrix B
Entities final requirements
Coalitions
Incentives
Payoff values
Matrix R
Items dependency relationships
Tuning Parameters
No. of problems generated
Random walk length
No. of random walks
Table 9.2: Randomized problem generation parameters.
Small autocorrelation values will represent abrupt fitness landscapes which will
be identified as difficult problems and will be represented by high λ values.
Finally, table 9.2 serves to summarize all exposed parameters involved in the
generation of randomized multi–party exchange problems.
9.3.3 Graphical Representation of Problems
A graphical representation of multi–party rational exchange problems will assist in
identifying the type of problem generated. Part of the information about a given
exchanging scenario, in particular information contained in matrices H(0) and B,
can be represented in a graph of the following properties:
• Each entity is represented in a circle.
• The set of items required by each one of the entities is grouped in a triangle
figure attached to the corresponding entity.
• For each item that en entity possesses at the initial state, there will be an arrow
pointing to the owner, labeled with the name of the possessed token. Dashed
arrows describe non–incentivized entities towards the exchange of such an
item, whereas solid lines indicate that the owner entity is part of an incentive
scheme for the exchange of that item.
• Finally, solid lines connecting entities represent alliances or coalitions between
entities, whereas dashed crossing lines indicate that relaying each other
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required–tokens represents a cost in their utilities. The absence of links
indicates cost free relays, this is, entities being indifferent towards each others
required–items.
Figure 9.1 serves as an example of a exchanging scenario of five entities and six
tokens, represented as a graph. The figure represents:
• The coalitions P0 ↔ P1, P0 ↔ P4 and, P1 ↔ P2.
• The non–coalition forms of relationship P1 ↔ P3 and P3 ↔ P4.
• Entity P0 initially possesses item o5 but it is not incentivized to exchange it.
• P0 also requires item o3.
• Entity P1 initially possesses item o0 and it is not incentivized to exchange it.
• P1 requires item o2.
• Entity P2 has no initial possessions and requires items o1 and o5.
• Entity P3 initially possesses items o2 and o4 and it is incentivized to lose
control over both of them.
• P3 requires item o0.
• Finally, entity P4 initially possesses item o1 and it is incentivized for the
exchange of this item and, it also possesses o3 but it is not incentivized to
lose control over it.
• P4 requires item o4.
9.4 Automated Generation of M–RES Solutions to
Randomized Problems
Similar optimization technique, based on Simulated Annealing, as the one described
in Chapter 7 will be used to explore the space of protocols and to find rational
solutions for any given randomized multi–party exchange problem.
Several rounds of preliminary experimentation gave us the indication that the
performance rate of the applied search technique was highly influenced by the
R DENSITY value of the given problem. For this reason, our experimental work
has focused on five types of randomized problems:
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Figure 9.1: Example of a exchanging scenario of five entities and six tokens.
1. Multi–party exchange problems with zero R DENSITY . These are problems
in which there is no dependency between the items to be exchanged.
2. Multi–party exchange problems with a low density value; these are problems
where 1.0% of values in matrix R are non zero values (R DENSITY = 0.010).
3. Multi–party exchange problems with medium R DENSITY value of 0.018;
these are problems where 1.8% of values in matrix R are non zero values. Note
that this is the density value for any of the v–RES family problems.
4. Multi–party exchange problems with medium R DENSITY value of 0.02;
problems where 2.0% of values in matrix R are non zero values.
5. Multi–party exchange problems with high R DENSITY ; these are problems
where 5.0% of values in matrix R are non zero values.
Several trials of experimentation have shown that the search technique fails when
applied to problems with higher R DENSITY values than 0.05. Highly dependency
rates amongst exchangeable items make the exchange problem a difficult one to
resolve or even impossible.
The algorithm used in the search is Simulated Annealing. Table 9.2(a) shows the
parameters of the experiment. Furthermore, Table 9.2(b) shows the performance
rates obtained when exploring the space of candidate solutions for different problems.
Varying the number of entities, number of tokens and number of protocol steps,
column (SR) shows the success rate of the search technique used, and column (Av.
NPE.) shows the average number of protocols evaluated in each trial search.
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9.5 Automatically Synthesized Protocols
Next we present some of the multi–party problems automatically generated, their
graphical representation and several rational protocols synthesized to solve such
problems.
We focus on describing four and six entity protocols to illustrate the type of
solution generating using our methodology.
9.5.1 Examples with Four Entities and Zero R DENSITY
We will now describe a four–entity randomized problem with zero R DENSITY .
Matrices H(0), B will define every parameter of the problem and matrix R will
contain all zero values. The number of exchangeable items will be six.
Matrix H(0) defines the initial state of possessions and benefit matrix B defines
coalitions, incentives and payoff values. Both are represented in Figure 9.3(a).
Furthermore, Figure 9.3(a) also represents the information described in previous
matrices as a graph. The figure represents the coalition between P2 ↔ P3 and
the non–coalition form of relationship between P0 ↔ P2 and P1 ↔ P2. Entity P0
initially possesses items o0 and o4 and it is incentivized to exchange any of them.
P0 requires item o3. Entity P1 initially possesses items o3 and o5 and it is not
incentivized to exchange any of them. P1 requires items o0 and o4. Entity P2 has
item o1 as the only initial possession and requires items o2 and o5. Finally, entity P3
initially possesses item o2 and it is incentivized to lose control over it. P3 requires
item o1.
In Figure 9.3(b) we present three possible rational protocols which are
automatically synthesized and give solution to the exchange problem just described.
Figure 9.3(b.I) shows a synthesized solution in which the number of messages
is five. Entity P1 starts by splitting its tokens between P0 and P3, one to each
recipient. P3 sends the token just received from P0 together with its own item o2
to P2. Entity P0 keeps the token received from P1 and sends its own tokens to P1.
Finally, P2 sends P3 its own item o1. Figures 9.3(b.II) and (b.III) show two more
solutions to the previously described problem. In this case, the protocols consist of
six messages.
9.5.2 Examples with Six Entities and Zero R DENSITY
A randomized six–entity problem is described in Figure 9.4(a). Matrix H(0) defines
the initial state of possessions, benefit matrix B defines coalitions, incentives and
payoff values, and matrix R contains all zero values. The number of exchangeable
items is eight.
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Matrix H(0) Matrix B
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0


−1 0 1 15 −1 1
51 0 1 1 51 1
1 −1 27 1 1 168
0 108 1 0 0 −1

P P
o
0
o
4 o
3
o
5
0 1
o
3 o
0
o
4
P
2P3
o
1o2
o
2
o
5
o
1
Required tokens
Participant entities
Coalition
Cost connection
Incentivized token
Non-Incentivized token
(a)
(1) P1 → P0 : {o3}
(2) P1 → P3 : {o5}
(3) P3 → P2 : {o2, o5}
(4) P0 → P1 : {o0, o4}
(5) P2 → P3 : {o1}
(b.I)
(1) P2 → P1 : {o1}
(2) P1 → P3 : {o5}
(3) P1 → P0 : {o3}
(4) P3 → P2 : {o2, o5}
(5) P1 → P3 : {o1}
(6) P0 → P1 : {o0, o4}
(1) P3 → P2 : {o2}
(2) P1 → P3 : {o5}
(3) P1 → P0 : {o3}
(4) P0 → P1 : {o0, o4}
(5) P3 → P2 : {o5}
(6) P2 → P3 : {o1}
(b.II) (b.III)
(b)
Figure 9.3: (a) Four–entity randomized problem. (b) Four–entity automatically
synthesized solutions.
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Furthermore, Figure 9.4(b.I) and (b.II) show two different solutions to the
previously described problem. The protocols consist of seven messages each.
9.5.3 Examples with Four Entities and Medium R DENSITY
Figure 9.5(a) represents a randomized four–entity problem with nine exchangeable
items. Matrix H(0) defines the initial state of possessions and benefit matrix B
defines coalitions, incentives and payoff values. The value of R DENSITY for this
problem is 0.018, this is, 1.8% of the elements of matrix R are non–zero values.
Table Figure 9.5(b) represents the dependency relationships between several of the
exchangeable items.
A rational solution automatically synthesized for this problem is shown in Figure
9.6.
9.5.4 Examples with Six Entities and Medium R DENSITY
Figure 9.7(a) represents a randomized six–entity problem with nine exchangeable
items. Matrix H(0) defines the initial state of possessions and benefit matrix B
defines coalitions, incentives and payoff values. The value of R DENSITY for this
problem is 0.018. This is, 1.8% of the elements of matrix R are non–zero values and
serve to represent the dependency relationships between several of the exchangeable
items. Values of matrix R are defined in Table (b) in Figure 9.7.
Rational solutions automatically synthesized for this problem are shown in
Figure 9.8(a) and (b). Both protocols consisting on nine messages each.
9.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have carried out further experimentation applying a heuristic
search algorithm (Simulated Annealing) for the synthesis of rational protocols in
more complex randomized environments.
The resulting data indicates that the technique is highly successful and that it
can resolve exchange problems in reasonable bounds of time. Furthermore, for every
protocol synthesized using this methodology there exists a formal proof of rationality.
All protocols can be represented as protocol–games within the framework described
in Part I of this thesis. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of these games can be computed
applying backward induction (see Theorem 7.4.1), being able to specify that the NE
corresponds to the sequence of steps described in the protocol.
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Matrix H(0) Matrix B
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0


202 0 1 1 −1 1 0 1
−1 1 0 1 133 0 −1 0
1 −1 −1 291 1 −1 −1 −1
1 0 −1 0 −1 −1 0 −1
−1 82 0 −1 −1 0 91 0
1 0 156 −1 0 142 0 278

P
0
P
1
o2 o5
o1
o6
o3
o4o0
P
2
PP4
P
5
o2
o
o3
3
o4 o7
o0o1
5
o7
o6
Required tokens
Participant entities
Coalition
Cost connection
Incentivized token
Non-Incentivized token
(a)
(1) P0 → P3 : {o2, o5}
(2) P1 → P2 : {o1}
(3) P4 → P0 : {o0}
(4) P2 → P4 : {o1, o6}
(5) P3 → P1 : {o4}
(6) P3 → P5 : {o2, o5, o7}
(7) P5 → P2 : {o3}
(1) P5 → P2 : {o3}
(2) P0 → P3 : {o2, o5}
(3) P1 → P4 : {o1}
(4) P4 → P0 : {o0}
(5) P2 → P4 : {o6}
(6) P3 → P5 : {o2, o5, o7}
(7) P3 → P1 : {o4}
(b.I) (b.II)
(b)
Figure 9.4: (a) Six–entity randomized problem. (b) Six–entity automatically
synthesized solutions.
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Matrix H(0)
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Matrix B
1 1 1 224 0 0 44 1 1
72 252 −1 1 0 0 1 157 −1
−1 −1 99 1 −1 1 1 −1 162
0 0 1 0 225 254 0 0 −1

P
0
P
1
o0, o1
o6
o8
o0o3
o6
o1
o7
P
2
P
3 o3
o2
o4
o4
o5
o5
o7
Required tokens
Participant entities
Coalition
Cost connection
Incentivized token
Non-Incentivized token
(a)
Matrix R
r0,12 = POS DR r4,10 = POS DR r2,17 = NEG DR
r4,34 = POS DR r8,21 = POS DR r6,33 = NEG DR
r8,30 = POS DR r12,24 = POS DR r21,10 = NEG DR
r13,7 = POS DR r15,30 = POS DR r25,18 = NEG DR
r18,21 = POS DR r18,35 = POS DR r33,18 = NEG DR
r19,16 = POS DR r27,18 = POS DR r34,25 = NEG DR
r27,34 = POS DR r28,4 = POS DR
r28,11 = POS DR r29,15 = POS DR
r32,14 = POS DR r32,28 = POS DR
r33,28 = POS DR r35,10 = POS DR
(b)
Figure 9.5: Four–entity randomized problem (R DENSITY = 1.8%).
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(1) P0 → P2 : {o0, o1}
(2) P1 → P3 : {o6}
(3) P2 → P3 : {o0, o1, o3, o5, o7}
(4) P3 → P1 : {o0, o1, o2, o7}
(5) P3 → P0 : {o3, o6}
(6) P2 → P3 : {o4}
(5) P1 → P2 : {o2, o8}
Figure 9.6: Four–entity synthesized solution (R DENSITY = 1.8%).
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Matrix H(0)
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1

Matrix B
−1 1 196 244 0 1 1 −1 136
69 91 1 1 0 259 0 −1 1
0 −1 0 0 79 −1 0 −1 0
−1 −1 −1 0 0 −1 0 −1 0
−1 −1 −1 −1 1 −1 0 6 −1
0 0 0 1 0 0 216 0 1

P
0
P
1
o0o6
o1 o5
o3 o8
o0
o1
o5
o2
o3
o8
P
2
PP4
P
5
o6 o4
3
o2, o7
o4o7
Required tokens
Participant entities
Coalition
Cost connection
Incentivized token
Non-Incentivized token
(a)
Matrix R
r2,18 = POS DR r3,17 = POS DR r5,7 = POS DR r5,35 = NEG DR
r6,43 = POS DR r10,8 = NEG DR r10,40 = POS DR r12,41 = NEG DR
r15,24 = NEG DR r18,45 = NEG DR r19,16 = POS DR r19,28 = POS DR
r21,7 = POS DR r21,17 = POS DR r22,3 = POS DR r22,10 = POS DR
r24,5 = POS DR r24,38 = POS DR r24,52 = POS DR r25,53 = POS DR
r26,12 = POS DR r29,8 = NEG DR r29,36 = POS DR r30,1 = POS DR
r30,19 = NEG DR r32,1 = POS DR r32,3 = POS DR r32,15 = POS DR
r33,19 = POS DR r33,39 = NEG DR r33,50 = NEG DR r35,20 = NEG DR
r35,24 = NEG DR r35,26 = POS DR r35,43 = NEG DR r36,15 = POS DR
r39,46 = POS DR r40,37 = NEG DR r41,8 = NEG DR r41,46 = NEG DR
r43,9 = POS DR r44,17 = NEG DR r45,37 = NEG DR r46,48 = NEG DR
r47,3 = POS DR r47,38 = POS DR r49,24 = NEG DR r51,14 = POS DR
r51,27 = NEG DR r51,36 = POS DR r51,43 = POS DR r52,27 = NEG DR
r53,11 = POS DR
(b)
Figure 9.7: Six–entity randomized problem (R DENSITY = 1.8%).
9.6 Conclusions 197
(1) P5 → P0 : {o8}
(2) P4 → P2 : {o4}
(3) P0 → P3 : {o0}
(4) P5 → P3 : {o3}
(5) P3 → P4 : {o2, o3, o7}
(6) P0 → P5 : {o6}
(7) P4 → P0 : {o2, o3}
(8) P2 → P1 : {o1, o5}
(9) P3 → P1 : {o0}
(1) P5 → P0 : {o8}
(2) P4 → P2 : {o4}
(3) P0 → P3 : {o0}
(4) P5 → P3 : {o3}
(5) P3 → P4 : {o2, o3, o7}
(6) P0 → P5 : {o6}
(7) P4 → P0 : {o2, o3}
(8) P2 → P1 : {o1, o5}
(9) P3 → P1 : {o0}
(a) (b)
Figure 9.8: Six–entity rational solutions (R DENSITY = 1.8%).
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Part III
List of Contributions,
Conclusions and Future Work

Chapter 10
Conclusions and List of
Contributions
10.1 Summary
The work in this thesis has been divided into two different parts: Part (I) Game
Theoretical Analysis of Rational–Exchange Protocols and Part (II) Automated
Design of Multi–party Rational–Exchange Security (M–RES) Protocols.
The first part was devoted to the presentation of two different Game–theoretical
models for the formal analysis of rational–exchange security protocols. The aim of
these formalisms is to formally establish whether a given exchange scheme is or not
a rational protocol.
In our opinion, various aspects of the two models represent a significant
contribution to the area of protocol formal validation and analysis. The following
relation highlights the most relevant:
1. In-depth analytical framework: Both of our formalisms extend an existing
paradigm which already applies Game Theory to formally represent and
verify rational schemes. However, in that previous work, only basic Game
Theoretical results were applied making the analysis too simplistic and
unrealistic.
By contrast, we make use of more advanced concepts in Game Theory for the
representation and analysis of exchange protocols, hence providing a formal
framework for more rigorous in-depth analysis. Despite the analytical process
becoming more complex than by using basic Game Theory, we find it more
realistic and informative.
2. Environmental factors: The capability to include contextual factors into
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the analysis of rational–exchange schemes, such as trust amongst participants,
reputation, robustness of the scheme, reliability of the network, etc., is also a
relevant aspect of our global approach.
Both models are highly flexible in terms of the number and type of
environmental factors taken into account in the analytical process. Any
contextual aspect can be parameterized and its impact on the outcome of
a given rational scheme evaluated. For instance, trust might not play a role
in a particular context while entities’ past experience, or being part of an
incentive scheme could have an effect on the overall process.
3. Participant unpredictable behavior: The way in which participant
unpredictable behavior is defined within both formalisms also represents a
significant break–through within the area.
Traditionally, protocol participant misbehavior has always being approached
from a restrictive point of view. This is, entities’ capability to misbehave or
deviate from a given scheme had always followed a predefined structure. By
contrast, unpredictable behavior is in no way restricted in either of our two
proposals. The way to model the unpredictable is solely based on assumptions
over the probability of such events taking place rather than on their nature.
4. Scalability: Scalability is an important feature of any analytical model. In
this case, our models set the basis for any multi–party rational exchange
scheme to be represented and analyzed using the proposed methodology.
5. Two models: We have presented two models with many common attributes
as well as significant dissimilarities. Informally, differences between the two
models stem from different levels of uncertainty that participant entities
hold about each other (further details were given in Section 4.4.1). In each
formalism a different type of game is used to represent a given protocol.
The application of both paradigms to the formal analysis of Syverson’s rational
exchange protocol serves to illustrate the two models. Moreover, the formal
validation of a content distributing protocol in a pure peer to peer system,
further illustrates the versatility of our approach.
5. Significance for any further analysis: Finally, the models described only
served to analyze single instances of a rational exchange protocol, however, it
is necessary to analyze single executions before studying player’s strategies in
iterated scenarios and this work represents the basis for any further analysis
in that direction (in Section 10.3.1 we further elaborate on this topic).
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In the second part of this thesis, Game Theory and heuristic search are applied
to the automated design of multi–party rational–exchange protocols. Automated
protocol synthesis represents a significant contribution to the design of rational–
exchange schemes in which the number of existing proposals was so far minimal.
Furthermore, several other aspects of this new approach are interesting and relevant
within the field. The following relation highlights the most significant:
1. Integral methodology: The proposed methodology serves to integrate into
the design process of a multi–party rational–exchange protocol the following:
• Aspects, specific to any exchanging scenario, such as incentive schemes
and coalitions amongst participants.
• Items dependency relationships are also easily specifiable within the
design phase. In many scenarios, there may exist strong dependency
links between two or more of the exchangeable items, for example, an
encrypted text and the decryption key.
• A system proof based on Game Theory, for the automated design of
provable multi–party rational–exchange protocols.
2. Heuristic search: The usage of non-standard computation techniques
applied to the automated synthesis of rational protocols allows us to explore
vast solution spaces, far greater than those possible through manual design.
4. Experimental results: Some experimental works guarantee the effectiveness
and efficiency of our approach. Several multi–party rational protocols are
depicted as a result of the automated synthesis.
5. Family of M-RES protocols: A family of rational–exchange protocols is
defined and a formal proof of rationality is depicted, based on Game Theory
and backward induction.
10.2 Publications
Some of the contributions presented in this thesis have already been published in
various peer–reviewed conference proceedings and journals. Below we list them:
Conference and Workshop Publications
1. “An Extended Model of Rational Exchange Based on Dynamic
Games of Imperfect Information”.
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Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C. and Ribagorda,
A. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Emerging Trends
in Information and Communication Security, ETRICS 2006. LNCS Vol.
3995/2006, pp. 396-408.
2. “Towards Automated Design of Multi–party Rational Exchange
Security Protocols”.
Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C. and Ribagorda,
A. In Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on
Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, WI-IATW ’07. IEEE
Computer Society, pp. 387–390.
3. “A Multi–party Rational Exchange Protocol”.
Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C. and Ribagorda,
A. In Proceedings of the Conference On the Move to Meaningful Internet
Systems 2007, OTM 2007 Workshops. Vol. 4805/2007, pp. 42–43.
4. “Bayesian Analysis of Secure P2P Sharing Protocols”.
Palomar, E., Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M. and Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C.
In Proceedings of the Conference On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems
2007, OTM 2007 Workshops. Vol. 4805/2007, pp. 1701–1717.
5. “Nature-Inspired Synthesis of Rational Protocols”.
Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C. and Ribagorda,
A. In Proceedings of 10th International Conference On Parallel Problem
Solving from Nature - PPSN X. LNCS Vol. 5199/2008, pp. 981–990.
Journal Articles
1. “Bayesian rational exchange”.
Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C. and Ribagorda,
A. International Journal of Information Security, Vol.7, No.1, pp. 85–100,
Jan. 2008.
2. “Cryptanalysis of Syverson’s Rational Exchange Protocol”.
Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C. and Ribagorda,
A. International Journal of Network Security, Vol.7, No.2, pp. 179-184, Sep.
2008.
3. “Automated Synthesis of Multiparty Rational Exchange Security
Protocols”. Alcaide, A., Este´vez–Tapiador, J.M., Herna´ndez–Castro, J.C.
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and Ribagorda, A. To appear in International Transactions on Systems
Science and Applications. 2008
Book Chapters
1. “Game Theory and
Cooperation Analysis” In “Cooperative Wireless Communications”. (To
be published by Auerbach Publications, Taylor&Francis Group, 2008.)
10.3 Open Issues and Future Work
In this section we discuss some open issues and ideas for possible enhancements to
our research work, and potential future lines of investigation.
10.3.1 Repeated Scenarios for Rational–Exchange Protocols
We belief this is the most interesting future line of research to culminate the formal
analysis of rational–exchange protocols.
In many cases, a more realistic scenario for the execution of a rational–exchange
protocol will be that in which the same protocol is repeatedly executed for an
indefinite number of times. By their very nature, repeated games are complex
objects for players to play and for theorists to analyze. There is a huge number
of possible strategies, even when the game is repeated just a few times. If k is
the number of strategy profiles and n the number of iterations, kn will be the
number of all possible strategy profiles for the n-repeated game (not counting
possibly randomized solutions). This makes the equilibrium analysis appear, at
first, unmanageable.
With regard to rational–exchange protocols we can describe two possible iterated
scenarios: (1) That in which the same game1 is repeatedly played by the same set of
players; and, (2) when the same game is repeatedly played but the participants are
not necessarily the same ones in every iteration. Examples of these two environments
could be: (1) A fixed set of entities which interact amongst each other by repeatedly
executing the same rational–exchange protocol. (2) A variable community of peers
in a file exchanging peer to peer system, a set of possible nodes in an ad-hoc wireless
network or a market place in which different customers exchange electronic items
with specific fixed providers.
For either type of environment, the following main components can be identified
for any formal analysis:
1The game is understood as the protocol game linked to the protocol description as specified
within the formal model. Player and protocol participant are terms used indistinctly.
206 Conclusions and List of Contributions
• Protocol participants will react to past experience and will also take into
account the future impact of their current actions.
• Along the different executions, patterns of behavior such as rewarding and
punishment or cooperation and threats will emerge.
• Cooperative outcomes on one-shot games usually require of external
enforcement mechanisms not always available in long term interactions.
Fortunately, there are various Game Theory results which make a connection
between outcomes of a one-shot game (game played only once) with the
corresponding repeated game (the same game played repeatedly). We now sketch
two main areas within Game Theory which will help to analyze the two possible
scenarios described above and their main components. One is due to the Nobel
Prize winner Robert J. Aumann2 and it is related to Repeated Games in the first
type of environments. The other area is due to John Maynard-Smith and George
Price and it is related to Evolutionary Stable Strategies which can be applied to the
analysis of scenarios described as type (2).
Aumann’s Theory on Repeated Games
Given an n–person game G of complete information, the supergame of G denoted
as G∗, represents the same game played indefinitely by the same set of players. The
important questions arising are:
1. What are the Nash equilibria of G∗?,
2. What are the resulting outcomes? and,
3. Is there a connection between the one-shot game G and the corresponding
supergame G∗?
Aumann ([Aumann, 1959],[Aumann, 1960],[Aumann, 1961]) was the first to
provide an extensive analysis of infinitely repeated games. He formally and
rigourously proved the following well known theorem Folk Theorem3, which
establishes a major and fundamental connection between cooperative behavior in
the one-shot game and non–cooperative strategies in the corresponding supergame.
Theorem 10.3.1 (The Folk Theorem). The set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of
the repeated game G∗ is precisely the set of feasible and individual rational outcomes
of the one-shot game.
2Aumann was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.
3More relevant for our future analysis will be the Perfect and Strong versions of the Folk
Theorem.
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In Game Theory terms, an outcome is non–cooperative if it does not require any
external enforcement mechanism to make it happen. A Nash equilibrium point is
self–enforcing as it is not worth for any players to deviate from it. Thus, it does
not require of any outside enforcement scheme, and so it represents non–cooperative
behavior. By contrast, general feasible outcomes need of an external enforcement
so they represent the cooperative approach. In Aumann words: “In a sense,
the repetition itself, with its possibilities of retaliation, becomes the enforcement
mechanism.”
In simple terms, Aumann shows that:
• One can succinctly analyze complex repeated scenarios by examining one-shot
instances.
• That simple, natural and familiar behaviors emerge in supergames.
• How cooperation can emerge from a non–cooperative setup.
For future work and in the case of Syverson’s protocol, the set of feasible and
individually rational outcomes could be easily derived from Figures 3.2 and 3.8.
Furthermore, the formal model will need to be extended to formalize concepts such
as those just described in the previous paragraphs. The objective would be to
formally prove rationality of Syverson’s protocol in repeated scenarios as this would
have significant implications from a security point of view.
Evolutionary Stable Strategies
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) is a different approach to the classic analysis
of games. Instead of directly calculating properties of a game, populations of
players using different strategies are simulated and a process similar to natural
selection is used to determine how the population evolves. Concepts such as
Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) introduced by John Maynard-Smith and
George R. Price ([Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973]) are the proposed refinement
of the Nash equilibrium for populations of players which seem to evolve in an stable
manner when adopting such strategies. All ESS represent a subset of the Nash
equilibria.
Formally, a strategy is called evolutionary stable if a population of individuals
homogenously playing this strategy is able to outperform and eliminate a small
amount of any mutant strategy introduced into the population.
To be exact, consider an n–player game where each player Pi has a strategy
space denoted by Si. An EGT approach would be to model each Pi (now renamed
agent) by a population of players. The population for agent Pi would then be
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partitioned into groups Ei1 , · · · , Eik . Individuals in group Eij would all play
the same (possibly mixed) strategy from Si. The next step, then, would be to
randomly make members of all different populations play against each other. The
sub–populations that perform the best would grow, and those that did not perform
well would shrink. The process of randomly playing members of all populations
and refining the populations based on performance would be repeated indefinitely.
Ideally the evolution would converge to some stable state for each population, which
would represent a (possibly mixed) best–response strategy for each agent.
For future work, and in relation to Syverson’s protocol, the question to be
answered would be: How will a population of individuals that repeatedly play
Syverson’s protocol-game evolve? Again, the answer to this question could have
significant implications from a security point of view in real implementations of
Syverson’s scheme.
Finally, although in recent years there have been various reports and experiments
on deciding best strategies in iterated scenarios when playing static games
([Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981]), there have not been yet the same level of deep
analysis when dealing with dynamic games (on imperfect or incomplete information)
in indefinitely repeated scenarios.
10.3.2 Rational Protocol Synthesis: Further Analytical Work
In the area of the automated design of rational protocols further analytical work is
needed. Here we present several lines for research which could be directed to:
• Examine and analyze multi–party exchange problems in terms of the different
topologies of the graph representing the exchanging scenarios.
• Extend the synthesis methodology to allow for the synthesis of specific
protocols in terms of:
– Number of times a token can be relayed during the protocol execution.
– Number of times a particular entity has an active role in the protocol.
• Further transformations of other protocol design problems (rational shared
secret distribution or rational multi–party computation), into optimization
problems, using simple linear structures as matrices and vectors.
Part IV
Appendices

Appendix A
Principles on Game Theory
The basic theory came into being in 1944, with the classic Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
[von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944]. In general, Game Theory provides a formal
modeling approach to situations in which decision makers interact with other players.
It analyzes and represents such situations as games, where players choose different
actions in an attempt to maximize their returns. Although some Game Theoretic
analysis appears similar to Decision Theory, Game Theory studies the decisions
made in environments where players interact. In other words, Game Theory studies
choice of optimal behavior when costs and benefits of each option depend upon the
choices of other individuals.
We will now introduce a few basic related concepts and some mathematical
notation. Since we cannot cover at length any of the notions here presented,
the reader is referred to [Gibbons, 1992b] and [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a] for
excellent Game Theory tutorial books.
A.1 Basic Concepts
Informally, a game is considered to be a collection of players who play different moves
(legal moves will be those which comply with the game rules), aiming at maximizing
their individual payoff obtained when the game is ended. Usually, players are able to
conform different game strategies and following one or another strategy will dictate
which move to make at each given turn in the game.
In a static game, players make their moves simultaneously. By contrast, in a
dynamic game, players take it in turns to move, so their actions may depend on
what actions other players have taken in previous turns.
The following definitions compose the basic Game Theory.
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Definition A.1.1 (Pure strategy). In a game, a pure strategy for player Pi, denoted
by si, is a complete contingency plan for player Pi. It describes the series of actions
that this player would take at each possible decision point in the game. We consider
si ∈ Si, where Si represents the set of all possible strategies for player Pi.
Definition A.1.2 (Strategy profile). A strategy profile is a vector of strategies
(s1, . . . , sn), one for each player Pi of a game. The set of strategy profiles, denoted
by S, is the Cartesian product of the strategy spaces of all players:
S = S1 × · · · × Sn (A.1)
A convention is to describe as s−i the strategies chosen by all other players except
for a given player Pi. Any given strategy profile in a game may then be represented
by the tuple (si, s−i).
Note that, specifying a strategy profile univocally determines the outcome of a
game.
Definition A.1.3 (Payoff function). In a game, a payoff function ui (also called
utility function) is defined for each player Pi.
ui : S → R (A.2)
So that, for each strategy profile (si, s−i) ∈ S, ui(si, s−i) represents the player
Pi’s payoff when Pi plays strategy si and the other players follow strategies s−i.
Definition A.1.4 (Game in normal form). We denote a game in normal form as
the tuple G = 〈P, S,−→u 〉 where:
• P= {P1, . . . , Pn} is a set of n players,
• S = S1 × · · · × Sn is the corresponding strategy profile space and
• −→u = (u1, . . . , un) is a vector of payoff functions, one for each player Pi.
A.1.1 Game Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash1, is a strategy profile s∗ = (s∗i , s
∗
−i)
in which no player has an incentive to unilaterally modify her strategy. In other
words, given the other players’ strategies s∗−i, player Pi cannot increase her payoff
by choosing a strategy different from s∗i . Next is the formal definition for such a
concept:
1In 1978 John Forbes Nash was awarded the John Von Neumann Theory Prize for his invention
of non–cooperative equilibria, now called Nash equilibria. In 1994 he received the Nobel Prize in
Economics as a result of his work in Game Theory as a Princeton graduate student.
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Definition A.1.5 (Nash equilibrium). Given a game G = 〈P, S,−→u 〉 , a strategy
profile s∗ ∈ S, represents a Nash equilibrium if and only if, for every player Pi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
ui(s∗i , s
∗
−i) > ui(si, s∗−i) ∀si ∈ Si. (A.3)
A Nash equilibrium is said to represent a solution for a given game. Moreover,
once such a state is identified, rational (self-interested) players are forced to follow
the set of strategies to reach such an outcome as by definition, changing their
strategy unilaterally will not result in better payoffs.
A.1.2 Dominated and Dominant Strategies
There are cases when it is possible to anticipate the strategy that a rational player
will follow during a protocol game execution. By contrast, in other instances, we
might be able to identify those strategies which will never be followed by any rational
participant. For either case we present the following concepts:
Definition A.1.6 (Dominated strategies). A strategy for which the expected payoff
is lower than the one obtained following any other option is called dominated
strategy.
Definition A.1.7 (Dominant strategies). A dominant strategy is such that, a
rational player will always choose to follow it, as the expected payoff by doing so
is greater than by taking a different move.
Note that, dominated strategies can be eliminated when computing a game Nash
equilibrium as rational (self-interested) players will never follow them. By contrast,
dominant strategies are key when trying to establish the equilibrium of any given
game.
A.1.3 Mixed Strategies
A randomized or mixed strategy for a player Pi is a strategy which chooses randomly
between different strategies at each step of the game.
Definition A.1.8 (Mixed strategy). Given a game G = 〈P, S,−→u 〉 where
Si={si1, . . . , siKi} is the space of strategies for player Pi then, a mixed strategy for
player Pi is a probability distribution function over Si denoted as pi=(pi1, . . . , piKi),
where 0 6 pik 6 1 ∀k = 1, . . . ,Ki and
∑Ki
k=1 pik = 1.
Note that, as described in A.1.1, a pure strategy is a mixed strategy in which the
probability distribution function pi assigns probability one to one of the strategies
in the strategy space and zero to every other option.
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Definition A.1.9 (Probabilistic strategy profile). A probabilistic strategy profile is
a vector (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) where for each player Pi, pi is a probability distribution over
the space of strategies Si.
By definition A.1.5, a Nash equilibrium represented by a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S
guarantees that, for every player Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the pure strategy s∗i is the best
response from player Pi to all other player’s pure strategies s∗−i. Likewise, a Nash
equilibrium on mixed strategies guarantees that a mixed strategy p∗i is the best
response from player Pi to all other player’s mixed strategies p∗−i. This is illustrated
in the next definition:
Definition A.1.10 (Nash equilibrium on mixed strategies). Given a game G =
〈P, S,−→u 〉, a probabilistic strategy profile (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) represents a Nash equilibrium
if and only if, for every player Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
vi(p∗i , p
∗
−i) > vi(pi, p∗−i) ∀pi ∈ ∆(Si). (A.4)
where:
vi(pi, p−i) =
K1∑
j1=1
∗ · · · ∗
Kn∑
jn=1
p1j1 ∗ · · · ∗ pnjn ∗ ui(s1j1 , . . . , snjn) (A.5)
and,
∆(Si) denotes the space of probability distributions over the set Si.
We will conclude this section with an seminal theorem by John Nash
([Nash, 1950]) which ensures the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium point on
possibly randomized strategies.
Theorem A.1.1 (Nash Equilibrium existence). In every finite normal form game
G = 〈P, S,−→u 〉 with n players, where Si is finite for each player Pi, i = 1, . . . , n there
exists at least one mixed strategy equilibrium.
In general, it is possible for a game to have multiple Nash equilibria.
To illustrate some of the definitions described in this section and before
introducing any further concepts, in the next section of this Appendix we will present
two classic games in Game Theory: The Prisoners Dilemma and The Battle of Sexes.
A.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoners Dilemma is a classic game studied in Game Theory since its origin in
1950 when Albert W. Tucker formalized the game with prison sentence payoffs and
gave it the name of ”Prisoner’s Dilemma” ([Poundstone, 1992]).
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (R,R) (S, T )
Defect (T, S) (P, P )
Table A.1: First component of each tuple corresponds to the sentence payoff for
prisoner A and the second component for prisonerB. The values satisfy the following
inequalities: S < P < R < T and R > (T + S)/2.
The Prisoners Dilemma shows that, in certain circumstances, if the members of
a group trust each other, they can choose a course of actions that will bring the best
possible outcome for each one of them. By contrast, without trust, each individual
will aim at maximizing their individual outcome which can lead them to suboptimal
solutions.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma two players act as prisoners who have been jointly
charged of a crime (which they did commit) but questioned separately. The police
only have enough evidence to be sure of a conviction for a minor offence, but not
enough for the more serious crime. The criminals had previously agreed to never
betray each other in the case of being arrested. The following prison sentence table
(Table A.1) is presented to both criminals who then have to decide what to do:
• If one of the criminals testifies for the prosecution of the other and the other
remains silent, the betrayer serves a small sentence (represented by value T ,
Temptation to defect payoff ) and the silent accomplice receives a full sentence
for the crime committed (represented by value S, Sucker’s payoff ).
• If both stay silent, both prisoners are sentenced but only for the minor offence
(represented by value R, Reward for mutual cooperation payoff ).
• If they both betray each other, each one receives an equal portion of the
sentence (represented by value P , Punishment for mutual defection payoff ).
A.2.1 Nash Equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
A Nash Equilibrium implies that neither player has an incentive to alter their
strategy unilaterally, since all other actions will decrease their expected payoff value.
a) One-shot Prisoners Dilemma
In the standard one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, the game is played only once and
players have to simultaneously choose between cooperation or defection. Playing
defection is a dominant strategy for both players (it reports better payoff when
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players do not know what the other player is going to choose) so they are expected
to play such an action and never choose cooperation. The ”defect-defect” outcome is
a Nash Equilibrium because neither player has an incentive to unilaterally perform
cooperation; unilateral cooperation would shift the player from the third worst payoff
(value P ) to the very worst payoff (value S).
b)Iterated Prisoners Dilemma
If two players play Prisoner’s Dilemma more than once in succession (that is, having
memory of at least the previous game), this is called iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
N-Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: If a PD is going to be iterated exactly N
times for some known constant N , then in all rounds, the optimal strategy
is to defect. Therefore, always defect represents the only possible Nash
equilibrium for the N-iterated PD game.
An intuitive proof of this, based on backward induction, can be sketched as
follows: players might as well defect on the last iteration since the opponent
will not have a chance to punish them in consecutive runs. Besides, defect
is a dominant strategy when there are no more rounds to play (similar to a
single–play game). Therefore, both will defect on the last turn. Thus, each
player might as well defect on the second-to-last turn, since the opponent will
defect on the last no matter what is done, so both will defect on the second-
to-last iteration and so on. The same reasoning will take players to defect in
all iterations.
For cooperation to emerge in N-iterated PD games, the total number of
rounds must be random, or at least unknown to the players. However, in
this case although always defect is no longer a strictly dominant strategy, it
still represents a Nash equilibrium of the N-iterated game.
Indefinitely Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Nobel Prize winner Robert J.
Aumann was the first to provide an extensive analysis of infinitely repeated
games. Amongst results shown by Aumann in his 1959 paper [Aumann, 1959]
is the formal proof of the well known Folk Theorem which establishes that,
rational players repeatedly interacting for indefinitely long games can yield
cooperative outcomes.
In 1979, Robert Axelrod (University of Michigan) hosted a tournament
to see what kind of strategies would perform best over the IPD game
([Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981]). He invited a number of well-known game
theorists to submit strategies to be run by computers. In the tournament,
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Husband \ Wife Opera Football
Opera (1, 2) (0, 0)
Football (0, 0) (2, 1)
Table A.2: First component of each tuple corresponds to the husband’s payoff and
the second component to the wife.
programs played the PD game against each other and themselves repeatedly.
At each iteration, each program would specify whether to cooperate or
defect based on its opponent’s previous moves and the predefined strategy.
Some of the strategies submitted were: always defect, always cooperate and
random defect (this strategy defects 50% of the time).
The winner of Axelrod’s tournament was the TIT FOR TAT strategy. The
strategy cooperates on the first move, and then does whatever its opponent
has done on the previous move. Thus, when matched against the all-defect
strategy, TIT FOR TAT strategy always defects after the first move. When
matched against the all-cooperate strategy, TIT FOR TAT always cooperates.
This strategy has the benefit of both cooperating with a friendly opponent,
getting the full benefits of cooperation, and of defecting when matched against
an opponent who defects. When matched against itself, the TIT FOR TAT
strategy always cooperates.
A.3 The Battle of Sexes
We have just described a game (The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game) for which a Nash
equilibrium is found when entities play only pure strategies (see Definition A.1.1).
We will now describe another simple game in which the Nash equilibrium computed
is reached when players play mixed or randomized strategies (see Definition A.1.8).
The Battle of the Sexes is a two player coordination game played by a couple,
husband and wife. The husband would most prefer going to a football match whereas
the wife would like to go to the opera. Both prefer attending together to one of the
events rather than going to different ones. If they cannot communicate, where
should they go?
The payoff matrix (Table A.2) shows the corresponding payoff values for each
possible outcome.
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A.3.1 Nash Equilibrium of the Battle of Sexes
In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy. Husband and wife have no
other option than to form conjectures about what the other will choose. Let p be
the probability that the wife assigns to the event of him, the husband, choosing
opera and (1−p) the probability assigned to the likelihood of the husband choosing
football. Likewise, the husband also conjectures about his wife’s most probable
action and assigns probability q to the event of his wife choosing opera and (1− q)
to the event of his wife choosing football.
Both espouses compute their expected payoff values taken into account the
aforementioned conjectures. This way, the husband performs the following
calculations, where EP stands for Expected Payoff :
EP (husband, opera) = q
EP (husband, football) = 2 ∗ (1− q) (A.6)
Then:
EP (husband, opera) > EP (husband, football)⇔
q > 2 ∗ (1− q)⇔ q > (2/3) (A.7)
Likewise, the wife would compute the following Expected Payoff values:
EP (wife, opera) = 2 ∗ p
EP (wife, football) = (1− p) (A.8)
Then:
EP (wife, opera) > EP (wife, football)⇔
2 ∗ p > (1− p)⇔ p > (1/3) (A.9)
Graphical representation of inequations A.7 and A.9 enables us to compute the
Nash equilibrium points as the intersection points between the two functions. See
Figure Fig. A.1.
This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, one where both go to the
opera and another where both go to the football game. There is also a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies, where the players go to their preferred event more
often than to the other (each player attends their preferred event with probability
2/3). This presents an interesting case since the two pure strategy Nash equilibria
are unfair, one player consistently does better than the other, the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium represents the most preferable solution for the game.
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Figure A.1: Best–response function for the wife (left), husband (center), and the
intersection of both (right).
A.4 Dynamic Games of Imperfect Information
In this section we will formalize the concept of dynamic games of imperfect
information. In simple terms, a dynamic sequential game is one of imperfect
information if a player does not know exactly what actions other players took up to
that point in the game. Intuitively, if it is my turn to move, I may not know what
every other player has done up to the current point.
Note that, some of the following definitions are only and extension of those
presented in Section A.1.
Definition A.4.1 (Game in extensive–form). An extensive–form of a dynamic
game of imperfect information is defined by the tuple:
〈P,A,Q, p, (Ii)i∈P , (¹i)i∈P 〉 (A.10)
where:
• P is a set of players.
• A is a set of actions.
• Q is a set of action sequences, satisfying:
– ² ∈ Q, where ² is the empty sequence.
– if (ak)wk=1 ∈ Q and 0 < v < w, then (ak)vk=1 ∈ Q
– if (ak)vk=1 ∈ Q ∀v > 1, then (ak)∞k=1 ∈ Q
If q is a sequence of actions and a is an action, then q · a denotes the action
composed by q followed by a. A finite sequence of actions q ∈ Q is said to be
terminal if there is no a such that q · a ∈ Q. The set of terminal sequences of
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actions is denoted by Z. Finally, A(q) = {a ∈ A : q · a ∈ Q} denotes the set
of available actions after q ∈ Q\Z.
• p is the player function. It assigns a player p(q) ∈ P to every non–terminal
sequence q ∈ Q\Z. The interpretation is that player p(q) has the turn after
the sequence of actions q.
• Ii is an information partition for player Pi ∈ P . It is a partition of the set
{q ∈ Q\Z : p(q) = i} preserving the property that if the sequences q and q′ are
in the same information set Ii ∈ Ii, then A(q) = A(q′).
• ¹i is a preference relation of player Pi ∈ P on Z.
The common interpretation of an extensive–form game is the following. The
game can be thought of as a tree, where the edges and the vertices are associated to
actions and sequences of actions, respectively. The empty sequence ² represents the
root of the tree. The game begins at ² and ends at a terminal node. After any non–
terminal sequence of actions q ∈ Q\Z, the player given by p(q) chooses an available
action from the set A(q). Next, q is extended with a, and the current history of
the game becomes q · a. Terminal vertices are those that cannot be followed by any
other action. When a sequence of actions q reaches a terminal vertex, the game
ends.
The sequences q ∈ Z are the possible outcomes of the game. The preference
relations ¹i establishes which outcomes are preferred by player Pi. Thus, if q, q′ ∈ Z
and q ¹i q′, then player Pi prefers q′ to q.
The most usual form of representing preference relations are payoffs. A vector
y(q) = (yi(q))i∈P of real numbers is assigned to every terminal sequence of actions
q ∈ Z, in such a way that q ¹i q′ ⇔ yi(q) 6 yi(q′). The value yi(q) can be interpreted
as a measure of how much player Pi gains when the game is developed as described
by q.
Information sets for players are defined in terms of their local state. Formally,
Σi(q) denotes the information that player Pi has obtained after the sequence of
actions q.
Information sets represent the information available to players at every stage of
the game. When an information set covers several nodes, then the player does not
know in which node of the information set she is –or, equivalently, she does not
know the last action of her rival. Usually, nodes belonging to the same information
set are graphically represented by a dashed line that links them together. When an
information set is not a singleton (i.e. it has more than one node), it is necessary
to specify the player beliefs. Formally, beliefs are represented by a probability
distribution over the nodes belonging to the information sets.
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If there exists at least one information set Ii ∈ Ii such that |Ii| > 1, then
the game is called a game of imperfect information. On the contrary, if for all
players every information set is a singleton, then the game is called a game of
perfect information.
A.4.1 Nash Equilibrium in Games of Imperfect Information
Definitions for player Strategy, Strategy Profile and Probabilistic Strategy Profile
described in Section A.1 are still applicable to this type of games. As for the notion
of Nash equilibrium, a new definition is provided which is a refinement of the concept
previously described (see Definition A.1.10) to be used in dynamic games. The new
equilibrium is referred to as a Nash equilibrium perfect in subgames.
Definition A.4.2 (Subgames). Given G a dynamic game of imperfect information,
a subgame of G is any part of the game satisfying:
• The initial node is in a singleton information set.
• The subgame contains all the nodes that are successors of the initial node.
• It contains all the nodes that are successors of any node it contains.
• If a node of a particular information set is in the subgame then, all members
of that information set belong to the subgame.
Definition A.4.3 (Nash equilibrium perfect in subgames). Given G a dynamic
game of imperfect information, a probabilistic strategy profile is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original
game G.
More informally, this means that if players played any smaller game that
consisted of only one part of the larger game and their behavior represents a Nash
equilibrium of that smaller game.
A.5 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information or
Bayesian Games
In a Bayesian game, each player is allowed to have some private information that
affects the overall game but which is not known by others. This information is
usually related to their payoff values (what players receive at the end of the game,
depending on what strategies all players play). In the following, we briefly introduce
the two most relevant concepts in Bayesian games: player’s types and player’s beliefs.
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Subsequently, we discuss the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium –a generalization
of Nash equilibrium for this kind of games.
A.5.1 Player’s Type
Following John C. Harsanyi’s framework, a way of modeling uncertainty in a game
is by introducing the notion of a player’s type [Gibbons, 1992a]. The type of a
player determines univocally that player’s payoff function, being perfectly possible
that different types will be associated with different payoff functions.
The following definitions formalize this concept:
Definition A.5.1 (Player’s type and type space). We will assume that each player
Pi ∈ P has a type Ti ∈ Ti, where Ti is the type space for player Pi.
Definition A.5.2 (Type profile). A type profile is a tuple of types T = (T1, . . . , Tn),
one for each player, which univocally determines the type of every player involved
in a specific game. We denote by T = T1 × · · · × Tn the type–profile space.
Note that games of incomplete information are not limited to a discrete type-
space profile. In fact, we can conceive continuous type spaces of the general form
Ti ⊆ R. We can for example assign a type Ti ∈ [0, 1] to each player Pi, which can
be viewed as her reputation factor.
A.5.2 Player’s Belief System
In a Bayesian game, the incompleteness of information means that each player does
not know the type of the rest of the players with complete certainty. As a result,
players have initial beliefs about the type of each player, and can update them
according to Bayes’ Rule as the game advances and more information is available
(e.g. beliefs about a player can change on the basis of the actions she have played).
The next definition formalizes this notion.
Definition A.5.3 (Belief system). The belief that a player has about the type of
player Pj ∈ P is represented by a probability distribution over Pj’s type-space ∆(Tj).
In general, we will denote each belief by a Greek letter α(·), β(·), . . . The set of all
beliefs will be termed ρ.
(∆(X) denotes the space of probability distributions over the set X).
In practice, assignment of types to players is carried out by introducing a
fictitious player: Nature. In the course of the game, nature randomly chooses
a type for each player according to a probability distribution over each player’s
type space. A typical scenario in a dynamic game of incomplete information is
A.5 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information or Bayesian Games 223
N
m1
P1
(T1) P1
(T2) P1
(Tk)
m2 m1 m2 m1 m2
payoffs ~ P1
(T1) payoffs ~ P1
(T2) payoffs ~ P1
(Tk)
q11 q12 q21 q22 qk1 qk2
Figure A.2: Illustration of a game of incomplete information.
graphically illustrated by Fig. A.2, in which P Tji means that player Pi has type Tj .
Initially, nature (N) “moves”, thus selecting a type for player P1, who moves either
m1 or m2. Next, it is the turn for player P2. Despite P2 has observed the move
performed by P1, she is not sure about P1’s type. Formally, I1 = {q11, q21, . . . , qk1}
and I2 = {q12, q22, . . . , qk2} form disjoint information sets for P2, since she knows
whether she is in I1 or I2, but she does not know the specific node.
From this point on, P2 will have to include into her analysis a belief system,
i.e. the probability of P1 being of type T1, T2, etc. Therefore, strategies must take
into account not only the several ways in which other players can play, but also the
probability for each player to be of a specific type.
A.5.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
In 1991, Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole formally defined the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) for extensive Bayesian games [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991b].
PBE adds to Nash equilibrium the requirement that players choose optimally given
their beliefs about the rest of the game. In extensive Bayesian games of incomplete
information, each player is not only aware of the informational uncertainties over
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the other participants, but also analyzes their implications. Thus, each player looks
for the best response, anticipating other party’s reaction.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Candidates
The following will formally define candidates to be a PBE.
Definition A.5.4 (Perfect bayesian equilibrium candidates). In an extensive–form
Bayesian game the tuple strategy-believe profile (s; ρ) constitutes a PBE candidate
if:
• The profile (s; ρ) does not only represent a Bayesian equilibrium of the whole
game, but also in each of the continuation subgames. This is, from each
information set, the moving player’s strategy maximizes its expected payoff for
the remainder of the game, considering its beliefs and all player’s strategies.
• On the equilibrium path, Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies determine
believes. An information set is on-the-equilibrium path if, it is reached with
positive probability iff the game is played according to the equilibrium strategies.
• Off-the-equilibrium path, Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies determine
beliefs where possible. A defection from the equilibrium path does not imply that
other players can increase their payoffs by unilaterally changing their strategy.
The stated (s; ρ) strategy-belief profile would describe a vector of strategies such
that for every player Pi ∈ P and every information set Ii ∈ Ii, player’s Pi strategy
is her best response, given her believes at set Ii.
Before formally defining the concept of Bayesian perfect equilibrium, a series of
requirements are necessary [Gibbons, 1992a].
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Requirements
Definition A.5.5 (Bayes requirement 1). Given a strategy profile s, it is required
that, for each player Pi ∈ P , and at each of her information sets Ii ∈ Ii, player
Pi has beliefs ρ(Ii) ∈ ∆(Ii) about the node at which she is located, conditional upon
being informed that play has reached the information set Ii.
This requirement establishes that at every node of any information set, a player
should have some beliefs about the node at which she is located, given that she has
reached that information set. In fact, the beliefs ρ(Ii) ∈ ∆(Ii) are no more than a
probability distribution over the nodes in Ii.
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Definition A.5.6 (Bayes requirement 2). Let us suppose the continuation game
defined by the information set Ii ∈ Ii of some player Pi, and the conditional beliefs
ρi(Ii). The restriction of the strategy-belief profile (s; ρ) to this game must be a Nash
equilibrium of the continuation game starting at information set Ii.
The concept of perfect equilibrium of the continuation game adds to the Nash
concept the requirement that players choose optimally in continuation games. More
generally, Bayes requirement 2 rejects all strategy profiles which specify at any
information set an action which is dominated at that information set.
Definition A.5.7 (Bayes requirement 3). Beliefs at any on the equilibrium path
information sets must be determined from the strategy profile according to Bayes’
rule. This is, if Ii ∈ Ii is an information set of player Pi reached with positive
probability when players follow strategy profile s, then ρ(Ii) ∈ ∆(Ii) must be
computed from S according to Bayes’ rule.
Definition A.5.8 (Bayes requirement 4). The beliefs at any off the equilibrium path
information set must be determined from the strategy profile according to Bayes rule
whenever possible.
This requirement establishes that a defection from the equilibrium path does
not increase the chance that others will play irrationally. In a PBE, players cannot
threaten to play strategies that are strictly dominated beginning at any information
set, off the equilibrium path.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Definition A.5.9 (Perfect bayesian equilibrium). Given a strategy profile s and
a set of beliefs ρ, then the strategy-belief profile (s; ρ) forms a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium iff it satisfies Bayes requirements 1 to 4.
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